Germany and the Third, Second, and First World Wars

Keyword(s):  
MELUS ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-34
Author(s):  
John D. "Rio" Riofrio
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Erik Lane

The implementation process of the global accord on climate change has to start now in order to be implementable. The decentralized process if implementation should take the lessons from the theory of policy implementation into account (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984; Wildavsky, 1987). The dependency upon various forms of coal (wood, stone) and fossil fuels is so large in the Third World that only massive financial assistance from the First World can mean a difference for the COP21 objectives. And many advanced countries (except Uruguay) also need to make great changes to comply with COP21.


1993 ◽  
Vol 23 (92) ◽  
pp. 427-449
Author(s):  
Samir Amin

In the framework of a world-system type of analysis, the perspectives of the European left after the decline of Soviel type socialism are described as a response to the polarization between the Third and the First World: In contrast to the capitalist mode of production in the centre, which operates as a market-based integration of the circulation of capital, of commodities and of labour power, labour in the periphery is blocked. In view of the contradiction between capital accumulation on a world-level and political and social governance on national levels, a socialist strategy should be based on a new internationalism, emphasizing regional alliances whose expansion is coupled to the increase in the unfettered mobility of labour.


Author(s):  
V. Shmat

According to the hypothesis known as the “resource curse”, natural resources abundance is a brake on economic growth of many Third World countries. But is it really so? The author believes there are deeper reasons why the Third World in general – regardless of the amount of raw material resources available in each country – cannot achieve the same level of welfare as the First World. The “resource curse” theory looks for the origins of the resourceful countries’ economic problems in the institutional sphere. But this seems misleading because of excessively narrow “here and now” approach. The economic and socio-political institutions of individual countries are regarded in short periods of time when “curse” declared itself. Its typical manifestations, such as rent-seeking, stagnation or degradation of the institutions, authoritarian power, snowballing public debt and symptoms of Dutch disease, were seen in many Third World countries long before the development of the major sources of raw materials and regardless of the availability or absence of them. Therefore, it seems appropriate to speak of a kind of “three-fold institutional curse” as an explanation of continuing underdevelopment of many countries and territories. Poor national institutions in the Third World countries are not actually caused by the presence or absence of concentrated natural resources. This is the result of prior historical development with series of discrete transitions from one condition to another: from colonial status – to independent statehood; from poverty – to unexpected wealth mostly based on the exploitation of the natural resources. Qualitative transformation of national institutions usually lags far behind. As a consequence, institutional development enters into a state of stagnation (inhibiting or destabilizing economic growth) that can stretch for very long periods of time. The author concludes that the presence or absence of resources, in fact, has no fundamental impact on the nature of socio-economic development of Third World countries. The major reason hindering institutional progress has external nature, that is heavy economic dependence on the First World (coupled with informal political subordination). This circumstance begets the “resource nationalism” by the developing countries – exporters of raw materials and fuel. History of “resource nationalism” provides a useful lesson for Russia whose economy is features by growing dependency on resources. Acknowledgement. The article has been supported by a grant of the Russian Science Foundation. Project № 14-18-02345.


2021 ◽  
pp. 61-84
Author(s):  
Jens Steffek

This chapter presents liberal varieties of technocratic internationalism from the interwar years. The first section sketches the tumultuous situation at the end of the First World War to set the stage for this discussion. Wartime cooperation among the Western allies became a point of reference for internationalism of the executive top-down type. The work of two British internationalists, James Arthur Salter and H. R. G. Greaves, illustrates this type of internationalism, and is the focus of the second section. These authors envisaged the economic and technical branches of the League as a continuation of the wartime ‘executives’ among the Western allies. The American Pitman B. Potter linked his vision of international expert administration to otherwise Wilsonian ideas about an international rule of law and the primacy of security. The third section is devoted to the more utopian kinds of technocratic internationalism of the interwar years. They are represented here by Leonard Woolf and G. D. H. Cole who applied ideas of functional government to the domestic and international level alike. The final section of the chapter turns to David Mitrany who developed the functional approach to international organization more systematically. It shows how Mitrany combined the pragmatic and utopian elements of technocratic internationalism into a new synthesis.


Author(s):  
Robert Jackson ◽  
Georg Sørensen ◽  
Jørgen Møller

This chapter examines how thinking about international relations (IR) has evolved since IR became an academic subject around the time of the First World War. The focus is on four established IR traditions: realism, liberalism, International Society, and International Political Economy (IPE). The chapter first considers three major debates that have arisen since IR became an academic subject at the end of the First World War: the first was between utopian liberalism and realism; the second between traditional approaches and behaviouralism; the third between neorealism/neoliberalism and neo-Marxism. There is an emerging fourth debate, that between established traditions and post-positivist alternatives. The chapter concludes with an analysis of alternative approaches that challenge the established traditions of IR, and with a discussion about criteria for good theory in IR.


Author(s):  
Robert Jackson ◽  
Georg Sørensen

This chapter examines how thinking about international relations (IR) has evolved since IR became an academic subject around the time of the First World War. The focus is on four established IR traditions: realism, liberalism, International Society, and International Political Economy (IPE). The chapter first considers three major debates that have arisen since IR became an academic subject at the end of the First World War: the first was between utopian liberalism and realism; the second between traditional approaches and behaviouralism; the third between neorealism/neoliberalism and neo-Marxism. There is an emerging fourth debate, that between established traditions and post-positivist alternatives. The chapter concludes with an analysis of alternative approaches that challenge the established traditions of IR.


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