Pakistan: Budgetary Conflicts, Military Expenditures, and Infrastructural Development

Author(s):  
Robert E. Looney ◽  
David Winterford
1975 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 314-314

The report issued by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in January 1975, concerns arms expenditures and sales made between 1963 and 1973. The 123-page document is composed mostly of two major parts: a country-by-country breakdown of arms trade for each of the years studied and a study contrasting each country's yearly military expenditures with its G.N.P., population size, and armed forces. The report (U.S. A.CD.A. Publication 74) may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 for $2. Persons ordering from abroad (other than Canada and Mexico) should add 25 percent to the price to cover shipping charges.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 453-462 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mert Topcu ◽  
İlhan Aras

Although the relationship between military expenditures and economic growth is well documented for the old members of the European Union, empirically little is known for the new members. Thus, the goal of this paper is to investigate the economic impact of military expenditures in Central and Eastern European countries employing panel cointegration and causality methods for the period 1993–2013. Findings indicate that the variables in question do not move together in the long run and the direction of causality in the short run is from economic growth to military expenditures. The implications of the results for international relations are discussed.


Author(s):  
Joshua Alley

Abstract How does alliance participation affect military spending? Some argue that alliance membership increases military expenditures, while others contend that it produces spending cuts. I argue that deep formal defense cooperation modifies the impact of alliance participation on military expenditures and can explain increases and decreases in spending by small alliance members. Security-seeking junior members of deep alliances usually decrease military spending because these treaties are more credible. Joining shallow alliances often increases junior alliance member military spending, however. I test the argument by creating a latent measure of alliance treaty depth and using it to predict differences in how alliance participation affects military spending. The research design generates new empirical evidence linking alliance participation and percentage changes in state military spending from 1919 to 2007. I find that deeper alliance treaties tend to decrease military spending by junior alliance members, and shallow alliances often increase military spending. These results help scholars and policymakers better understand a central question about alliance politics that has been debated in scholarship for decades.


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