The Normality of Constitutional Politics

2017 ◽  
pp. 387-408
Author(s):  
Bellamy Richard ◽  
Schönlau Justus
1993 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 463-478
Author(s):  
George Feaver

‘IF THE STATE DID NOT EXIST, WE WOULD HAVE TO INVENT IT. Comment.’ Few of the responses to this examination question qualified its suggestion that the state might be amenable to instantaneous contrivance or conscious design. The oversight on the part of my undergraduate charges pointed to the still potent legacy of a generation of Canadian political artificers whose projects of inventing the Canadian state had abetted the rise of a species of ‘constitutional politics’ given to the ever more elaborate concoction of comprehensive solutions to Canada's vexing constitutional shortcomings. These projects tended to politicize historically embedded elements in the constitutional order, serviceable if imperfect, which had been conventionally regarded as resistant beyond redemption to improved reformulation. This new-style politics was at centre stage in the long and eventful prime ministerial years of the Liberal Party's Pierre Trudeau, the great Cartesian inventor par excellence of the contemporary Canadian state. It would remain a central feature of the nine-year incumbency of Trudeau's Conservative Party successor, Brian Mulroney. Trudeau's vision of a reinvented Canada had proceeded from his background preparation for public life as an academic constitutional lawyer. Mulroney, aiming to finesse what the more cerebral Trudeau could not, would bring to bear on the affairs of the Canadian state the skills of a labour lawyer with the know-how to get Canada's perennially fractious provinces and interest groups to the political bargaining table, there to resolve once and for all any constitutional differences still outstanding.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-155
Author(s):  
Juli Amalia Nasucha

Some of the themes discussed in this study include: knowing the miniature of Sharia, the field of Fiqh, Islamic governance, and Political Asylum. Some of the conclusions generated from the discussion regarding the Competence and Jurisdiction of Islamic Law include: First, it is necessary to know that there are two dimensions in Islamic law which are closely related to each other, namely the divine dimension and the Insaniyah dimension. Second, as a derivation of the two dimensions contained in Islamic law, then Islamic law is divided into two parts, namely Islamic law as a product of Law / Fiqh or fiqh as a science, while the second is law as a social institution. Third, fiqih as a social institution This then gives rise to jurisdiction in applying Islamic law so that the next discussion that becomes important is the concept of constitutionality in Islam with all its articulations concerning Islamic constitutional politics.


Author(s):  
Mark Tushnet ◽  
Mark A. Graber ◽  
Sanford Levinson ◽  
Mariah Zeisberg

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
William E Scheuerman

Radical democratic political theorists have used the concept of constituent power to sketch ambitious models of radical democracy, while many legal scholars deploy it to make sense of the political and legal dynamics of constitutional politics. Its growing popularity notwithstanding, I argue that the concept tends to impede a proper interpretation of civil disobedience, conceived as nonviolent, politically motivated lawbreaking evincing basic respect for law. Contemporary theorists who employ it cannot distinguish between civil disobedience and other related, yet ultimately different, modes of political illegality (e.g. conscientious objection, resistance, revolution). The essay also examines Jürgen Habermas’ recent contributions to a theory of mixed or dualistic (postnational) constituent power, conceding that Habermas avoids many theoretical and political ills plaguing competing radical democratic theoretical retrievals. Nonetheless, Habermas’ attempt to salvage the idea of constituent power as part of his reformist agenda for the European Union not only breaks with his earlier understandable skepticism about the idea but also risks trimming the admirably ambitious sails of his radical democratic interpretation of civil disobedience.


2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-29
Author(s):  
Yonatan T. Fessha

Some call it Addis Ababa. Others call it Finfinnee. That is the capital city of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. “What’s in a name?” In fact, the name is at the centre of the row over the federal capital. Those who opt to refer the capital as Finfinnee claim that the capital belongs to the Oromo. Those that stick to the official name, Addis Ababa, reject the language of ownership. But this is not merely a fight over history. It is a constitutional politics that has gripped the federation. The debate over the Ethiopian capital brings to fore the question about the place of capital cities in multi-ethnic federations. Using the Ethiopian capital as a case study, this article investigates how capital cities can manage the tension between the accommodation of diverse communities and the indigeneity argument that is often used as a basis to claim ownership. The article argues that the mediation of tensions can be best addressed through the framework of intergovernmental cooperation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 96-120
Author(s):  
André Lecours

This chapter considers a case, Flanders, where secessionism has not gained strength despite many episodes fuelling tensions between the two main communities and significant, though episodic, cynicism about the future of the country. The singular political development of the Belgian state, which has involved an incremental and open-ended process of decentralization, has meant that Flemish autonomy is dynamic. Belgium is famous for its seemingly incessant constitutional politics leading to reforms of the state that transform the country’s institutional architecture in innovative ways. For Flanders, these state reforms have meant a gradual expansion of autonomy. Moreover, the reforms are never meant to conclude a process of decentralization; they always leave issues to be dealt with at an ulterior date. State reforms are high-profile events that often occur to manage a crisis between the two communities and are subject to government formation agreements in the context of the country’s consociational practices. Flemish parties can typically have a state reform if most of them want one or else the country remains without a government, which is something Francophone parties want to avoid for fear it makes Belgium seem unworkable and therefore feeds Flemish secessionist arguments. As Flemings know there is a forthcoming state reform that will enhance their collective autonomy and address some issues perceived as important for their national identity and interests, there is little incentive to support secessionist positions.


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