The Global Financial Architecture: Towards a Strengthened Institutional Framework for Global Financial Stability?

Author(s):  
Hare Christopher

Whilst the letter of credit has been the dominant force in the trade-finance area, its utility has increasingly been challenged by technology, regulation, and competition from other financial products. Additionally, there are some circumstances where economic, political, or financial instability makes the letter of credit inapt. This is because the letter of credit requires a certain level of financial stability and an appropriate institutional framework to function properly. In such circumstances, the parties may resort to trade finance mechanisms that can withstand such instability. The prime example is countertrade, whereby goods or services are used to ‘pay’ for goods or services. Whilst this form of transacting is not without its legal difficulties, countertrade may provide a useful trade-finance device in times of crisis, such as the global coronavirus pandemic.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 79-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Milena Vučinić

Abstract The crisis pointed to the necessity for strong and stable financial system resistant to potential risks and shocks. Macroprudential policy is used to identify, monitor and asses systemic risks to financial stability. Therefore, it is very important to create effective and efficient macroprudential policy. To achieve this, it is crucial to create a strong institutional framework. This paper deals with the importance of macroprudential policy for financial system stability. The first part of the paper explains the macroprudential policy and its connection with other economic policies. The second part refers to the necessity of building strong institutional framework and the importance of providing clear responsibilities for macroprudential policy, as long as precise determination of responsibilities is very suggested and important for further functioning and policy implementation. Responsibilities for macro-prudential policy and macroprudential supervision defers among countries.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 61-100
Author(s):  
Dalit Flaiszhaker

This article explores whether the post-GFC global financial architecture is likely to provide efficient regulation capable of preventing a future crisis from occurring. The article starts with a brief overview of the emergence in the 1970s of global financial architecture. A thorough descriptive analysis of the post-crisis architecture follows, raising serious doubts regarding the current architecture’s ability to accomplish its goal. This analysis is performed in two stages, taking first an outsider’s perspective on the changes the architecture underwent after the crisis and moving then to the inside — the structure and contents of the architecture. Using macro-prudential methodological tools, the establishment of the Financial Stability Board is reviewed, along with three cutting edge regulations: the Basel III framework for banking, the IOSCO’s recommendation for money market funds, and the FSB’s recommendations regarding repurchase agreements. Pointing out the architecture’s perceived failure to provide stability due to severe regulatory arbitrage, the article then widens the lens to explore the implications of the above regulation. The article suggests that the current architecture encourages ‘financialisation’ and pushes the financial system and the real economy further apart. Consequently, the article raises normative concerns regarding the legal foundations of the global financial architecture, and its legitimacy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (520) ◽  
pp. 317-327
Author(s):  
M. O. Zhytar ◽  
◽  
R. I. Shchur ◽  

The article explains the essence of institutional provision and characterizes the main aspects of regulation of the world financial architecture. It is defined that no other element of financial architecture has such powerful financial resources to realize the goal of financial stability and to assist developing countries, as well as countries with transition economies. The main directions of implementation of strategic goals for regulation of financial architecture are considered. The authors justify the need to timely improve the institutional provision for the process of regulating international financial relations in the context of increasing financial stability in the global economic environment and as an appropriate reflection on the conditions of transformational uncertainty and strategic imperatives of the development of the world financial architecture. The conceptual scheme of institutional provision for regulation of world financial architecture is presented and characterized. A new world financial architecture is proposed and its main advantages are analyzed. The need for algorithmic transformation of the liberal model of world financial architecture to a clearer regulation both the State-based and the superior one fulfilled on the grounds of regionalization is argued. It is concluded that the main factors of negative impact of global disparities on the world economy are as follows: imperfection of the financial mechanism, aggravation of a totality of contradictions between financial and real sectors of the economy, between national and international structures in the direction of implementation of the strategic State goals and strengthening of regionalism.


2019 ◽  
pp. 189-230
Author(s):  
Iris H-Y Chiu ◽  
Joanna Wilson

This chapter assesses international banking supervision. The solution to the issues in international banking has been the development of procedures that seek to encourage coordination or cooperation between national supervisors. This has been facilitated by the creation of international organisations that have allowed large numbers of countries to discuss, agree, and promote not only supervisory standards, but also regulatory rules. Together, these organisations constitute the international financial architecture that seeks to ensure financial stability by addressing a number of different issues. Two of the key bodies in international banking regulation include the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB). Ultimately, the proliferation of international banking in recent decades, and the need to ensure that banking supervision takes place on a consolidated basis, has led to calls for the creation of a single global regulator.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 120-142
Author(s):  
Haidar Hamza Judy ◽  
Noufel Smaili .

Since the recent Global Financial Crisis, Central Banks Have extensive Powers and Objectives include both Monetary Sability and Financial Stability. Which required new arrangements for the Governance of Central Banks and the design of a new Institutional Framework to restrict the use of power by focusing on Independence, Accountability and Transparency. Perception of individuals to risks resulting from shifts in Monetary Policy because of the change in the multiple goals weakens the degree of the effectiveness and acceptance. As the Central Bank is responsible for Monetary Policy management, identify orientations, objectives and choose the appropriate means, it works to ensure the effectiveness of Monetary Policy, and for that warrant provided on the Independence, Accountability, and Respect for the Principles of Transparency, So the application of Banking Governance..


Author(s):  
Pierre Canac

Several South American countries experienced financial crises during the 1990s and each responded differently. Thus Brazil floated the real following its 1997 crisis, Argentina started the decade with a currency board arrangement, but was forced to give it up some ten years later at more or less the same time that Ecuador adopted the dollar as its official currency. Chile, on the other hand, has been an island of financial stability in a subcontinent in turmoil. This article provides an alternative model for South American countries that could lead to more stability in the region and more independence from any of the major economies, especially the United States. This model borrows heavily from the experience of the European Union in general and European Monetary Union in particular. It recommends that the countries in South America first join a reformed Mercosur before forming a South American Monetary Union. In addition to creating a new common central bank or currency board, some other regional institutions will probably need to be created in order to coordinate economic policies, to negotiate with other countries, and to settle disputes that might arise among members.


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