Research of Cascade Reservoirs Flood Limit Level Dynamic Control Based on Game Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 748 ◽  
pp. 1160-1163
Author(s):  
Ying Ji Xuan ◽  
Jiang Song Xu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Control ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Control Model ◽  
Level Control ◽  
Water Utilization ◽  
Cascade Reservoirs ◽  
Generating Capacity ◽  
Information Dynamic

This paper proposes a cascade reservoir flood limit level control model based on complete information dynamic game. By solving the model, the result shows that under the premise of ensuring flood safety, this equalization scheme will increase generating capacity, guaranteed output, and improve water utilization, effectively solve the conflict between flood protection and conservation.

scholarly journals Centralized and Decentralized Recycle Policy with Transboundary Pollution

Environments ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (5) ◽  
pp. 40
Author(s):  
Chien-Hui Lee ◽  
Po-Sheng Ko ◽  
Yu-Lin Wang ◽  
Jen-Yao Lee ◽  
Jiong-Hung Kwo
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Spillover Effect ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Local Conditions ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Information Dynamic

In this study, under the existence of unilateral cross-border environmental pollution in two regions, a complete information dynamic game theory is constructed to discuss the environmental policy (recycling fee and treatment subsidy) formulation of the central government by two local governments. As a result, it was found that the spillover effect will reduce the level of social welfare. At the same time, the intervention of the central government and the adoption of policies tailored to local conditions will be conducive to the improvement of social welfare.

scholarly journals Modeling the Role of Government, Firm, and Civil Society for Environmental Sustainability

2020 ◽  
pp. 62-83
Author(s):  
Humaira Yasmeen ◽  
Ying Wang ◽  
Hashim Zameer ◽  
Hina Ismail
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Environmental Responsibility ◽  
Role Of Government ◽  
The Government

The objective of this article is to design a game theory-based model to outline the role of the government, firm and civil society for environmental sustainability. The study used the dynamic game theory of complete information. Based upon the equilibrium analysis, the study highlights that when the punishment for non-compliance with environmental responsibility is smaller, the role of civil society would be higher for environmental sustainability. On the other hand, when the environmental responsibility cost is higher, then the role of a government is also higher for the implementation of environmental responsibility and to ensure the punishment. However, the authors found from model analysis that if the cost is low, the probability of firm to fulfill environmental responsibility is higher. In real life, the high cost of environmental responsibility is the main reason that the firm does not fulfill environmental responsibility. Under the high cost, the firm often has the phenomenon of bribery to the government and other means to avoid environmental responsibility. This article is a valuable policy guide for policy makers to cope with global environmental challenges.

An Advanced Dynamic Secondary Cooling Control Model for Bloom Castings

2010 ◽  
Vol 154-155 ◽  
pp. 171-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhan Guang Han ◽  
Jia Quan Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Control ◽  
Casting Process ◽  
Feedback System ◽  
Control Model ◽  
Secondary Cooling ◽  
Level Control ◽  
Online Application ◽  
Cooling Control ◽  
Surface Temperatures ◽  
The Difference

For bloom casting, typical quality defects such as midway crack usually occur upon improper cooling control during non-steady casting conditions specially for the production specialty steels,. A key measure to eliminate the defects formation has been presented by the adoption of more sophisticated secondary cooling strategies to balance the surface reheating due to casting speed fluctuation. With the consideration of the complex casting conditions and the characteristics of bloom casters, a dynamic control model for the secondary cooling has been developed in the paper to obtain a reasonable temperature profile and solidification progress for the bloom casting process, which is based on a slice residence time method combined with a multi-level control strategy. The feedback system, based on the difference between the calculated surface temperatures and the predetermined or measured surface temperatures, has been integrated into two-dimensional thermal model. The interlocking protection system between level-1 and level-2 is included in the model together with the data diagnosis and processing. Furthermore, the control model also offers technological interface for the introduction of new steel grades in production and the related modification to the secondary cooling parameters. It is shown from online application that the dynamic control system of secondary cooling for bloom casting is robust during operation and adaptable to any change of real casting conditions. Sound quality bloom castings according to acid etched tests have been obtained from the caster accordingly.

The Energy-Saving Management System Design of Major Projects in Implementation

2014 ◽  
Vol 919-921 ◽  
pp. 1739-1743
Author(s):  
Wei Li ◽  
Ming Yuan Ma ◽  
Hong Tu Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Energy Saving ◽  
Management System ◽  
Design Theory ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Management Mechanism ◽  
Rational Management ◽  
The Government ◽  
Information Dynamic ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

The energy-saving management system of major projects in implementation has always been in a state of imperfect. On the basis of combining energy-saving management status of major projects in implementation, referring to the research results of the management mechanism design theory at home and abroad, this paper aims at the primary interest-related subjects of the major projects energy-saving, uses economic mechanism designing theory and incentive theory, designs the energy-saving management mechanism; It does the theoretical analysis of the government and major projects owner with the complete information dynamic game model, then, provides decision evidence for the government to formulate the rational management intensity and maximize the interests of all parties. At last, the paper provides the suggestions to solve the existing problems of major projects energy-saving management.

scholarly journals A Game Theoretic Study of Enterprise Mergers and Acquisitions: The Case of RJR Nabisco Being Acquired by KKR

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Yanqing Jiang ◽  
Jian Yuan ◽  
Mengmeng Zeng
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Micro Level ◽  
Information Dynamic

There are both macro- and micro-level studies concerning enterprise mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Past studies have focused on M&A valuation, utility of the M&A motives and the strategic behavior during of the M&A process. Few game theory methods in the application of M&A stay mostly in the analysis of Nash equilibrium under the complete information static game. This paper thus aims to analyze the M&A behavior of enterprises within the framework of incomplete information dynamic game, combined with sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of complete information dynamic game and Bayesian Nash equilibrium of incomplete information.

scholarly journals Modeling the Role of Government, Firm, and Civil Society for Environmental Sustainability

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 82-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Humaira Yasmeen ◽  
Ying Wang ◽  
Hashim Zameer ◽  
Hina Ismail
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Environmental Responsibility ◽  
The Government

The objective of this article is to design a game theory-based model to outline the role of the government, firm and civil society for environmental sustainability. The study used the dynamic game theory of complete information. Based upon the equilibrium analysis, the study highlights that when the punishment for non-compliance with environmental responsibility is smaller, the role of civil society would be higher for environmental sustainability. On the other hand, when the environmental responsibility cost is higher, then the role of a government is also higher for the implementation of environmental responsibility and to ensure the punishment. However, the authors found from model analysis that if the cost is low, the probability of firm to fulfill environmental responsibility is higher. In real life, the high cost of environmental responsibility is the main reason that the firm does not fulfill environmental responsibility. Under the high cost, the firm often has the phenomenon of bribery to the government and other means to avoid environmental responsibility. This article is a valuable policy guide for policy makers to cope with global environmental challenges.

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