La Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo: il divieto di eterologa non viola la Convenzione europea sui diritti umani Nota in margine alla sentenza della Grande Camera del 3 novembre 2011

2012 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina Casini

Il contributo prende in esame la sentenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo emanata dalla Grande Camera il 3 novembre 2011 (caso S.H. et Al.v. Austria n. 57813/00). Essa va ad arricchire positivamente il panorama biogiuridico europeo. La sentenza in oggetto riguarda il giudizio instaurato nei confronti dell’Austria, a proposito della disciplina che pone il divieto di fecondazione artificiale eterologa. Nella sentenza, resa in via definitiva, la Grande Camera ha superato, ribaltandolo, il giudizio espresso dalla Camera semplice il 1° aprile 2011, affermando che il divieto di fecondazione artificiale eterologa, contenuto nella legge austriaca, non contrasta con gli artt. 8 (diritto alla vita privata e familiare) e 14 (principio di non discriminazione) della Convenzione europea per la salvaguardia dei diritti e delle libertà fondamentali. La Corte non affronta le questioni bioetiche e biogiuridiche sollevate dalla fecondazione artificiale eterologa (si pensi al diritto del figlio all’unitarietà delle figure genitoriali), ma salva la legge austriaca facendo riferimento alla dottrina del c.d. “margine di apprezzamento” degli Stati membri. È auspicabile comunque che la sentenza influisca sul giudizio di costituzionalità in ordine al divieto di eterologa contenuto nella legge italiana. Nella prospettiva di valorizzare la voce degli Stati, merita sostegno iniziativa cittadina europea promossa ai sensi dell’art. 11 del Trattato di Lisbona per riconoscere il diritto alla vita di ogni essere umano fin dal concepimento. ---------- The article considers the decision of the European Court of Human Rights given by the Grand Chamber on November 3rd 2011 (case S.H. et Al. vs. Austria, application n. 57181/00). This ruling, which adds an important contribution to European Biolaw, concerns the Austrian law that prohibits heterologous artificial human reproduction and reversed the previous ruling (April, 1st, 2011) by the lower chamber of the European Court. So, the Grand Chamber affirmed that the ban on heterologous artificial reproduction does not violate article 8 (Right to respect for private and family life) and article 14 (Prohibition of discrimination) of Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Grand Chamber did not address the bioethical questions raised by heterologous artificial reproduction, but confirmed the law by referring to the theory of a “wide margin of appreciation” of member States. It is to be hoped that this decision will carry weight with the Italian Constitutional Court when it considers the Italian law prohibiting heterologous artificial reproduction. With regard to valorizing the beliefs of the member States, it would be good to support the European citizen’s initiative, promoted following article 11 of the Lisbon Treaty, to recognize the right to life of every human being from conception.


2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-323 ◽  
Author(s):  
H.G. Hoogers

On March 16, 2006, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its final judgment in the case of Tatjana Ždanoka against the Republic of Latvia. Although not the first decision under Article 3 of the first Protocol, the Ždanoka v. Latvia case was important, because it allowed the Court to come to a decision on an aspect of Article 3, first Protocol, which in earlier case law had not extensively been dealt with by the ECtHR: the right to be elected. Moreover, the case allowed the Court to make some statements of principle on another question with which numerous member states of the Council have been dealing throughout the 20th century: how far may a democracy go in protecting itself from (allegedly) undemocratic parties, groups or individuals?



2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-201
Author(s):  
Giulia Angiolini

The purpose of this paper is to try to analyse the Italian regulation of accused persons’ remote participation in criminal proceedings. The interest in this matter arises from the suspected frictions of the provisions at hand with fundamental rights to be guaranteed for a fair trial. These suspicions, aroused right after the introduction of the institute in Italian law, have been increased by the recent reform of the discipline of remote participation, and they become even clearer after a comparison of Italian regulation with those of other European Countries. Hence, an inescapable question occurs: will the European Court of Human Rights and the Italian Constitutional Court save the new regulation as they did with the previous one?



