Decentralized Dual channel Supply Chain Optimization Based on Stackelberg Game Model

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (7) ◽  
pp. 223-229
Author(s):  
Yong Ming WANG ◽  
Hong Li YIN ◽  
Kai Da QIN
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Supply Chain Optimization ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

scholarly journals The Impacts of Fairness Concern and Different Business Objectives on the Complexity of Dual-Channel Value Chains

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiuxiang Li ◽  
Yuhao Zhang ◽  
Yimin Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Chaotic State ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
High Level ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This paper considers a Stackelberg game model in a dual-channel supply chain, which is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer and retailer consider fairness concern in the market competition, and the manufacturer takes market share and profit as his/her business objectives. The entropy complexity and dynamic characteristic of the dual-channel system are analyzed through mathematical analysis and numerical simulation, such as local stability, bifurcation, entropy, and chaos. The results show that, with the increase of price adjustment speed, the dual-channel supply chain is more complex and falls into a chaotic state in which system entropy increases; the stability of the dual-channel supply chain will be robust with the increase of weight of market share and weaken with the increase of the fairness concern level of the manufacturer and retailer. The high level of fairness concern of the manufacturer and retailer is always disadvantageous to the leading manufacturer but not always bad for the follower retailer. The performance of the dual-channel supply chain is improved with a high level of the manufacturer’s fairness concern and reduced with a high level of the retailer’s fairness concern. We also find the retailer will gain more profits in the chaotic state than the stable state in the Stackelberg game model. The variable feedback control method is applied to control the chaos of the dual-channel supply chain, and choosing appropriate control parameters can make the dual-channel supply chain system return to the stable state from the chaotic state, or delay the system to enter the bifurcation state. The research results can provide a guideline for enterprise decision-making.

scholarly journals Study on Emission Reduction Strategies of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Green Finance

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheng Che ◽  
Yi Chen ◽  
Xiaoguang Zhang ◽  
Liangyan Zhao ◽  
Peng Guo ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Green Finance ◽  
Emission Reduction Strategies ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

As a weapon for economic development, green finance plays an important supporting and promoting role in the economic recovery and transformation of enterprises in the post-epidemic era. By constructing a dual-channel supply chain model, this paper considers two situations in which manufacturers participate in carbon trading and green finance loans, and uses Stackelberg game to study the impact of different situations on participants’ profits and emission reduction decisions. The results show that: under the carbon trading mechanism, the carbon emission reduction level of the manufacturer is inversely proportional to the relevant price, and the demand and profit of the two channels increase with the increase in emission reduction; when carbon trading and green financial loans are carried out at the same time, participants have lower profits, but with the increase in emission reductions, it is still a growing trend.

scholarly journals Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chain with a Fair Caring Retailer

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lufeng Dai ◽  
Xifu Wang ◽  
Xiaoguang Liu ◽  
Lai Wei
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Channel Competition ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

Manufacturers add online direct channels that inevitably engage in channel competition with offline retail channels. Since price is an important factor in consumers' choice of purchasing channel, pricing strategy has become a popular topic for research on dual-channel competition and coordination. In contrast to previous research on pricing strategies based on the full rationality of members, we focus on the impact of retailers' fairness concerns on pricing strategies. In this study, the hybrid dual-channel supply chain consists of one manufacturer with a direct channel who acts as the leader and a retailer who acts as the follower. First, we use the Stackelberg game approach to determine the equilibrium pricing strategy for a fair caring retailer. Simultaneously, we consider a centralized dual-channel supply chain as the benchmark for a comparative analysis of the efficiency of a decentralized supply chain. Furthermore, we study pricing strategies when the retailer has fairness concerns and determine the complete equilibrium solutions for different ranges of the parameters representing cross-price sensitivity and fairness. Finally, through numerical experiments, the pricing strategies, the profit and utility of the manufacturer and retailer, and the channel efficiency of the supply chain are compared and analysed for two scenarios. We find that fairness concerns reduce the manufacturer's profits, while for the most part, the retailers’ profit can be improved; however, the supply chain cannot achieve complete coordination.

Competition and Coordination in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain With Asymmetric Retailers

2020 ◽  
pp. 1311-1328
Author(s):  
YuHang Zhang ◽  
Ying Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Single Channel ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Market ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Different Characteristics ◽  
Linear Quantity

This article studies competition and coordination in a dual-channel supply chain where one supplier supplies homogeneous products to multiple asymmetric retailers, meanwhile, selling products to the end consumers acting as retailers, through a two-level Stackelberg game. This article first studies the asymmetry among the retailers in terms of the different characteristics of the cost, price, quantity. This article finds that a supplier's profits increase when the number of retailers are high enough in the retail market, even though the retail price of the retailers is lower than that of the supplier, or the wholesale price is cut down when there are many retailers competing in the retail market. On the other hand, under certain conditions, the efficiency of supply chain goes to 1. In this article, the authors show that some traditional contracts that can perfectly coordinate the single-channel supply chain, while failing to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain. Therefore, this article puts forth a linear quantity discount contract and first proves it can be applicable to the dual-channel supply chain with asymmetric retailers under a certain special condition where the lead retailer exits the retail market. The authors examine contracts which can reduce the loss of the efficiency, though they cannot completely coordinate a dual-channel supply chain.

scholarly journals Tripartite game models in a dual-channel supply chain: competition and cooperation

2021 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 653-671
Author(s):  
Zhenkai Lou ◽  
Fujun Hou ◽  
Xuming Lou ◽  
Yubing Zhai
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Competition And Cooperation ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Supply Chain Competition ◽  
Bertrand Game ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This paper considers tripartite games in a dual-channel supply chain which involves a manufacturer, an offline retailer and an online retailer. Both competition and cooperation issues are analyzed. In the competition model, a Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and two retailers and a Bertrand game between two retailers occur simultaneously. It is shown that the channel which attracts more consumers’ purchase preference is charged a higher wholesale price and it meanwhile declares a higher sales price. In the presence of revenue sharing, cooperation issues between the three participants are studied and the change of the revenue of each participant is analyzed when partial cooperation exists. Further, the definition of the optimum two-player coalition is proposed. We demonstrate that the channel which attracts more preference of consumers is definitely in the optimum coalition. The structure of the two-player coalition is analyzed. Finally, under revenue sharing and cost apportionments, the change of each participant’s profit is examined.

scholarly journals Pricing decision of a dual-channel supply chain with different payment, corporate social responsibility and service level

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baogui Xin ◽  
Le Zhang ◽  
Lei Xie
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Payment Methods ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Strategies such as price, CSR, and service have an important impact on enterprises and supply chains. This paper proposes a two-echelon dual-channel supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. Considering the product pricing, CSR level, and service level in the supply chain, this paper employs the Stackelberg game to depict supply chain participants' optimal decisions and analyze the influence of explanatory variables on the optimal decision with retailer's payment methods. The results state that market share, service level, CSR, and financing interest rate significantly impact the pricing decision of all participants in the supply chain. In addition, strategies of CSR level and service level are also affected by the discount rate of advance payment, financing interest rate, return on investment, and opportunity cost rate. This paper incorporates CSR and service level into the objective function, considers a variety of retailers' payment methods, enriches the supply chain's pricing model, and is of great value to scientific decision-making of enterprises and sustainable development of supply chains.

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