scholarly journals Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the US Military-political Strategy and Ukraine

2016 ◽  
pp. 132-152
Author(s):  
O. Potiekhin

The article deals with the main events and causes of appearance in the US of nuclear taboo under President H. Truman’s influence, who was responsible for the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The consideration is given to the principles and options for containment as a separate case of non-use of nuclear weapons strategy. The positive and negative features of the nuclear deterrent doctrine and policy are shown.The author considers some aspects of the US policy in the sphere of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons related to nuclear taboo and the joint efforts of Washington and Moscow aimed at depriving Ukraine of the nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union. The discussions on the matter are revealed. The consequences of violation  of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 and a lack of deterrent power against the Russian aggression in nuclear-free Ukraine are analysed. The attention is focused on the need for the US military and political assistance  to Ukraine and its provision with  appropriate weapons for strengthening international security. It is stressed that nuclear weapons play a decisive role in preventing  the third WW.

Polar Record ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Summerhayes ◽  
Peter Beeching

In January-February 1939, a secret German expedition visited Dronning (or Queen) Maud Land, Antarctica, apparently with the intention inter alia of establishing a base there. Between 1943 and 1945 the British launched a secret wartime Antarctic operation, code-named Tabarin. Men from the Special Air Services Regiment (SAS), Britain's covert forces for operating behind the lines, appeared to be involved. In July and August 1945, after the German surrender, two U-boats arrived in Argentina. Had they been to Antarctica to land Nazi treasure or officials? In the southern summer of 1946–1947, the US Navy appeared to ‘invade’ Antarctica using a large force. The operation, code-named Highjump, was classified confidential. In 1958, three nuclear weapons were exploded in the region, as part of another classified US operation, code-named Argus. Given the initial lack of information about these various activities, it is not, perhaps, surprising that some people would connect them to produce a pattern in which governments would be accused of suppressing information about ‘what really happened’, and would use these pieces of information to construct a myth of a large German base existing in Antarctica and of allied efforts to destroy it. Using background knowledge of Antarctica and information concerning these activities that has been published since the early 1940s, it is demonstrated: that the two U-Boats could not have reached Antarctica; that there was no secret wartime German base in Dronning Maud Land; that SAS troops did not attack the alleged German base; that the SAS men in the region at the time had civilian jobs; that Operation Highjump was designed to train the US Navy for a possible war with the Soviet Union in the Arctic, and not to attack an alleged German base in Antarctica; and that Operation Argus took place over the ocean more than 2000 km north of Dronning Maud Land. Activities that were classified have subsequently been declassified and it is no longer difficult to separate fact from fancy, despite the fact that many find it attractive not to do so.


Author(s):  
C. Dale Walton

This chapter examines how nuclear weapons have influenced international politics, both during and after the cold war. In particular, it distinguishes between the spread of nuclear weapons to more states, which poses an increasing threat to international security, and the decline in the absolute number of nuclear weapons due to the reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. The chapter first provides an overview of the First Nuclear Age — which lasted approximately from 1945 to the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union — before discussing the risks in the Second Nuclear Age. It also considers other contemporary issues such as ballistic missile defences, the cultural dimensions of nuclear weapons acquisition, and the possibility of using nuclear weapons for terrorism. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the prospects for a Third Nuclear Age.


1971 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 163-176
Author(s):  
Donald N. Lammers

Here is a concise, recent and thoroughly orthodox historical judgment on the Nyon Arrangements of 1937: There was one minor but significant exception to the inaction of of the British and the French. In 1937, pirates in the form of unidentified Italian warships, began sinking British and French merchantmen entering Republican ports. To this, a direct attack and affront, France and Britain responded with firmness. A Conference was called in September at Nyon, in Switzerland, and the law was laid down. The sinkings stopped abruptly. It was a most instructive incident, but no lessons were drawn. Indeed, the governments wished, apparently, to draw no lessons.Here is another judgment, this one by a Soviet historian, which offers a somewhat different view of this episode: Bourgeois political persons ignore the positive, determined role of the Soviet Union in the outcome of the conference and assign the achievement of its successful results only to the unity of England and France. [Thus] Eden, in a letter to Churchill written after the conference, explained that its results showed the wholesomeness and effectiveness of cooperation between England and France. “The two Western Powers proved that they could play a decisive role in European affairs.” Eden completely ignores the fact that at the conference in Nyon there took part not two, but three Great Powers. The third Great Power, which played a first-class role in the resolution of the problem of piracy, was the Soviet Union. Eden's statement does not answer the question, why earlier, before the Nyon conference, England did not succeed in attaining such results.