Author(s):  
Yaroslav Skoromnyy ◽  

The article presents the conceptual foundations of bringing judges to civil and legal liability. It was found that the civil and legal liability of judges is one of the types of legal liability of judges. It is determined that the legislation of Ukraine provides for a clearly delineated list of the main cases (grounds) for which the state is liable for damages for damage caused to a legal entity and an individual by illegal actions of a judge as a result of the administration of justice. It has been proved that bringing judges to civil and legal liability, in particular on the basis of the right of recourse, provides for the payment of just compensation in accordance with the decision of the European Court of Human Rights. It was established that the bringing of judges to civil and legal liability in Ukraine is regulated by such legislative documents as the Constitution of Ukraine, the Civil Code of Ukraine, the Explanatory Note to the European Charter on the Status of Judges (Model Code), the Law of Ukraine «On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges», the Law of Ukraine «On the procedure for compensation for harm caused to a citizen by illegal actions of bodies carrying out operational-search activities, pre-trial investigation bodies, prosecutors and courts», Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the case on the constitutional submission of the Supreme Court of Ukraine regarding the compliance of the Constitution of Ukraine (constitutionality) of certain provisions of Article 2, paragraph two of clause II «Final and transitional provisions» of the Law of Ukraine «On measures to legislatively ensure the reform of the pension system», Article 138 of the Law of Ukraine «On the judicial system and the status of judges» (the case on changes in the conditions for the payment of pensions and monthly living known salaries of judges lagging behind in these), the Law of Ukraine «On the implementation of decisions and the application of the practice of the European Court of Human Rights».



2013 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori G. Beaman

Moreover, with the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to identify in the constant central core of Christian faith, despite the inquisition, despite anti-Semitism and despite the crusades, the principles of human dignity, tolerance and freedom, including religious freedom, and therefore, in the last analysis, the foundations of the secular State.A European court should not be called upon to bankrupt centuries of European tradition. No court, certainly not this Court, should rob the Italians of part of their cultural personality.In March, 2011, after five years of working its way through various levels of national and European courts, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights decided that a crucifix hanging at the front of a classroom did not violate the right to religious freedom under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Specifically, Ms. Soile Lautsi had complained that the presence of the crucifix violated her and her children's right to religious freedom and that its presence amounted to an enforced religious regime. The Grand Chamber, reversing the lower Chamber's decision, held that while admittedly a religious symbol, the crucifix also represented the cultural heritage of Italians.



Pravni zapisi ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 620-644
Author(s):  
Tamás Korhecz

The right to peaceful enjoyment of property is a first-generation human right, protected by the international and domestic law of the highest rank. This is not an absolute right - the European standards of protecting property rights allow possible interferences prescribed by law. The interferences can be made in the public interest but only under the assumption that the proportionality between the public interest and property rights of individuals at stake is established. Forfeiture of undeclared cash the individuals are transferring across state borders, together with imposing fines for a misdemeanor, represent an interference with individuals' property rights. The EU Member States do not share an identical system of sanctions for this petty offense, but there is a tendency of unification related to the monitoring, registering, and sanctioning of undeclared, cross-border, individual cash transfer. The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights has established rather precise criteria for distinguishing permitted from unpermitted interferences in cases of undeclared cross-border cash transfers. The Serbian Constitutional Court has been faced with several constitutional complaints regarding alleged unconstitutionally of the imposed security measure amounting to the forfeiture of undeclared cash physically transferred across the state borders. The Constitutional Court has ruled inconsistently on the matter. Although it has regularly referred to the European Court of Human Rights' relevant decisions, it fails to be consistent in following the Strasbourg Court's rulings. In this article, the author has suggested that the legal certainty principle requires the Constitutional Court to consistently interpret the constitutional rights and be systematic in following Strasbourg. Only in this way, the Constitutional Court can help regular courts effectively to harmonize the interpretation and application of laws with the constitutional and international human rights standards regarding property rights.



