Human Dignity and the Kingdom of Ends

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan-Willem van der Rijt ◽  
Adam Cureton
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Jan-Willem van der Rijt ◽  
Adam Cureton

2021 ◽  
pp. 90-105
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Hill, Jr.

In this broadly Kantian account of deliberation about moral principles, human dignity is not a metaphysical ground for the norms that we associate with it. Rather it is a comprehensive status defined by the basic moral principles and values, such as the requirements of justifiability to all and treating humanity as an end in itself. The essay comments on the sense in which dignity is an elevated though inclusive status, in contrast to a conventional status, and an inner worth, in contrast to a derivative value. Human dignity has an important role in practical deliberations, but its specific requirements must be determined and justified by the theory in which it is embedded. Many have discussed the constraints and limits required to respect the dignity of every human person, but this essay emphasizes that this also calls for certain positive attitudes and ideals beyond these negative duties.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 107
Author(s):  
Fuad Al-Daraweesh

The author argues that the current practices of human rights education produce anti-educational orthodoxies that result from a divorce between human rights and human rights education and human dignity, moral autonomy, and the right to justification.


Philosophy ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 371-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dietmar von der Pfordten

AbstractThe contribution starts with the observation that Kant mentioned Human Dignity in his main works with great variety in emphasis. In the ‘Grundlegung’ from 1785 we find a significant treatment and again in the ‘Tugendlehre’ from 1798 but none in the ‘Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft’ from 1788 and in the ‘Rechtslehre’ from 1797. This needs an explanation. In the ‘Grundlegung’ human dignity is not attached to the second formula of the categorical imperative, the formula of self-purposefulness, as it is often assumed, but to the third formula of a kingdom of ends. It is there explained as self-legislation. This placement needs also an explanation, which is attempted by the article. In the ‘Tugendlehre’ human dignity is then explained as self-purposefulness. So Kant changed his understanding of human dignity from the ‘Grundlegung’ to the ‘Tugendlehre’. But the question is: why?


1991 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian L. Wilcox ◽  
Hedwin Nalmark

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (5) ◽  
pp. 264-271
Author(s):  
Rachel E. López

The elderly prison population continues to rise along with higher rates of dementia behind bars. To maintain the detention of this elderly population, federal and state prisons are creating long-term care units, which in turn carry a heavy financial burden. Prisons are thus gearing up to become nursing homes, but without the proper trained staff and adequate financial support. The costs both to taxpayers and to human dignity are only now becoming clear. This article squarely addresses the second dimension of this carceral practice, that is the cost to human dignity. Namely, it sets out why indefinitely incarcerating someone with dementia or other neurocognitive disorders violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. This conclusion derives from the confluence of two lines of U.S. Supreme Court precedent. First, in Madison v. Alabama, the Court recently held that executing someone (in Madison’s case someone with dementia) who cannot rationally understand their sentence amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. Second, in line with Miller v. Alabama, which puts life without parole (LWOP) sentences in the same class as death sentences due to their irrevocability, this holding should be extended to LWOP sentences. Put another way, this article explains why being condemned to life is equivalent to death for someone whose neurodegenerative disease is so severe that they cannot rationally understand their punishment.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 75-92
Author(s):  
Christian Schröer

An act-theoretical view on the profile of responsibility discourse shows in what sense not only all kinds of technical, pragmatic and moral reason, but also all kinds of religious motivation cannot justify a human action sufficiently without acknowledgment to three basic principles of human autonomy as supreme limiting conditions that are human dignity, sense, and justifiability. According to Thomas Aquinas human beings ultimately owe their moral autonomy to a divine creator. So this autonomy can be considered as an expression of secondary-cause autonomy and as the voice of God in the enlightened conscience.


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