Continuum hypothesis

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Tiles
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Natural Numbers ◽  
Generalized Continuum ◽  
Power Set ◽  
Independence Results ◽  
Infinite Set ◽  
Special Case ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
The Continuum

The ‘continuum hypothesis’ (CH) asserts that there is no set intermediate in cardinality (‘size’) between the set of real numbers (the ‘continuum’) and the set of natural numbers. Since the continuum can be shown to have the same cardinality as the power set (that is, the set of subsets) of the natural numbers, CH is a special case of the ‘generalized continuum hypothesis’ (GCH), which says that for any infinite set, there is no set intermediate in cardinality between it and its power set. Cantor first proposed CH believing it to be true, but, despite persistent efforts, failed to prove it. König proved that the cardinality of the continuum cannot be the sum of denumerably many smaller cardinals, and it has been shown that this is the only restriction the accepted axioms of set theory place on its cardinality. Gödel showed that CH was consistent with these axioms and Cohen that its negation was. Together these results prove the independence of CH from the accepted axioms. Cantor proposed CH in the context of seeking to answer the question ‘What is the identifying nature of continuity?’. These independence results show that, whatever else has been gained from the introduction of transfinite set theory – including greater insight into the import of CH – it has not provided a basis for finally answering this question. This remains the case even when the axioms are supplemented in various plausible ways.

scholarly journals Several results on compact metrizable spaces in $$\mathbf {ZF}$$

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyriakos Keremedis ◽  
Eleftherios Tachtsis ◽  
Eliza Wajch
Keyword(s):  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Compact Spaces ◽  
Power Set ◽  
Compact Metrizable Space ◽  
Permutation Models ◽  
Independence Results ◽  
The Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Metrizable Spaces ◽  
Transfer Theorems ◽  
The Continuum

AbstractIn the absence of the axiom of choice, the set-theoretic status of many natural statements about metrizable compact spaces is investigated. Some of the statements are provable in $$\mathbf {ZF}$$ ZF , some are shown to be independent of $$\mathbf {ZF}$$ ZF . For independence results, distinct models of $$\mathbf {ZF}$$ ZF and permutation models of $$\mathbf {ZFA}$$ ZFA with transfer theorems of Pincus are applied. New symmetric models of $$\mathbf {ZF}$$ ZF are constructed in each of which the power set of $$\mathbb {R}$$ R is well-orderable, the Continuum Hypothesis is satisfied but a denumerable family of non-empty finite sets can fail to have a choice function, and a compact metrizable space need not be embeddable into the Tychonoff cube $$[0, 1]^{\mathbb {R}}$$ [ 0 , 1 ] R .

The independence of a weak axiom of choice

1956 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 350-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elliott Mendelson
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Weak Form ◽  
Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Transfinite Induction ◽  
Exact Nature ◽  
Generalized Continuum ◽  
Power Set ◽  
The Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Weak Axiom

1. The purpose of this paper is to show that, if the axioms of a system G of set theory are consistent, then it is impossible to prove from them the following weak form of the axiom of choice: (H1) For every denumerable set x of disjoint two-element sets, there is a set y, called a choice set for x, which contains exactly one element in common with each element of x. Among the axioms of the system G, we take, with minor modifications, Axioms A, B, C of Gödel [6]. Clearly, the independence of H1 implies that of all stronger propositions, including the general axiom of choice and the generalized continuum hypothesis.The proof depends upon ideas of Fraenkel and Mostowski, and proceeds in the following manner. Let a be a denumerable set of objects Δ0, Δ1, Δ2, …, the exact nature of which will be specified later. Let μj = {Δ2j, Δ2j+1} for each j, c = {μ0, μ1, μ2, …}, and b = [the sum set of a]. By transfinite induction, construct the class Vc which is the closure of b under the power-set operation. For each j, it is possible to define a 1–1 mapping of Vc onto itself with the following properties. The mapping preserves the ε-relation, or, more precisely, .

Eliminating the continuum hypothesis

1969 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Platek
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Simple Theory ◽  
Generalized Continuum ◽  
The Continuum

In this paper we show how the assumption of the generalized continuum hypothesis (GCH) can be removed or partially removed from proofs in Zermelo-Frankel set theory (ZF) of statements expressible in the simple theory of types. We assume the reader is familiar with the latter language, especially with the classification of formulas and sentences of that language into Σκη and Πκη form (cf. [1]) and with how that language can be relatively interpreted into the language of ZF.

The generalized continuum hypothesis is equivalent to the generalized maximization principle

1971 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel I. Friedman
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Methodological Principle ◽  
Theoretical Statement ◽  
Generalized Continuum ◽  
And Mathematics ◽  
Maximization Principle ◽  
The Continuum

In spite of the work of Gödel and Cohen, which showed the undecidability of the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis (GCH) from the axioms of set theory, the problem still remains to decide GCH on the basis of new axioms. It is almost 100 years since Cantor first conjectured the Continuum Hypothesis, yet we seem to be no closer to determining its truth (or falsity). Nevertheless, it is a sound methodological principle that given any undecidable set-theoretical statement, we should search for “other (hitherto unknown) axioms of set theory which a more profound understanding of the concepts underlying logic and mathematics would enable us to recognize as implied by these concepts” (see Gödel [7, p. 265]).