1979 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-125
Author(s):  
Silviu Brucan

As part of a study of the anatomy of militarization, this paper examines the role that Europe has played, and continues to play, in the ongoing strategic game. The globalization of the war system in the nuclear era (but with the nuclear monopoly in the hands of the US and the Soviet Union) has enabled the two superpowers to reserve exclusively to themselves the power to decide the question of war and peace. The war system fuels the insensate arms race regardless of the demands of ideological rivalry or security requirements. Since the arms policies of the superpowers cannot be understood in exclusively military terms, the paper analyzes the dynamics of the arms race in the broader context of the pressure of technology and interdependence, power politics, self-assertion of nations, and social change, of which technology-interdependence pressure and the thrust for social change are likely to play a more decisive role in the coming decades. It is in this context that the paper projects the scenario of the future. If the scenario fails to materialize, the result will be nuclear escalation to the point of no return.


2014 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 127-137
Author(s):  
Tatsiana Hiarnovich

The paper explores the displace of Polish archives from the Soviet Union that was performed in 1920s according to the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921 and other international agreements. The aim of the research is to reconstruct the process of displace, based on the archival sources and literature. The object of the research is those documents that were preserved in the archives of Belarus and together with archives from other republics were displaced to Poland. The exploration leads to clarification of the selection of document fonds to be displaced, the actual process of movement and the explanation of the role that the archivists of Belarus performed in the history of cultural relationships between Poland and the Soviet Union. The articles of the Treaty of Riga had been formulated without taking into account the indivisibility of archive fonds that is one of the most important principles of restitution, which caused the failure of the treaty by the Soviet part.


Author(s):  
Bipin K. Tiwary ◽  
Anubhav Roy

Having fought its third war and staring at food shortages, independent India needed to get its act together both militarily and economically by the mid-1960s. With the United States revoking its military assistance and delaying its food aid despite New Delhi’s devaluation of the rupee, India’s newly elected Indira Gandhi government turned to deepen its ties with the Soviet Union in 1966 with the aim of balancing the United States internally through a rearmament campaign and externally through a formal alliance with Moscow. The US formation of a triumvirate with Pakistan and China in India’s neighbourhood only bolstered its intent. Yet India consciously limited the extent of both its balancing strategies and allowed adequate space to simultaneously adopt the contradictory sustenance of its complex interdependence with the United States economically. Did this contrasting choice of strategies constitute India’s recourse to hedging after 1966 until 1971, when it liberated Bangladesh by militarily defeating a US-aligned Pakistan? Utilising a historical-evaluative study of archival data and the contents of a few Bollywood films from the period, this paper seeks to address the question by empirically establishing the extents of India’s balancing of, and complex interdependence with, the United States.


Slavic Review ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 324-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lynn Mally

In this article Lynn Mally examines the efforts of a Comintern affiliate called MORT (Mezhdunarodnoe ob“edinenie revoliutsionnykh teatrov) to export models of Soviet theatrical performance outside the Soviet Union. Beginning with the first Five-Year Plan, MORT was initially very successful in promoting Soviet agitprop techniques abroad. But once agitprop methods fell into disgrace in the Soviet Union, MORT abruptly changed its tactics. It suddenly encouraged leftist theater groups to move toward the new methods of socialist realism. Nonetheless, many leftist theater circles continued to produce agitprop works, as shown by performances at the Moscow Olympiad for Revolutionary Theater in 1933. The unusual tenacity of this theatrical form offers an opportunity to question the global influence of the Soviet cultural policies promoted by the Comintern. From 1932 until 1935, many foreign theater groups ignored MORT's cultural directives. Once the Popular Front began, national communist parties saw artistic work as an important tool for building alliances outside the working class. This decisive shift in political strategy finally undermined the ethos and methods of agitprop theater.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document