scholarly journals Centralized and Decentralized Recycle Policy with Transboundary Pollution

Environments ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (5) ◽  
pp. 40
Author(s):  
Chien-Hui Lee ◽  
Po-Sheng Ko ◽  
Yu-Lin Wang ◽  
Jen-Yao Lee ◽  
Jiong-Hung Kwo
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Spillover Effect ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Local Conditions ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Information Dynamic

In this study, under the existence of unilateral cross-border environmental pollution in two regions, a complete information dynamic game theory is constructed to discuss the environmental policy (recycling fee and treatment subsidy) formulation of the central government by two local governments. As a result, it was found that the spillover effect will reduce the level of social welfare. At the same time, the intervention of the central government and the adoption of policies tailored to local conditions will be conducive to the improvement of social welfare.

Research of Cascade Reservoirs Flood Limit Level Dynamic Control Based on Game Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 748 ◽  
pp. 1160-1163
Author(s):  
Ying Ji Xuan ◽  
Jiang Song Xu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Control ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Control Model ◽  
Level Control ◽  
Water Utilization ◽  
Cascade Reservoirs ◽  
Generating Capacity ◽  
Information Dynamic

This paper proposes a cascade reservoir flood limit level control model based on complete information dynamic game. By solving the model, the result shows that under the premise of ensuring flood safety, this equalization scheme will increase generating capacity, guaranteed output, and improve water utilization, effectively solve the conflict between flood protection and conservation.

scholarly journals «Double First-Class» Project Implementation: The Influence of Local Government in China

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 75-86
Author(s):  
Xin Fangkun ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Spillover Effect ◽  
Core Competitiveness ◽  
University Development ◽  
Left Behind ◽  
Class Project ◽  
The Matthew Effect ◽  
The Core Competitiveness ◽  
Class Construction

This paper discusses the influence of local governments over the realization of «Double First-Class» project in China. Based on the qualitative analysis of 36 universities’ mid-term reports, the spillover effect on local economic and social development was found to be enhancing the core competitiveness of local governments. Text analysis of eight local governments’ «Double First-Class» implementation reports showed that the way of their promoting the «Double First-Class» construction were investment and talent introduction. The local participation in the «Double First-Class» competition under the constraint of national financial resources leads to the Matthew effect of university development. Universities selected for «Double First-Class» will get more resources and develop better, while other universities will be left behind. Therefore, the central government needs to intervene the competition of local governments.

scholarly journals “In Accordance with Local Conditions”: Policy Design and Implementation of Agrarian Change Policies in Rural China

2016 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
René Trappel
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Policy Design ◽  
Rural China ◽  
Agrarian Change ◽  
The Political ◽  
Local Conditions ◽  
Cognitive Framework ◽  
Chinese Agriculture ◽  
Leading Cadres

An important part of Beijing's strategy to reduce the welfare gap between urban and rural parts of China has been the promotion of urbanisation. Replacing peasant agriculture with commercial operations of scale is an integral part of this endeavour. This article analyses the implementation of policies meant to transform the structure of Chinese agriculture. It argues that the central government is using a set of very flexible policies, project-based implementation and adaption to local conditions to guide and support an existing dynamic of structural transformation in agriculture. Local governments, in turn, appreciate the flexibility, the political predictability, the potential revenue improvements and the cognitive framework inherent in these programmes. The article is primarily based on interviews with leading cadres at the township and county levels in the provinces of Shandong, Sichuan and Guizhou between 2008 and 2010.

scholarly journals Modeling the Role of Government, Firm, and Civil Society for Environmental Sustainability

2020 ◽  
pp. 62-83
Author(s):  
Humaira Yasmeen ◽  
Ying Wang ◽  
Hashim Zameer ◽  
Hina Ismail
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Environmental Responsibility ◽  
Role Of Government ◽  
The Government