Martin's axiom and the continuum

1995 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 374-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haim Judah ◽  
Andrzej Rosłanowski
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Georg Cantor ◽  
Mathematical Research ◽  
Kurt Gödel ◽  
Uncountable Cardinal ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Infinite Set ◽  
The Continuum

Since Georg Cantor discovered set theory the main problem in this area of mathematical research has been to discover what is the size of the continuum. The continuum hypothesis (CH) says that every infinite set of reals either has the same cardinality as the set of all reals or has the cardinality of the set of natural numbers, namelyIn 1939 Kurt Gödel discovered the Constructible Universe and proved that CH holds in it. In the early sixties Paul Cohen proved that every universe of set theory can be extended to a bigger universe of set theory where CH fails. Moreover, given any reasonable cardinal κ, it is possible to build a model where the continuum size is κ. The new technique discovered by Cohen is called forcing and is being used successfully in other branches of mathematics (analysis, algebra, graph theory, etc.).In the light of these two stupendous works the experts (especially the platonists) were forced to conclude that from the point of view of the classical axiomatization of set theory (called ZFC) it is impossible to give any answer to the continuum size problem: everything is possible!In private communications Gödel suggested that the continuum size from a platonistic point of view should be ω2, the second uncountable cardinal. As this is not provable in ZFC, Gödel suggested that a new axiom should be added to ZFC to decide that the cardinality of the continuum is ω2.

Transcendence of cardinals

1965 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gaisi Takeuti
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Natural Numbers ◽  
Recursive Functions ◽  
Power Set ◽  
Recursive Predicate

In this paper, by a function of ordinals we understand a function which is defined for all ordinals and each of whose value is an ordinal. In [7] (also cf. [8] or [9]) we defined recursive functions and predicates of ordinals, following Kleene's definition on natural numbers. A predicate will be called arithmetical, if it is obtained from a recursive predicate by prefixing a sequence of alternating quantifiers. A function will be called arithmetical, if its representing predicate is arithmetical.The cardinals are identified with those ordinals a which have larger power than all smaller ordinals than a. For any given ordinal a, we denote by the cardinal of a and by 2a the cardinal which is of the same power as the power set of a. Let χ be the function such that χ(a) is the least cardinal which is greater than a.Now there are functions of ordinals such that they are easily defined in set theory, but it seems impossible to define them as arithmetical ones; χ is such a function. If we define χ in making use of only the language on ordinals, it seems necessary to use the notion of all the functions from ordinals, e.g., as in [6].

PRIMITIVE INDEPENDENCE RESULTS

2003 ◽  
Vol 03 (01) ◽  
pp. 67-83
Author(s):  
HARVEY M. FRIEDMAN
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Large Cardinal ◽  
Power Set ◽  
Independence Results

We present some new set and class theoretic independence results from ZFC and NBGC that are particularly simple and close to the primitives of membership and equality (see Secs. 4 and 5). They are shown to be equivalent to familiar small large cardinal hypotheses. We modify these independendent statements in order to give an example of a sentence in set theory with 5 quantifiers which is independent of ZFC (see Sec. 6). It is known that all 3 quantifier sentences are decided in a weak fragment of ZF without power set (see [4]).

Certain predicates defined by induction schemata

1953 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao Wang
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Formal System ◽  
General Notion ◽  
Constant Number ◽  
Natural Numbers ◽  
System L ◽  
Truth Definition ◽  
Consistency Proofs ◽  
Special Case

It is known that we can introduce in number theory (for example, the system Z of Hilbert-Bernays) by induction schemata certain predicates of natural numbers which cannot be expressed explicitly within the framework of number theory. The question arises how we can define these predicates in some richer system, without employing induction schemata. In this paper a general notion of definability by induction (relative to number theory), which seems to apply to all the known predicates of this kind, is introduced; and it is proved that in a system L1 which forms an extension of number theory all predicates which are definable by induction (hereafter to be abbreviated d.i.) according to the definition are explicitly expressible.In order to define such predicates and prove theorems answering to their induction schemata, we have to allow certain impredicative classes in L1. However, if we want merely to prove that for each constant number the special case of the induction schema for a predicate d.i. is provable, we do not have to assume the existence of impredicative classes. A certain weaker system L2, in which only predicative classes of natural numbers are allowed, is sufficient for the purpose. It is noted that a truth definition for number theory can be obtained in L2. Consistency proofs for number theory do not seem to be formalizable in L2, although they can, it is observed, be formalized in L1.In general, given any ordinary formal system (say Zermelo set theory), it is possible to define by induction schemata, in the same manner as in number theory, certain predicates which are not explicitly definable in the system. Here again, by extending the system in an analogous fashion, these predicates become expressible in the resulting system. The crucial predicate instrumental to obtaining a truth definition for a given system is taken as an example.

Frege's theorem in a constructive setting

1999 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 486-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
John L. Bell
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Natural Numbers ◽  
The Family ◽  
Power Set ◽  
Law Of Excluded Middle ◽  
The Law ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Excluded Middle ◽  
Intuitionistic Set Theory

By Frege's Theorem is meant the result, implicit in Frege's Grundlagen, that, for any set E, if there exists a map υ from the power set of E to E satisfying the conditionthen E has a subset which is the domain of a model of Peano's axioms for the natural numbers. (This result is proved explicitly, using classical reasoning, in Section 3 of [1].) My purpose in this note is to strengthen this result in two directions: first, the premise will be weakened so as to require only that the map υ be defined on the family of (Kuratowski) finite subsets of the set E, and secondly, the argument will be constructive, i.e., will involve no use of the law of excluded middle. To be precise, we will prove, in constructive (or intuitionistic) set theory, the followingTheorem. Let υ be a map with domain a family of subsets of a set E to E satisfying the following conditions:(i) ø ϵdom(υ)(ii)∀U ϵdom(υ)∀x ϵ E − UU ∪ x ϵdom(υ)(iii)∀UV ϵdom(5) υ(U) = υ(V) ⇔ U ≈ V.Then we can define a subset N of E which is the domain of a model of Peano's axioms.

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