2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 342-362
Author(s):  
Ergul Celiksoy

In November 2018, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the case of Beuze v Belgium. Relying on Ibrahim and Others v the United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber held that the Salduz principles require a two-stage test of analysis, and hence, ruled out that systematic statutory restriction of a general and mandatory nature would in itself constitute an automatic violation of Article 6 § 3(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the Beuze judgment appears to be very controversial, since the Grand Chamber failed to put forward any convincing reason why it departed from previous case law, particularly Dayanan v Turkey and other judgments against Turkey. In their separate opinion, the concurring Judges in Beuze were concerned that the Beuze judgment overruled ‘ Salduz itself and all other cases that have applied the Salduz test’, and thus, ‘actually distorts and changes the Salduz principle and devalues the right that the Court established previously’. This article analyses the Beuze judgment in the light of the Court’s recent jurisprudence in order to examine whether it contradicts and dilutes the principles previously set out. Further, it discusses the implications of the new standards established in Ibrahim and Others and in subsequent cases, particularly Beuze. Particular attention is paid to the questions of how ‘fair’ is the application of overall fairness assessment in every case, how may the Court’s changing direction of approach concerning the right to access to a lawyer affect the increasing trend of recognition thereof, as a rule, by the contracting states, and finally, to what extent the new principles, especially those established in Beuze, comply with Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer.



2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (2) ◽  
pp. 417-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irini Papanicolopulu

In a unanimous judgment in the case Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (Court) held that Italy’s “push back” operations interdicting intending migrants and refugees at sea and returning them to Libya amounted to a violation of the prohibition of torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR or Convention), the prohibition of collective expulsions under Article 4 of Protocol 4 to the Convention, and the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the Convention. Hirsi Jamaa is the Court’s first judgment on the interception of migrants at sea and it addresses issues concerning the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, as well as the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.



Author(s):  
Silvia DEL SAZ

LABURPENA: Giza Eskubideen Europako Auzitegiaren jurisprudentziaren ondorioz, Konstituzio Auzitegiak aurreko doktrina zuzendu behar izan du. Horretarako, errugabetasun-presuntziorako eskubidearen irismena zabaldu behar izan du, eta, administrazio-ebazpen zehatzaileetatik eta zigor-epaietatik harago, kalte-ordaina ukatzen duten erabakietara zabaldu du hori, Botere Judizialaren Lege Organikoaren 294. artikuluak eskatzen duen bezalaxe, errugabetasun-presuntzioaren printzipioa ezarri ostean akusatua absolbitu egin den baina delituzko egintzak egon ez zirela frogatu ez den kasuetarako. RESUMEN: Fruto de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, el Tribunal Constitucional se ha visto obligado a rectificar su doctrina anterior extendiendo el alcance del derecho a la presunción de inocencia, más allá de las resoluciones administrativas sancionadoras y sentencias penales, a los pronunciamientos que, tal y como exige el art. 294 LOPJ, deniegan la indemnización en atención a que el acusado fue absuelto en aplicación del principio de presunción de inocencia sin que haya quedado probado que los hechos delictivos no existieron. ABSTRACT: As a result of the case law by the European Court of Human Rights, the Constitutional Court was compelled to rectify its former doctrine by broadening the scope of the right to the presumption of innocence beyond punitive administrative resolutions and criminal judgments to rulings that as art. 294 of Judiciary Act requires, deny the award of damages on the ground that the accused was acquitted due to the application of the principle of innocence without having been proved that the criminal offences did not exist.



2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Schorkopf

On 12 December 2001, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights unanimously found the case Bankovic et al. vs. 17 NATO and ECHR- Member States (NATO Bombing Case) inadmissible.



2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 1746-1763 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Lucy Cooper

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been considering whether same-sex couples should have the rights to marry and to be recognized as a family under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) for over thirty years. In the 1980s the European Commission of Human Rights (the Commission) and the ECtHR respectively rejected the notion that same-sex relationships constituted a “family life” under Article 8 of the ECHR, and that post-operative transgendered persons had the right to marry under Article 12. However, throughout the 1990s and the first decade of the new millennium, the ECtHR handed down a body of judgments that incrementally liberalized these rights (albeit not always smoothly) in favor of LGBT persons. This evolution culminated in part on 24 June 2010, when the ECtHR passed judgment inSchalk and Kopf v. Austria.In that case the First Section of the ECtHR made a number of major, but seemingly contradictory rulings. For the first time in its history, the ECtHR ruled that same-sex relationships expressly constitute a “family life” under Article 8, and that the right to marry under Article 12 was not confined to opposite-sex couples in “all circumstances.” However, the ECtHR simultaneously ruled that Member States are under no obligation to protect that “family life,” by providing same-sex couples with access to marriage under Article 12, or an alternative registration system under Articles 8 and 14. The Grand Chamber denied the applicants' subsequent request for a referral.



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