The objective of this article is to design a game theory-based model to outline the role of the government, firm and civil society for environmental sustainability. The study used the dynamic game theory of complete information. Based upon the equilibrium analysis, the study highlights that when the punishment for non-compliance with environmental responsibility is smaller, the role of civil society would be higher for environmental sustainability. On the other hand, when the environmental responsibility cost is higher, then the role of a government is also higher for the implementation of environmental responsibility and to ensure the punishment. However, the authors found from model analysis that if the cost is low, the probability of firm to fulfill environmental responsibility is higher. In real life, the high cost of environmental responsibility is the main reason that the firm does not fulfill environmental responsibility. Under the high cost, the firm often has the phenomenon of bribery to the government and other means to avoid environmental responsibility. This article is a valuable policy guide for policy makers to cope with global environmental challenges.

scholarly journals Housing Rental Incentive and Development Empirical Analysis from the Perspective of Financial Decentralization

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Xuanxuan Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Financial Support ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Transmission Mechanism ◽  
Healthy Development ◽  
Rental Market ◽  
Local Support ◽  
Implementation Effect

This study aims to evaluate and analyze the implementation effect by central government of the housing rental market in different cities in the context of rent and purchase in parallel. Game theory and panel data empirical analysis were used to study the subsidy transmission mechanism of the development of the housing rental market under the perspective of financial decentralization. The central finance played an indirect role in the development of the local housing rental market, and the local government’s support for the local housing rental market was an intermediary variable. To promote the rapid and healthy development of the domestic housing rental market, the central government needs to make top-level design and give certain local policies and financial support. At the same time, local governments must actively implement relevant policies of the central government and support corresponding local support policies.

The Center’s Distributive Strategy and Fund Allocation

2020 ◽  
pp. 86-110
Author(s):  
Xian Huang
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Welfare Provision ◽  
Fund Allocation ◽  
Fiscal Transfers ◽  
Important Means ◽  
And Behaviors ◽  
Primary Materials

Chapter 4 focuses on Chinese central leaders (the Center) and their distributive strategy and behaviors in providing social welfare. The deliberations and calculations reflected in the central leaders’ speeches between 1998 and 2011 show that the stratified expansion of social welfare was the Center’s most preferred model for social welfare provision in this period. Various internal speeches and communication revealed the hidden concern and measures taken to maintain the elites’ welfare privileges and benefits during the welfare expansion. Careful reading of the primary materials also suggests that the Center’s fiscal transfers to local governments were an important means for maintaining the welfare privileges of elite groups (e.g., civil servants, public-sector and SOE formal employees). This chapter later analyzes the central-to-local fiscal transfers from 1999 to 2010 and finds that the larger the elite groups in a province, the greater were the fiscal transfers the province received from the central government.

The Energy-Saving Management System Design of Major Projects in Implementation

2014 ◽  
Vol 919-921 ◽  
pp. 1739-1743
Author(s):  
Wei Li ◽  
Ming Yuan Ma ◽  
Hong Tu Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Energy Saving ◽  
Management System ◽  
Design Theory ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Management Mechanism ◽  
Rational Management ◽  
The Government ◽  
Information Dynamic ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

The energy-saving management system of major projects in implementation has always been in a state of imperfect. On the basis of combining energy-saving management status of major projects in implementation, referring to the research results of the management mechanism design theory at home and abroad, this paper aims at the primary interest-related subjects of the major projects energy-saving, uses economic mechanism designing theory and incentive theory, designs the energy-saving management mechanism; It does the theoretical analysis of the government and major projects owner with the complete information dynamic game model, then, provides decision evidence for the government to formulate the rational management intensity and maximize the interests of all parties. At last, the paper provides the suggestions to solve the existing problems of major projects energy-saving management.

scholarly journals A Game Theoretic Study of Enterprise Mergers and Acquisitions: The Case of RJR Nabisco Being Acquired by KKR

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Yanqing Jiang ◽  
Jian Yuan ◽  
Mengmeng Zeng
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Micro Level ◽  
Information Dynamic

There are both macro- and micro-level studies concerning enterprise mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Past studies have focused on M&A valuation, utility of the M&A motives and the strategic behavior during of the M&A process. Few game theory methods in the application of M&A stay mostly in the analysis of Nash equilibrium under the complete information static game. This paper thus aims to analyze the M&A behavior of enterprises within the framework of incomplete information dynamic game, combined with sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of complete information dynamic game and Bayesian Nash equilibrium of incomplete information.

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