Foundationalism

Author(s):  
Ernest Sosa

Some foundationalists are rationalists who rely on intuition and deduction. Others are empiricists, in a broad sense, and accept observation and induction or abduction or yet other ways to support beliefs by means of other beliefs. What they have in common is that they are all willing to hazard a positive view about what in general makes a belief epistemically justified in the way required for it to be a case of knowledge; and they all propose something of the following general form: belief b is justified if and only if either b is foundationally justified through a psychological process of direct apprehension p (such as rational intuition, observation, introspection, and so on) or else b is inferentially justified through a psychological process of reasoning r (such as deduction, induction, abduction, and so on) ultimately from beliefs all of which are acquired or sustained through p. If one rejects all forms of such foundationalism, then a question remains as to what distinguishes in general the cases where a belief is epistemically justified from the cases in which it is not. Can anything general and illuminating be said about what confers epistemic justification on a belief, and what gives a belief the epistemic status required for it to constitute knowledge (provided it is true)?

1990 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-28
Author(s):  
Katharine Worth

The Irish Literary Theatre, from which a new Irish theatre was to develop, came to birth at the very point when Ibsen was about to depart from the European theatrical scene. His last play, When We Dead Awaken, appeared in 1899, the year in which Yeats's The Countess Cathleen and Edward Martyn's The Heather Field were produced in Dublin. They were the first fruits of the resolve taken by the two playwrights, with Lady Gregory and George Moore, to ‘build up a Celtic and Irish school of dramatic literature’ and they offered decidedly different foretastes of what that ‘school’ might bring forth. Yeats declared himself an adherent of a poetic theatre that would use fantasy, vision and dream without regard for the limits set by the realistic convention. Martyn, on the other hand, was clearly following Ibsen in his careful observance of day-to-day probability. The central symbol of his play, the heather field, represents an obscure psychological process which might have received more ‘inward’ treatment. But instead it is fitted into a pattern of social activities in something like the way of the prosaically functional but symbolic orphanage in Ghosts.


Author(s):  
Roula-Maria Dib

Abstract My article re-reads John Milton’s Paradise Lost through a feminist post-Jungian perspective; the study will observe the implications of contemporary Jungian critical approaches toward Milton’s portrayal of Eve, who helps Adam find ‘a paradise within …, happier far’ (PL 12. 587). I will first highlight the negative portrayal of an evil, intellectually inferior Eve in Paradise Lost, and ultimately re-reading the poem—and the role of Eve in it—from the perspective of a feminist Jung. The initial reading of Paradise Lost, in which Eve was regarded as inferior and complementary to Adam, reflects Jung’s criticized notion that the anima’s role is to complement a man’s psychology. This, however, can be read differently through a post-Jungian feminist perspective. From this new viewpoint, Eve can be regarded as Adam’s equal, rather than an inferior company, and a catalyst in their ‘coniunctio’, in which they both individuate (rather than Eve, the anima be subservient to Adam’s individuation) in Paradise Lost. Despite the vast differences between John Milton’s and Carl Jung’s cultural and historical backgrounds, this novel reading of Paradise Lost in context of revisions to Jung’s anima theory and theory of individuation offers a more positive view on the poet’s depiction of Eve in keeping with more recent developments in Milton scholarship, which have drawn attention to the way the text questions conventions of gender hierarchy and patriarchy.


Author(s):  
Karen Neander

In the second chapter, the author describes some research by cognitive scientists, who posit nonconceptual representations to explain certain perceptual capacities (and incapacities). This research and the way in which it is reported illustrate the type of theoretical work done by an error-permitting notion of nonconceptual representation, alongside a malfunction-permitting notion of function. One set of studies (led by McCloskey) that is described in some detail focuses on an unusual deficit in locating visual targets (in a young woman, AH), which were intended to contribute to understanding normal human vision. The author makes clear why the contents ascribed to the underlying representational states, where the errors first occur, are referential-intentional contents, not merely (natural-factive) informational contents, and why their ascriptions count as intensional, according to standard criteria. Toward the end of the chapter, the author reminds readers of a familiar conundrum: if a representation’s having content is not causally potent in a psychological process, why is it (still) a central tenet of mainstream cognitive science that such a process should be understood as representational?


2021 ◽  
pp. 115-136
Author(s):  
Kevin McCain ◽  
Luca Moretti

This chapter further elucidates PE by explaining how it applies to multiple domains. Though the preceding chapter already touches upon some of these, here it is cashed out how PE can account for perceptual justification, memorial justification, testimonial justification, introspective justification, and a priori justification. Exploring the contours of PE in this way reveals just how powerful and unified the theory is. Along the way, it is argued that Declan Smithies’ forceful objections to PC fail to impugn PE. Additionally, it is shown that PE has the resources to respond to each of the challenges that Smithies claims are faced by any internalist theory with “global ambitions”––any theory that purports to be a comprehensive account of epistemic justification. (These challenges for instance include the problem of forgotten evidence and the problem of stored beliefs.) The discussion in this chapter makes it clear that PE is a comprehensive account of epistemic justification that achieves its global ambitions.


2021 ◽  
pp. 348-386
Author(s):  
Alexander A. Guerrero

Philosophers spend a lot of time discussing what consent is. In this chapter, Alexander Guerrero suggests that there are also hard and important epistemological questions about consent and that debates about consent often mistake epistemological issues for metaphysical ones. People who defend so-called “affirmative consent” views sometimes are accused of, or even take themselves to be, offering a new, controversial view about the nature of consent. Guerrero argues that this is a mistake. The right way of understanding “affirmative consent” is as a view about what is required, epistemically, before one can justifiably believe that another person has consented. This view will be justified, if it is, because of background views about epistemic justification and the way epistemic justification interacts with moral norms governing action. Guerrero concludes by discussing the implications of this view for the morality and law regarding consent.


