Secondary-Cause Autonomy and Divine Motivation

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 75-92
Author(s):  
Christian Schröer

An act-theoretical view on the profile of responsibility discourse shows in what sense not only all kinds of technical, pragmatic and moral reason, but also all kinds of religious motivation cannot justify a human action sufficiently without acknowledgment to three basic principles of human autonomy as supreme limiting conditions that are human dignity, sense, and justifiability. According to Thomas Aquinas human beings ultimately owe their moral autonomy to a divine creator. So this autonomy can be considered as an expression of secondary-cause autonomy and as the voice of God in the enlightened conscience.

Philosophies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 12
Author(s):  
Lorenzo Magnani

Research on autonomy exhibits a constellation of variegated perspectives, from the problem of the crude deprivation of it to the study of the distinction between personal and moral autonomy, and from the problem of the role of a “self as narrator”, who classifies its own actions as autonomous or not, to the importance of the political side and, finally, to the need of defending and enhancing human autonomy. My precise concern in this article will be the examination of the role of the human cognitive processes that give rise to the most important ways of tracking the external world and human behavior in their relationship to some central aspects of human autonomy, also to the aim of clarifying the link between autonomy and the ownership of our own destinies. I will also focus on the preservation of human autonomy as an important component of human dignity, seeing it as strictly associated with knowledge and, even more significantly, with the constant production of new and pertinent knowledge of various kinds. I will also describe the important paradox of autonomy, which resorts to the fact that, on one side, cognitions (from science to morality, from common knowledge to philosophy, etc.) are necessary to be able to perform autonomous actions and decisions because we need believe in rules that justify and identify our choices, but, on the other side, these same rules can become (for example, as a result of contrasting with other internalized and approved moral rules or knowledge contents) oppressive norms that diminish autonomy and can thus, paradoxically, defeat agents’ autonomous capacity “to take ownership”.


Author(s):  
Marcus Düwell

This chapter investigates how human dignity might be understood as a normative concept for the regulation of technologies. First, various distinctions that are relevant for the way human dignity can be understood are discussed. It is argued that it is particularly important that we should see human dignity as a concept that ascribes a specific status that forms the basis of the human rights regimes. Second, the author’s own approach, inspired by Kant and Gewirth, is presented, it being proposed that we should see the concrete content of human dignity as the protection of the authority of human beings to govern their own lives. Third, various consequences for the evaluation of technologies are discussed. In a context of major global and ecological challenges, together with the replacement of human action by automation, the role of human dignity becomes one of guiding the development of a technology-responsive human rights regime.


Traditio ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 57 ◽  
pp. 67-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Kries

Due especially to the pioneering work of Lottin, philosophers and theologians interested in the medieval discussion of the human conscience are today well aware that the Scholastic debate was framed principally in relation to two words, conscientia and synderesis. In the now classic formulation of the distinction between those two terms by Thomas Aquinas, synderesis is understood as the special habitus of the practical intellect whereby human beings know the basic principles of morality, whereas conscientia is the act whereby the practical reasoning powers of a human being apply the fundamental principles to the particular matter at hand. It is also generally acknowledged by scholars today that the argument about the relationship between conscientia and synderesis began many years prior to Thomas's work, that the medieval debate was originally spurred by the introduction of the strange term synderesis into the conversation, and that the term entered the discussion by means of an enigmatic passage in Jerome's Commentary on Ezekiel. Finally, most scholars acknowledge that the appearance of synderesis in the medieval manuscripts of Jerome's commentary is in all likelihood a corruption of the Greek word syneidēsis, which is the standard correlate in Greek Patristic literature for the Latin conscientia.


2017 ◽  
pp. 383-406
Author(s):  
Christian Guillermet-Fernandez ◽  
David Fernandez Puyana

War and peace perpetually alternate and peace is always seen as an endless project, even a dream, to be realised in brotherhood by everyone all over the earth. Present generations should ensure that both they and future generations learn to live together in peace with the highest aspiration of sparing future generations the scourge of war. The UN Charter is the most solemn pact of peace in history, which lays down on the necessary basic principles for an enduring peace. Recently, in the context of the joint effort in the recognition of the high importance of practicing tolerance, dialogue, cooperation and solidarity among all human beings, peoples and nations, the General Assembly has raised the voice of victims to strongly condemn war and to openly reiterate their inalienable right to enjoy peace such that all human rights are promoted and protected and development is fully realized. The aim is to present activities of the General Assembly focused on the adoption of the Declaration on the right to peace.


2002 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 130-141
Author(s):  
Abdullah Muhammad al-Shami

In Islamic law judgements on any human action are usually evaluated in terms of the intention involved. Accordingly, the rules of substantive issues have to be accommodated under the basic principles of Islamic jurisprudence. The understanding of these principles by the juristic scholar is highly rewarding because it will lead the muftī to the right path in deriving legal opinions from the original sources. The basic principle of Islamic jurisprudence, which stipulates that ‘all actions depend on intentions,’ has played an important role in the construction of Islamic jurisprudence. Moreover, this rule has a special place in the theory of Islamic legal contract. So what is the effect of intention in the validity of human actions and legal contracts? It is known that pure intention has significant effects on spiritual worship and legal contracts of transaction. It also gives guidance for earning rewards from Almighty Allah. This article concentrates on the effect of intention in perpetual worship, the concept of action and intention in Islamic legal works, the kind of contract with all its components, and the jurists' views on the effects of intention in human action and legal contract along with their discussion and counter-arguments.


