Rent-Seeking Game Analysis and Countermeasure Study of Contractors in Various Stages of Construction Projects

2013 ◽  
Vol 405-408 ◽  
pp. 3473-3476
Author(s):  
Cheng Zhi Li ◽  
Feng Peng
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Construction Projects ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Countermeasure Study ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Seeking Behavior

Project quality is affected by many factors,of which the rent-seeking behavior of the contractor is an important one.In this paper,the contractor’s rent-seeking behavior in various stage of construction projects and its effect to social welfare is analyzed based on the game theory and rent-seeking theory.After building a game model among the owner,contractor and supervisor,some suggestions are propounded to forestall such behavior from the point of equilibrium solutions.

Game Analysis on Bulit-In Outsourcing Alliance of Logistics

2013 ◽  
Vol 834-836 ◽  
pp. 1942-1946
Author(s):  
Shou Wen Ji ◽  
Ling Li Li
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Logistics Outsourcing ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Outsourcing Logistics ◽  
General Game

The built-in outsourcing logistics alliance is a new thing compared to other logistics concepts. This paper first makes a game analysis on the bulit-in outsourcing alliance of logistics based on game theory after conducting the research actuality on logistics outsourcing and alliance. According to research and analysis, the game theory is applied to the composition of built-in outsourcing logistics alliance and cooperative game is suitable for the alliance. Then the game analysis of the built-in outsourcing logistics alliance is made, which includes the establishment of a general game model and the game analysis which is suitable for choosing alliance member.

Game Analysis of Preventing Conspiracy in Construction Project

2011 ◽  
Vol 50-51 ◽  
pp. 409-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Chao Feng ◽  
Chun Feng Liu ◽  
Shao Hong Yan ◽  
Ai Min Yang ◽  
Jin Peng Wang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
National Economy ◽  
Construction Project ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Main Body ◽  
Construction Project Management ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Project Management System ◽  
Utility Matrix

With rapid growth of national economy, infrastructure construction maintains its vigorous development, but there are some serious problems in this field, for example, construction unit and supervision unit may conspire together to swindle governmental capital. This paper introduces some background which exists in construction project management system, analyses relation and benefit of project’s tripartite main body, and establishes conspiracy game’s utility matrix of construction unit and supervision unit by introducing game theory. By establishing conspiracy game model between construction unit and supervision unit, the paper mainly discusses conspiracy action which may occur between construction unit and supervision unit (rent-seeking and rent-creating), gets equilibrium probabilities of seeking rent and creating rent, and make some further analysis.

The Analysis of Government Re-Regulation Caused by Externality of Building Energy-Saving

2012 ◽  
Vol 446-449 ◽  
pp. 2267-2271
Author(s):  
Ting Wang ◽  
Qian Li ◽  
Hong Liang Ma
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Energy Saving ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Building Energy ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Seeking Behavior ◽  
Building Energy Saving ◽  
The Government

In this paper, aiming at the problem of “market failure” in the building energy-saving field, we discuss the principle of externality in this field and analyze how the externality of building energy-saving leads to the rent-seeking behavior of building energy-saving products manufacturers or developers using the economic theory. Based on the Game theory, we analyze the revenue and cost of unproductive activities between building energy-saving regulation department and building energy-saving products manufacturers or developers, how the government supervises and regulates corruption which comes from unproductive activities, and the tripartite game model of the rent-seeking behavior in the domain of energy-saving is built. On the basis of the establishment and solution of the tripartite game model，we put forward effective countermeasures and methods for government re-regulation.

The Game Analysis of Rent-Seeking Behavior in the Public Project

2011 ◽  
Vol 94-96 ◽  
pp. 2233-2237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Jiang ◽  
Ying Peng ◽  
Yu Shui Chen
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Public Project ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Static Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Seeking Behavior

Rent-seeking behavior in the public project is a problem which the construction administrative departments at all levels always attach great importance to. This paper analyzed the causes and harms of rent-seeking behavior in the public project. At the same time, according to the hypothesis that supervision department can drive its right impartially, this paper established a tripartite incomplete information static game model in the public project, and then analyzed the own rent-seeking behavior of supervision department, and got the specific measures that could reduce rent-seeking behavior.

Game Analysis on Collusion Tender in the Construction Projects Bidding

2013 ◽  
Vol 357-360 ◽  
pp. 2414-2419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hai Bing Shi ◽  
Xue Wu Li ◽  
Hao Jia Xu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Construction Projects ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Analysis Strategy ◽  
Analysis Models

Causes and main forms of collusion tender in the bidding of construction projects were analyzed. In accordance mainly with the characteristics of the collusion tender, one-off game and repeated game analysis models were established respectively on the two common forms of complementary bid and bid rotation between bidders. They were analyzed with the relevant principles of the game theory. Based on the results of analysis, strategy and measures to collusion tender were proposed from the perspective of the bid inviting party.