Author(s):  
William P. Alston

The internalism–externalism distinction is usually applied to the epistemic justification of belief. The most common form of internalism (accessibility internalism) holds that only what the subject can easily become aware of (by reflection, for example) can have a bearing on justification. We may think of externalism as simply the denial of this constraint. The strong intuitive appeal of internalism is due to the sense that we should be able to determine whether we are justified in believing something just by carefully considering the question, without the need for any further investigation. Then there is the idea that we can successfully reply to sceptical doubts about the possibility of knowledge or justified beliefs only if we can determine the epistemic status of our beliefs without presupposing anything about which sceptical doubts could be raised – the external world for example. The main objections to internalism are: (1) It assumes an unrealistic confidence in the efficacy of armchair reflection, which is often not up to surveying our entire repertoire of beliefs and other possible grounds of belief and determining the extent to which they support a given belief. (2) If we confine ourselves to what we can ascertain on reflection, there is no guarantee that the beliefs that are thus approved as justified are likely to be true. And the truth-promoting character of justification is the main source of its value. Externalism lifts this accessibility constraint, but in its most general sense it embodies no particular positive view. The most common way of further specifying externalism is reliabilism, the view that a belief is justified if and only if it was produced and/or sustained by a reliable process, one that would produce mostly true beliefs in the long run. This is a form of externalism because whether a particular belief-forming process is reliable is not something we can ascertain just on reflection. The main objections to externalism draw on internalist intuitions: (1) If the world were governed by an evil demon who sees to it that our beliefs are generally false, even though we have the kind of bases for them we do in fact have, then our beliefs would still be justified, even though formed unreliably. (2) If a reliable clairvoyant (ones who ‘sees’ things at a great distance) forms beliefs on this basis without having any reason for thinking that they are reliably formed, those beliefs would not be justified, even though they pass the reliability test.


2017 ◽  
Vol 94 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 126-137
Author(s):  
Hamid Vahid

In a series of papers, Crispin Wright has proposed a number of arguments to show that what makes one’s perceptual experience confer justification on the beliefs it gives rise to includes having independent, non-evidential warrant (entitlement) to believe the kind of presuppositions (or ‘cornerstones’) that the skeptic highlights. It has been objected that such arguments at most show that entitlement has a pragmatic character. While sympathizing with this objection, I will argue in this paper that the kind of considerations that Wright adduces in support of the entitlement thesis can nevertheless bear on the epistemic status of cornerstone beliefs, though not in the way envisaged by Wright himself. To show this, I shall make use of the thesis of pragmatic encroachment arguing that, in addition to its practical stakes, the epistemic stakes of a belief are also relevant to its epistemic status. The consequences of the claim will then be explored for the question of the epistemic status of cornerstone beliefs which seem to show that, pace Wright, such beliefs can, after all, be evidentially warranted.


Author(s):  
Joaquim Espinós Felipe

Resum: La Transició (1975-1982) constitueix un període històric controvertit. En els darrers anys, arran del moviment 15-M, s’han revifat a l’Estat espanyol les veus critiques amb el relat oficial. En l’àmbit valencià existeix un corpus de novel·les considerable que aporta informació rellevant sobre la manera com s’ha construït la memòria de la Transició valenciana. La distància existent entre l’actualitat i els anys en què se situen els fets, així com el desconeixement de les noves generacions sobre el tema, permet que aquestes novel·les puguen ser considerades, en un sentit amplei com a novel·les històriques, al mateix nivell que les ambientades en la Guerra Civil i la postguerra. Paraules clau: novel·la històrica, literatura catalana, País Valencià, Transició. .Abstract: The Spanish Transition (1975-1982) is a controversial historical period. In recent years, following the 15-M movement, we have witnessed in Spain a revival of voices critical of the official narrative. In the Valencian area there is a considerable corpus of novels that provide relevant information on the way how the memory of the Valencian Transition has been built. The distance existing between the present and the years in which the facts took place, as well as the ignorance of the new generations on the subject, allows us to consider these novels, in a broad sense, as historical novels, at the same level as those set in the Civil War and the post-war period.Keywords: historical novel, catalan literature, Spanish Transition, Valencia.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Ylwa Sjölin Wirling

Abstract Philosophers often make exotic-sounding modal claims, such as: “A timeless world is impossible”, “The laws of physics could have been different from what they are”, “There could have been an additional phenomenal colour”. Otherwise popular empiricist modal epistemologies in the contemporary literature cannot account for whatever epistemic justification we might have for making such modal claims. Those who do not, as a result of this, endorse scepticism with respect to their epistemic status typically suggest that they can be justified but have yet to develop some distinct, workable theory of how. That is, they endorse a form of non-uniformism about the epistemology of modality, according to which claims about philosophically interesting modal matters need to be justified differently from e.g. everyday or scientific modal claims, but they fail to provide any more detail. This article aims to fill this gap by outlining how such a non-uniformist view could be spelled out and what story about philosophically interesting modal justification it could contain.


Author(s):  
Haruni Julius Machumu ◽  
Chang Zhu

In this chapter, a conceptual relational model is built addressing the main actors of the K-20 education programmes and the key aspects of blended learning approach. The chapter goes beyond by addressing the K-20 education system in a lenses of technology integration in education, and that the K-20 education system cannot exist in remote. The chapter discusses the way blended learning and its related aspects and approaches are related to the K-20 education system. In its broad sense, the chapter suggests appropriate forces and delivery approaches be used in K-20 education.


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