1988 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-246
Author(s):  
Mohammad A. Siddiqui

IntroductionCommunication today is increasingly seen as a process through whichthe exchange and sharing of meaning is made possible. Commtinication asa subject of scientific inquiry is not unique to the field of mass communication.Mathematicians, engineers, sociologists, psychologists, political scientists,anthropologists, and speech communicators have been taking an interest inthe study of communication. This is not surprising because communicationis the basic social process of human beings. Although communication hasgrown into a well developed field of study, Muslim scholars have rdrely hcusedon the study of communication. Thus, a brief introduction to the widely usedcommunication concepts and a framework for the study of communicationwithin the context of this paper is provided.In 1909, Charles Cooley defined communication from a sociologicalperspective as:The mechanism through which human relations exist and develop -all the symbols of mind, together with the means of conveyingthem through space and preserving them in time. It includes theexpression of the face, attitude and gesture, the tones of the voice,words, writing, printing, railways, telegraph, and whatever elsemay be the latest achievement in the conquest of space and time.In 1949, two engineers, Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, definedcommunication in a broader sense to include all procedures:By which one mind may affect another. This, of course, involvesnot only written and oral speeches, but also music, the pictorialarts, the theater, the ballet, and, in kct, all human behavior.Harold Lasswell, a political scientist, defines communication simply as:A convenient way to describe the act of communication is to answerthe following question: Who, says what, in which channel, towhom, with what effect?S.S. Stevens, a behavioral psychologist, defines the act of communication as:Communication occurs when some environmental disturbance (thestimulus) impinges on an organism and the organism doessomething about it (makes a discriminatory response) . . . Themessage that gets no response is not a commnication.Social psychologist Theodore Newcomb assumes that:In any communication situation, at least two persons will becommunicating about a common object or topic. A major functionof communication is to enable them to maintain simultaneousorientation toward one another and toward the common object ofcommunication.Wilbur Schramm, a pioneer in American mass communication research,provides this definition:When we communicate we are trying to share information, anidea, or an attitude. Communication always requires threeelements-the source, the message, and the destination (thereceiver).


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Apaar Kumar

Abstract Kant interpreters have contrasting views on what Kant takes to be the basis for human dignity. Several commentators have argued that human dignity can be traced back to some feature of human beings. Others contend that humans in themselves lack dignity, but dignity can be attributed to them because the moral law demands respect for humanity. I argue, alternatively, that human dignity in Kant’s system can be seen to be grounded in the reciprocal relationship between the dignity of the moral law and the dignity inherent in the human constitution. The latter includes the dignity of personhood, construed as rational inner purposiveness, and the dignity of giving oneself the law and striving to follow it.


2007 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 326-340
Author(s):  
Stephanie Smith

AbstractThis work critically examines the moral theology of Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II. In his writings as Wojtyla, and later as John Paul II, the theme of human dignity served as the starting point for his moral theology. This article first describes his conception of human dignity as influenced by Thomist and by phenomenological sources. The Thomist philosophy of being provided Wojtyla with an optimistic view of the epistemic and moral capacity of human persons. Wojtyla argued that because of the analogia entis, humans gain epistemic access to the normative order of God as well as the moral capacity to live in accordance with the law of God. Built upon the foundation of his Thomist assumptions, Wojtyla's phenomenological research enriched his insight into human dignity by arguing in favour of the formative nature of human action. He argued that human dignity rested also in this dynamism of personhood: the capacity not only to live in accordance with the normative order but to form oneself as virtuous by partaking in virtuous acts or to form one's community in solidarity through acts of participation and self-giving. After presenting his moral theology, this article then engages critically with his assumptions from a Protestant perspective. I argue that, while human dignity provides a powerful and beneficial starting point for ethics, his Thomist ontology of being/substance and the optimistic terms in which he interprets human dignity ultimately undermine his social programme. I propose that an ontology of relation provides a better starting point for interpreting human dignity and for appealing for acts of solidarity in the social realm.


Apeiron ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 405-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Maximilian Robitzsch

Abstract This paper deals with Heraclitus’ political thought. First, in discussing the conception of cosmic justice, it argues that it is a mistake to separate Heraclitus’ political thought from his cosmological thought. Second, the paper works out two basic principles of Heraclitean political thinking by offering a close analysis of fragment B 114 as well as related texts. According to Heraclitus, (1) there is a standard common and relevant to all human beings in the political realm, namely, the logos, and (2) ruling well is a matter of grasping the logos and using it as a guide in all things political. Finally, the paper tackles the notoriously difficult question of whether there are certain forms of political order towards which Heraclitean thought is more or less inclined. According to what may be called the traditional view, Heraclitus is seen as a supporter of an aristocratic political order, while according to what may be called the revisionist view, Heraclitus is classified as a supporter of a democratic political order. The paper concludes that while Heraclitean philosophy is compatible with a plethora of different forms of political order, including democratic ones, the two basic principles of Heraclitean politics that were distinguished above are more conducive to aristocratic forms of political order.


1970 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-17
Author(s):  
Tadeusz Ślipko

The idea of expressing an opinion on the difficult issue of relating to the anthropological basis of human dignity, arose in response to writings coming from two ideologically very different philosophical positions. The first of these is to be found in the author's academic neighborhood, namely school of Christian personalist philosophy associated with the Catholic University of Lublin. The second, on the other hand, originates from the sphere of libertarian humanist philosophy and expresses itself in a secular concept of human moral autonomy. Ideas coming from these two diametrically opposed standpoints provoke critical reflection; the latter will form the basis on which an alternative concept of human dignity will be outlined. With this aim in mind, analysis of this subject will consist of two parts: the first will take the form of a commentary-style critique, while the second will consist of proposals and clarifications.


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