Introduction What price deterrence? 12 The purposes of the US nuclear arsenal 14 Alternative force configurations 17

Keyword(s):  
2006 ◽  
Vol 105 (694) ◽  
pp. 375-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dinshaw Mistry ◽  
Sumit Ganguly

Stronger us-India strategic ties resulting from the pact would lessen India's need to greatly expand its nuclear arsenal and would bind Indian governments more firmly to norms against nuclear testing.


Subject Upgrading the US nuclear arsenal. Significance The United States is undertaking the most comprehensive modernisation of its nuclear forces since the 1970s and 1980s. Over the next ten years, annual US spending on nuclear weapons is projected to increase from about 15 billion dollars to 25 billion dollars per year to upgrade the three legs of the US nuclear arsenal: land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles and strategic bombers. This recapitalisation is considered necessary to sustain deterrence against growing strategic threats from Russia and China and regional nuclear threats from North Korea, but will entail trade-offs among other military assets far more likely to be used in any conflict. Impacts Russian rhetoric towards Ukraine and eastern Europe will strengthen the hands of pro-nuclear lobbies in Washington. Greater nuclear spending will increase the drive to find savings in military personnel costs. By shifting pensions to retirement savings accounts, it will increase the attractiveness of the military as a mid-career employment option.


Survival ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 27-50
Author(s):  
James E. Doyle
Keyword(s):  

Subject Potential US adoption of a 'no first use' nuclear weapons policy. Significance The administration of US President Barack Obama is reportedly considering the adoption of a 'no first use' nuclear weapons posture in his final months in office. A no first use policy would involve the United States declaring that it would only use its nuclear arsenal in response to a nuclear attack, never as a preliminary move in escalating tensions. This shift would be a significant departure from Washington's earlier posture, which maintained ambiguity as to whether nuclear weapons would be used in a hypothetical conventional attack on the United States or its allies. Impacts Arsenal upgrades and shifts in doctrine favouring tactical nuclear weapons would counteract the benefits of a restrained declaratory policy. Technological breakthroughs with hypersonic missiles are likely to undermine existing legal and diplomatic arms control arrangements. Obama may take up the pursuit of nuclear arms reductions with an ex-president's public profile. Eastern NATO allies will react strongly against any hint that their security does not fall under the US nuclear umbrella.


2016 ◽  
pp. 132-152
Author(s):  
O. Potiekhin

The article deals with the main events and causes of appearance in the US of nuclear taboo under President H. Truman’s influence, who was responsible for the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The consideration is given to the principles and options for containment as a separate case of non-use of nuclear weapons strategy. The positive and negative features of the nuclear deterrent doctrine and policy are shown.The author considers some aspects of the US policy in the sphere of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons related to nuclear taboo and the joint efforts of Washington and Moscow aimed at depriving Ukraine of the nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union. The discussions on the matter are revealed. The consequences of violation  of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 and a lack of deterrent power against the Russian aggression in nuclear-free Ukraine are analysed. The attention is focused on the need for the US military and political assistance  to Ukraine and its provision with  appropriate weapons for strengthening international security. It is stressed that nuclear weapons play a decisive role in preventing  the third WW.


Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig

This chapter analyzes the cost of the US nuclear arsenal. Many analysts have argued that a robust nuclear arsenal is unaffordable, but this chapter shows that this view is incorrect. It reviews the arguments made by those in favor of reducing spending on US nuclear weapons and moves on to present the counterargument about why the US nuclear force is affordable. It shows that nuclear weapons represent a small percentage of overall US defense spending and that roughly five percent of the US defense budget is not too much to spend for a strategic deterrent. The United States can afford to maintain and modernize its nuclear forces and, indeed, they come at a good value.


Significance The document is the first comprehensive statement by President Donald Trump’s administration on its approach to nuclear strategy, modernisation of the US nuclear arsenal and international commitments. The document also sets the stage for bureaucratic battles over the funding of new weapons systems. Impacts US Asian allies will likely welcome the new nuclear posture, as insurance against North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Washington’s limited interest in disarmament will undercut non-nuclear states’ support of international monitoring bodies. Current congressional reliance on short-term funding deals will undermine nuclear spending flexibility for now.


Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig

This chapter challenges the notion that US nuclear posture has a significant bearing on the proliferation behavior of other states. Many believe that a robust US nuclear arsenal is an important determinant of proliferation decisions in other states and that the United States can dissuade proliferation elsewhere by reducing the size of its own nuclear arsenal. This chapter argues that state decisions on nonproliferation issues are driven by a range of other factors and, once these considerations are taken into account, there is little remaining variance to be explained by US nuclear posture. This argument is supported with a case study of the Iranian nuclear program and a statistical analysis using a data set on US nuclear arsenal size from 1945 to 2011. It finds no evidence of a relationship between the size of the US nuclear arsenal and a variety of nuclear nonproliferation outcomes.


2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-184
Author(s):  
Amy Garrigues

On September 15, 2003, the US. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that agreements between pharmaceutical and generic companies not to compete are not per se unlawful if these agreements do not expand the existing exclusionary right of a patent. The Valley DrugCo.v.Geneva Pharmaceuticals decision emphasizes that the nature of a patent gives the patent holder exclusive rights, and if an agreement merely confirms that exclusivity, then it is not per se unlawful. With this holding, the appeals court reversed the decision of the trial court, which held that agreements under which competitors are paid to stay out of the market are per se violations of the antitrust laws. An examination of the Valley Drugtrial and appeals court decisions sheds light on the two sides of an emerging legal debate concerning the validity of pay-not-to-compete agreements, and more broadly, on the appropriate balance between the seemingly competing interests of patent and antitrust laws.


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