Are ethnic minority parties held accountable by voters for their participation in governing coalitions in the same way as parties drawing votes from the ethnic majority? Scholars have shown that incumbents in postcommunist East Central Europe are routinely punished in elections, particularly in the face of poor economic performance. However, it remains to be seen if ethnic minority political parties are similarly punished by voters when they join coalitions. I argue that ethnic minority parties are less likely to be punished than their fellow coalition members for poor economic performance, enjoying the benefits of a “captive” electorate. Using data sets of electoral and economic data at the national and subnational levels in Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia, I find that ethnic minority parties, on average, gain votes after serving in government, while mainstream parties almost always lose. This finding holds when controlling for economic factors. Additionally, I show that while mainstream incumbents are punished or rewarded accordingly for changes in gross domestic product growth, ethnic minority parties do not see their vote share being impacted. Understanding the unique role of ethnic minority parties in party systems enhances our understanding of the dynamics of political representation, party competition, and coalition building in ethnically heterogeneous states.
Colorful or colorless? Local parties defending ethnic minority interests
