The “Resource Curse”: Lessons of the Third World

Author(s):  
V. Shmat

According to the hypothesis known as the “resource curse”, natural resources abundance is a brake on economic growth of many Third World countries. But is it really so? The author believes there are deeper reasons why the Third World in general – regardless of the amount of raw material resources available in each country – cannot achieve the same level of welfare as the First World. The “resource curse” theory looks for the origins of the resourceful countries’ economic problems in the institutional sphere. But this seems misleading because of excessively narrow “here and now” approach. The economic and socio-political institutions of individual countries are regarded in short periods of time when “curse” declared itself. Its typical manifestations, such as rent-seeking, stagnation or degradation of the institutions, authoritarian power, snowballing public debt and symptoms of Dutch disease, were seen in many Third World countries long before the development of the major sources of raw materials and regardless of the availability or absence of them. Therefore, it seems appropriate to speak of a kind of “three-fold institutional curse” as an explanation of continuing underdevelopment of many countries and territories. Poor national institutions in the Third World countries are not actually caused by the presence or absence of concentrated natural resources. This is the result of prior historical development with series of discrete transitions from one condition to another: from colonial status – to independent statehood; from poverty – to unexpected wealth mostly based on the exploitation of the natural resources. Qualitative transformation of national institutions usually lags far behind. As a consequence, institutional development enters into a state of stagnation (inhibiting or destabilizing economic growth) that can stretch for very long periods of time. The author concludes that the presence or absence of resources, in fact, has no fundamental impact on the nature of socio-economic development of Third World countries. The major reason hindering institutional progress has external nature, that is heavy economic dependence on the First World (coupled with informal political subordination). This circumstance begets the “resource nationalism” by the developing countries – exporters of raw materials and fuel. History of “resource nationalism” provides a useful lesson for Russia whose economy is features by growing dependency on resources. Acknowledgement. The article has been supported by a grant of the Russian Science Foundation. Project № 14-18-02345.

1985 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-82
Author(s):  
Zia Ul Haq

Amiya Kumar Bagchi, an eminent economist of the modern Cambridge tradition, has produced a timely treatise, in a condensed form, on the development problems of the Third World countries. The author's general thesis is that economic development in the developing societies necessarily requires a radical transformation in the economic, social and political structures. As economic development is actually a social process, economic growth should not be narrowly defined as the growth of the stock of rich capitalists. Neither can their savings be equated to capital formation whose impact on income will presumably 'trickle down' to the working classes. Economic growth strategies must not aim at creating rich elites, because, according to the author, "maximizing the surplus in the hands of the rich in the Third World is not, however, necessarily a way of maximizing the rate of growth".


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Erik Lane

The implementation process of the global accord on climate change has to start now in order to be implementable. The decentralized process if implementation should take the lessons from the theory of policy implementation into account (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984; Wildavsky, 1987). The dependency upon various forms of coal (wood, stone) and fossil fuels is so large in the Third World that only massive financial assistance from the First World can mean a difference for the COP21 objectives. And many advanced countries (except Uruguay) also need to make great changes to comply with COP21.


1981 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-345
Author(s):  
Ali A. Mazrui

We accept the proposition that the worst kind of dependency lies in North-South interaction. But emphasizing this dimension should not go to the extent of ignoring other dimensions. It is simply not true that all forms of international dependency concern interactions between the Northern Hemisphere and the South, or between industrialism and sources of raw materials. There are important forms of dependency among industrialized nations themselves. Increasingly, there are also forms of dependency between one country in the Third World and another; or between one region of the Third World and another. Dependency is a form of political castration. For the purposes of this essay, dependency between one country in the Northern Hemisphere and another or between one industrialized state and another, is categorized as macro-dependency. This involves variations in power within the upper stratum of the world system. Macro-dependency is thus upper-horizontal, involving variations in affluence among the affluent, or degree of might among the mighty. Micro-dependency for our purposes here concerns variations of technical development among the under-developed, or relative influence among the weak, or degrees of power among those that are basically exploited. The dependency of some West African countries upon Nigeria, or of some of the Gulf States upon Iran or Saudi Arabia, are cases of micro-dependency. We shall return to this level more fully later, but let us first begin with the phenomenon of macro-dependency.


1997 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Singleton

In his introduction to Culture and Imperialism, Edward Said lays to rest my fears of political incorrectness and of being orientalist in my teaching and research of Asian as well as European theatre practices and proto-theatrical forms. Said empowers me by locating my nationality (Irish) and the locus of my vision of the Orient in the very realm of the Orient: amongst the colonized peoples of the world. Theatre historians in recent years have embraced Said's modernist dichotomies of Orientalism, and mistakenly divided the theatrical manifestation of culture into West/East, first world/third world, bad/good, colonizers/colonized. The simplicity of such binary opposites consequently denounces and sanctifies. The politics of culture, however, is a much more complex affair. Modern Irish theatre, for example, contemporaneous with social struggle and revolution, is lauded by Said as a strategy of resistance against cultural imperialism. In Asia the resurrection of pre-colonial dance forms and folk traditions is similarly seen as a cultural assertion of independence. Conversely fin de siècle European theatre divorced from its formalist, societal and religious origins has looked to the oriental theatres for inspiration. In the same mistaken paradigm à la Said, this is branded as eclectic purloining of the surface of foreign cultures of the third world, a colonial plundering disguised as aesthetic pursuit.


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