scholarly journals Logical contradiction, contrary opposites, and epistemological relativism

2020 ◽  
pp. 208-229
Author(s):  
Miira Tuominen ◽  
Eeva K. Kallio
Theoria ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 64 (152) ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
James Furner

AbstractThe contradiction in conception test (CC test) is one of two tests posed by Kant’s Formula of the Law of Nature. This article proposes a new interpretation of this test: a causal-teleological version of the Logical Contradiction Interpretation (LCI). Its distinctive feature is that it identifies causal and teleological implications in the thought of a universal law of nature. A causal-teleological version of LCI has two advantages. While the established view of the Groundwork’s applications of the CC test is a hybrid view that treats the Groundwork’s arguments as different in kind, a causal-teleological version of LCI unifies the Groundwork’s applications of the CC test. Relatedly, a causal-teleological version of LCI provides a solution to the problem of how the CC test can confirm the impermissibility of a self-directed maxim.


Hypatia ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacquelyn N. Zita

In this commentary on Joyce Trebilcot's “Dyke Methods or Principles for the Discovery/Creation of the Withstanding,” I discuss four areas of difficulty in Trebikot's proposed methods: (1) an overly negative view of “the intention to persuade,” (2) a tendency towards epistemological relativism and loss of cultural authorities, (3) a circularity in defining the proposed methods as dyke methods, and (4) a hint of repressive tolerance towards differences among lesbians by avoidance of painful confrontation involving those differences. Unlike Trebilcot, I make a distinction between the abuse of persuasion and the art of persuasion, re-claiming the latter as a caring and challenging strategy, rather than an invasion of adversarial heteropatriarchal tactics.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Raphael Jospe

Jewish theology is compatible with religious pluralism, based on the paradigm of the Jewish obligation to live in accordance with the commandments of the Torah while accepting the legitimacy of other ways of life in accordance with the paradigm of the universal “seven commandments of the children of Noah.” Jospe here answers two challenges to this thesis, one, voiced by Christian theologians, that pluralism equals relativism, and a second, voiced by the Jewish scholar, Menachem Kellner, that there are no sources for pluralism in Jewish tradition and that pluralism itself makes no sense. In presenting his arguments, Jospe invokes a wide range of ancient, medieval and modern thinkers, probing the theological possibilities for pluralism within Jewish tradition and its boundaries with relativism. In doing so, he argues that one should differentiate between moral relativism, a non-negotiable category, and epistemological relativism, where there is room for compromise.


Author(s):  
Jean-Luc Marion

In this chapter Marion speaks of the miracle as what we think to be impossible although it actually takes place. The miracle is about what really occurs but seems impossible, not about a logical contradiction, but about an event (it is hence about faith in the event). Christ’s death is the end of any possibility; his resurrection the miracle of the event of the impossible. The miracle puts faith into play. Metaphysics excludes possibility (and sees it as opposed to actuality). Phenomenology frees the possibility of phenomena. The Resurrection becomes the paradigm for any miracle. It appears outside the horizon and displaces or suspends it by saturating our gaze. This saturated phenomenon constitutes the I.


Author(s):  
R. Rodrigo Soberano

The argument (d) ("All arguments with true premises and false conclusions are invalid.") is an argument with true premises and false conclusion. Therefore "(d) is invalid" seems to be formally valid. Thus presumably formal logic has to admit it as valid. But then formal logic finds itself in a bind. For the above argument is problematic and even paradoxical since it involves an internal logical contradiction. The paradox, aptly termed "Stove's paradox," is fully realized by demonstrating with the help of symbolic logic the contradiction within the argument. Then as the main part of this essays shows, the paradox is attacked by exposing the paradox's genesis. It is shown that by appeal to some not so obvious logical considerations regarding sound linguistic construction and usage, the above argument could not have been legitimately construction. For its construction must have involved either equivocation or hiatus of meaningfulness in the use of the symbol (d).


1992 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-45
Author(s):  
David D. Cooper ◽  

For the past two decades, the humanistic disciplines have been dominated by poststructuralist theories and, more recently, a not unrelated curricular philosophy best defined as hardline multiculturalism, much discussed and often misunderstood. When linked together, they form an internal contradiction that is the moral challenge of liberal education today. Traditional political alignments cannot explain current divisions among the humanities professoriate. Ideological quarrels only obscure a deeper moral debate between an ascendant poststructuralism and a resurgent liberal humanism. It is important to reappropriate liberal humanism in an effort to revitalize humanistic inquiry and renew its place in creative public discourse, and check a danger posed by poststructuralism's fascination with power and epistemological relativism which threaten to erase the ethical border between education and indoctrination.


1972 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 796-817 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugene F. Miller

The present controversy between “behavioral” and “postbehavioral” views of political inquiry reflects a larger dispute between two opposing theories of knowledge. Whereas the behavioral movement has its epistemological roots in positivism and, ultimately, in classical British empiricism, the most recent protest against behavioralism draws upon the theory of knowledge that has been the principal foe of empiricism over the past century. This theory of knowledge, which received the name “historicism” shortly after its emergence, had become the dominant epistemological position by the mid-twentieth century. This essay considers the general nature of historicism and its influence on the recent revolt against positivism in the philosophy of science. Finally, it examines the use that political scientists have made of historicist principles in opposing positivistic models of political inquiry. It argues that an epistemological relativism becomes unavoidable once certain premises of historicism are embraced.


Kybernetes ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 40 (7/8) ◽  
pp. 995-1003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ron Eglash

PurposeThe paper aims to describe the inadequate nature of both “mono‐objectivist” approaches, which deny any role of social influence in science, and relativist social constructions, which fail to distinguish between science and pseudoscience. It outlines an alternative conceptual framework that allows for the possibility of social construction of science, while preventing epistemological relativism.Design/methodology/approachThe study utilizes the cybernetic concept of recursion to show how science can bend back on itself, investigating its own foundations, without undermining its ability to improve our empirical understanding of the world. The paper makes use of several case studies to define specific mechanisms that show how the process of knowledge production in science can steer a course between reduction to a single “right answer,” and fragmentation into subjective interpretations.FindingsThe paper concludes by showing how the cybernetic recursion of multiple objectivity can also be applied to cybernetics itself. In particular, it suggests that such recursive investigations allow us to reconsider the Law of Requisite Variety, and envision an alternative form that can better account for the complexity that arises in self‐generating systems.Research limitations/implicationsThe research is unlikely to be of use to scientists looking for epistemological proof of singular right answers, or social constructivists looking for proof of epistemological relativism.Practical implicationsThe paper suggests that researchers in constructivism need not limit their work for fear that it will lead to relativist conclusions.Originality/valueThis paper fulfils an identified need to offer an alternative to current developments in the field of science and technology studies.


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