scholarly journals Research on C2C E-Commerce Taxation Based on Mixed Decision Game

2022 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Jiamian Yu ◽  
Haiyan Yu
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Tax Revenue ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Rapid Rise ◽  
Progressive Taxation ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Tax Neutrality ◽  
Balance Of Interests ◽  
Collection And Management

The rapid rise of C2C e-commerce in China has brought serious difficulties to China's tax collection and management. Based on the principle of progressive taxation, the necessity of Taxation on C2C e-commerce is analyzed and discussed. It is shown that the absence of Taxation in C2C e-commerce is contrary to the principle of tax equity and tax neutrality, and the tax revenue is lost.It is demonstrated that it is imperative that China to implement C2C e-commerce taxation in a comprehensive and standardized way. By constructing a hybrid decision game model between C2C business operators and tax authorities, the static game analysis of incomplete information is conducted for the balance of interests between tax authorities and e-commerce operators.

Research on C2C e-commerce taxation based on mixed decision game

2022 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 0-0
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Tax Revenue ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Rapid Rise ◽  
Progressive Taxation ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Tax Neutrality ◽  
Balance Of Interests ◽  
Collection And Management

The rapid rise of C2C e-commerce in China has brought serious difficulties to China's tax collection and management. Based on the principle of progressive taxation, the necessity of Taxation on C2C e-commerce is analyzed and discussed. It is shown that the absence of Taxation in C2C e-commerce is contrary to the principle of tax equity and tax neutrality, and the tax revenue is lost.It is demonstrated that it is imperative that China to implement C2C e-commerce taxation in a comprehensive and standardized way. By constructing a hybrid decision game model between C2C business operators and tax authorities, the static game analysis of incomplete information is conducted for the balance of interests between tax authorities and e-commerce operators.

The Game Analysis of Rent-Seeking Behavior in the Public Project

2011 ◽  
Vol 94-96 ◽  
pp. 2233-2237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Jiang ◽  
Ying Peng ◽  
Yu Shui Chen
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Public Project ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Static Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Seeking Behavior

Rent-seeking behavior in the public project is a problem which the construction administrative departments at all levels always attach great importance to. This paper analyzed the causes and harms of rent-seeking behavior in the public project. At the same time, according to the hypothesis that supervision department can drive its right impartially, this paper established a tripartite incomplete information static game model in the public project, and then analyzed the own rent-seeking behavior of supervision department, and got the specific measures that could reduce rent-seeking behavior.

The Analysis of Willingness to Cooperate for Farmers to Participate in Water Management Based on Game Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 448-453 ◽  
pp. 1002-1010
Author(s):  
Cong Liu
Keyword(s):  
Water Management ◽  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Collective Rationality ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Evolution Analysis ◽  
Prisoners Dilemma ◽  
Willingness To Cooperate

To analyze the willingness to cooperate of farmers to participate in water management, we base on game theory and first carry on single static game analysis of willingness to cooperate for farmers to participate in water management, and find that farmers are into a Prisoners Dilemma in a single game, individual rationality comes into conflict with collective rationality, at this time farmers have a tendency to "free riders", so it is difficult to achieve cooperation between the farmers. Then trying to break the prisoners' dilemma, we carry on the farmers repeated dynamic game, the analysis is carried on in the context of incomplete information and limited rationality, we carry on game evolution analysis for willingness to cooperate for farmers to participate in water management. In order to guarantee the rationality of the study, we conduct a survey of willingness to cooperate of farmers to participate in water management in province of Zhejiang and finally confirm that the study is reasonable. And through the analysis of the full text, we conclude six important conclusions.

Evolutionary game analysis of information sharing by institutional investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Relationship Network ◽  
The Relationship

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.

A Static Game Study between Food Enterprises Based on Value Perception Differences of Food Quality and Safety

2013 ◽  
Vol 791-793 ◽  
pp. 2171-2174
Author(s):  
Yuan Fen Yin ◽  
Yun Deng ◽  
Xiu Li Sang
Keyword(s):  
Food Quality ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Quality And Safety ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Safety Issues ◽  
Value Perception ◽  
Safety Mechanism ◽  
Psychology And Economics ◽  
Food Quality And Safety ◽  
Food Market

Behavior strategy of food enterprises exerts a direct influence on food quality and safety. Against the backdrop of value perception differences on food quality and safety between different food enterprises, this paper establishes a static game model and based on prospect theory, explores the reasons for food quality and safety issues in our food market from the perspectives of psychology and economics. Finally, it presents a more scientific food quality and safety mechanism and countermeasures.

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