Rent-seeking behavior of BIM- and IPD-based construction project in China

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 514-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tingting Mei ◽  
Qiankun Wang ◽  
Yaping Xiao ◽  
Mi Yang
Keyword(s):  
Construction Projects ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Construction Project ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Central China ◽  
Collaborative Management ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Building Information ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Seeking Behavior

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study the rent-seeking behavior of stakeholders in construction projects and to provide a reference for further studies on collaboration in China, which could thus improve the collaborative management in construction and reduce the waste of resources. Design/methodology/approach In this paper, the authors discuss and analyze the current situation of rent-seeking behavior in infrastructure construction projects, integrated project delivery (IPD), and the application of a building information model (BIM) in China. The authors analyze the collusive behavior between the supervision department and the contractor via the rent-seeking model on the basis of the game theory and present that BIM and IPD have a positive impact on rent-seeking activities of construction projects. The key factors influencing the rent-seeking activities from the perspective of the owner are studied via a questionnaire survey. Findings The research status of IPD in China includes the application of IPD, IPD collaborative management and the combination of lean construction (LC), IPD and BIM. The enthusiasm of the adoption of BIM and IPD is higher for design institute, construction units, research institutions and universities. The findings indicate that the owner appears to have a significant influence on stakeholders in construction projects, such as supervising efficiency, rewards and punishment. Therefore, the results also demonstrate that the construction project based on BIM and IPD can effectively avoid the rent-seeking activities of the participants. Research limitations/implications The findings are primarily based on questionnaire data originated from Central China; hence there are some limitations that are worth noting. Practical implications First, it provides compelling data evidence for the adoption of BIM and IPD in China. Second, it paves a solid foundation for the behavior of stakeholders in construction projects based on BIM and IPD. Originality/value In this paper, a game model of contractor, supervisor and owner is established, and a preliminary attempt is made to introduce BIM and IPD into the model for the behavioral research of participants.

scholarly journals Multi-Robot Searching using Game-Theory Based Approach

10.5772/6232 ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Meng
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Programming ◽  
Utility Function ◽  
Real Time ◽  
Dynamic Environment ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Target Searching ◽  
Multi Robot

This paper proposes a game-theory based approach in a multi–target searching using a multi-robot system in a dynamic environment. It is assumed that a rough priori probability map of the targets' distribution within the environment is given. To consider the interaction between the robots, a dynamic-programming equation is proposed to estimate the utility function for each robot. Based on this utility function, a cooperative nonzero-sum game is generated, where both pure Nash Equilibrium and mixed-strategy Equilibrium solutions are presented to achieve an optimal overall robot behaviors. A special consideration has been taken to improve the real-time performance of the game-theory based approach. Several mechanisms, such as event-driven discretization, one-step dynamic programming, and decision buffer, have been proposed to reduce the computational complexity. The main advantage of the algorithm lies in its real-time capabilities whilst being efficient and robust to dynamic environments.

scholarly journals Bidirectional Multi-Input and Multi-Output Energy Equalization Circuit for the Li-Ion Battery String Based on the Game Theory

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiayu Wang ◽  
Shuailong Dai ◽  
Xi Chen ◽  
Xiang Zhang ◽  
Zhifei Shan
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Energy Storage ◽  
Storage Systems ◽  
Output Energy ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Li Ion Battery ◽  
Energy Storage Systems ◽  
Static Game ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Li Ion

Energy inconsistency among Li-ion battery cells widely exists in energy storage systems, which contributes to the continuous deterioration of the system durability and overall performance. Researchers have proposed various kinds of battery energy equalizers to reduce such inconsistency. Among them, the inductor equalizer is a predominant type in fast equalization applications. However, it requires relatively more complex control than other types of equalizers. In order to reduce the control complexity of inductor equalizers, a bidirectional multi-input and multi-output energy equalization circuit based on the game theory is proposed in the present work. The proposed equalizer has the modularized circuit topology and the mutually independent working principle. A static game model is developed and exploited for the mathematical description and control analysis of an energy equalization circuit comprised of these equalizers. The feasible control of each equalizer was obtained by solving a series of linear equations for the Nash Equilibrium of the model among the states of charge of the battery cells. The complexity of equations grows linearly with the cell number. The equivalent simulation model for the four-cell equalization is established in the PISM software, where the operational data and simulation results justify the static game model and verify the control validation, respectively. It is concluded that the proposed inductor equalizer is suitable for large-scale battery strings in energy storage systems, electrical vehicles, and new energy power generation applications.

Model of Intrusion Detection Based on the Game Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 347-350 ◽  
pp. 3971-3974 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heng Xiao ◽  
Cao Fang Long
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Network Security ◽  
Intrusion Detection ◽  
Working Group ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Network Application ◽  
Stage Game

With the development of network application, network security is facing greater pressure. Based on the characteristics of intrusion detection in the wireless network of the Ad hoc working group, the article introduces the game theory, proposes a game model of network security, concluds the Nash equilibrium in the stage game, repeats game, the pareto Nash equilibrium, more attack both income and payment, so that they get the best choice.

scholarly journals Game Analysis of Google’s Information Dissemination Strategy in China

2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 35
Author(s):  
Bojan Obrenovic ◽  
Slobodan Obrenovic
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Information Dissemination ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Chinese Market ◽  
Dissemination Strategy ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Foreign Countries ◽  
Regulation Policy ◽  
The Game Theory

This paper addresses the issues that arise when corporations are required to make strategic choices regarding operation in foreign countries with diverse socio-political systems and culture, while taking into consideration all the relevant stakeholders, which ultimately affects the corporations’ current and future payoffs. Using the game theory principles we focus on Google’s internet search operations in China, particularly information dissemination decisions, and we examine how Google’s decisions affect the corporation’s success on the Chinese market, which is additionally determined by the information regulation policy of the Chinese authorities. In view of the fact that goals of Google and Chinese authorities are partially overlapping and partially conflicting this perfect information game contains both competitive and cooperative elements. In this paper we will argue that for Google or any other company in the equal situation the best strategic choice would be to respect and follow the laws and restrictions set by the authorities of the country in which the company chooses to operate. Finally, an analysis is completed through determining the optimal strategy for Google and Chinese authorities and finding the equilibrium point.

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