Heads of state and other government officials before the International Criminal Court: the uneasy revolution continues

Author(s):  
Leila Nadya Sadat
2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Chernor Jalloh

Abstract In these remarks, the author considers the most recent challenge to the application of international criminal justice in Africa: Kenya’s controversial November 2013 proposal to amend the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to temporarily exempt from prosecution sitting presidents accused of involvement with international crimes. He examines several legal and practical reasons why such a proposal is untenable. Instead, citing the principle of complementarity and urging the principled use of judicial and prosecutorial discretion, he contends that much of the African Union’s current concerns about the Kenya Situation can be addressed within the confines of existing Rome Law. This is important because, even if it is possible for African countries to secure amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, African States Parties are unlikely able to secure the global consensus required to effect substantive amendments to the 1998 treaty. On the other hand, the author suggests that the International Criminal Court officials, especially the judges and the chief prosecutor, can help bridge the apparent gap between the Court and its African supporters. Towards that end, they should consider taking a more flexible and more nuanced approach to their interpretations and application of several important provisions contained in their founding statute. Eschewing a one-size fits all approach, it is submitted that each African situation is unique – both in the scope of the problem, and in the solution required in the necessary fight against impunity in Africa.


2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (4) ◽  
pp. 967-969
Author(s):  
Arthur W. Rovine

Late last year, in a letter to Congressman Tom DeLay, majority whip of the House of Representatives, twelve former high government officials expressed their support for a bill introduced by Senator Jesse Helms in June 2000, entitled "American Servicemembers' Protection Act."1 The bill, if enacted, would prohibit any agency of the U.S. government from cooperating with the international criminal court (ICC), and proscribe U.S. military assistance to any nation that becomes a party to the treaty of Rome,2 with the exception of NATO members and certain other allied countries.


2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elise Keppler

AbstractThe International Criminal Court (ICC) suffered two notable setbacks in Africa in 2010: the African Union's (AU) renewed call for members not to cooperate in executing ICC arrest warrants for Sudanese President al-Bashir; and the president's first visits to the territory of ICC states parties since warrants were issued in 2009 and 2010. Factors surrounding these developments suggest they do not represent the predominant view or approach to the court in Africa, where there is considerable backing for the ICC among African government officials and civil society. African ICC states parties and civil society should enhance initiatives to demonstrate the support that exists for the court, and to ensure that attacks on it are understood as limited efforts that emanate more from criticisms of the UN Security Council than of the court. Developments in 2011 reinforce these assessments.


Subject Regional risks posed by the crisis in Burundi. Significance On January 31, the African Union (AU) heads of state voted against deploying a proposed 5,000-strong peacekeeping force to Burundi to quell violence triggered by President Pierre Nkurunziza's successful bid for a third term in office. The decision indicates tacit support by many leaders, some of whom are planning similar bids. Yet they remain concerned for the wider security implications should a full civil war erupt. Impacts Tanzania's new president, John Magufuli, is best placed to lead future peace talks given his strong standing regionally and internationally. If the crisis becomes genocidal, the UNSC may consider extending its DRC peacekeeping mission's mandate to include Burundi. AU opposition to the International Criminal Court means that Nkurunziza is unlikely to face charges if he steps down or is removed.


2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 197-209
Author(s):  
Suzanne Bullock

Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al BashirIn this decision the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) condemned Malawi, as a member state of the ICC, for the failure to comply with the request to arrest and surrender the President of Sudan, Omar Al Bashir. Significantly, the Chamber determined that the traditionally sacrosanct concept of immunity of Heads of State no longer applied before an international court or tribunal. Whilst the intention to create universal jurisdiction over perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity is extremely laudable, the legal reasoning by the Chamber is regrettably unsound. If the decision remains unchallenged, the implication is that no Head of State, whether or not they are a signatory to the ICC, is immune from prosecution on the mere basis of the ICC’s status as an international court.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 38 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 38 deals with the Presidency, one of the four ‘organs of the Court’ listed in article 34. The Presidency is made up of three judges, elected by their peers. It is responsible for the proper administration of the Court, through management oversight, coordination, and cooperation. It oversees the judicial functions, and has specific responsibilities in this respect assigned by the Statute. The Presidency also assumes a role representing the Court at the international level, broadening its support and promoting its values and ideals. This includes meeting with government officials, representatives of States, parliamentarians, and representatives of international and regional organizations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (6) ◽  
pp. 1177-1233
Author(s):  
Thomas Weatherall

On May 6, 2019, the Appeals Chamber (AC) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) delivered its judgment in Jordan's appeal of the December 11, 2017 decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) in Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir. The first and second grounds of appeal concerned whether Jordan had complied with its duty to cooperate with the request of the Court to arrest and surrender Al-Bashir. The third ground of appeal concerned whether the PTC abused its discretion in referring Jordan's noncompliance to the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute (ASP) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Prior to the judgment, ICC PTCs had created divergent jurisprudence regarding the immunity of incumbent heads of state before international courts.


Author(s):  
Charles Chernor Jalloh ◽  
Ilias Bantekas

Africa has been at the forefront of contemporary global efforts towards ensuring greater accountability for international crimes. This work analyses the relationship and tensions between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and Africa. It traces the origins of the confrontation between African governments, acting individually or within the framework of the African Union, and the permanent Hague-based ICC. Topics examined include Africa, the ICC, and universal jurisdiction; the controversial use of the Prosecutor’s proprio motu power to initiate investigations in Africa; national implementation of the ICC statute in Africa; the complementarity principle; the sequencing of justice and peace; the question of immunity of sitting heads of state; the controversial role of the UN Security Council in referring and deferring situations under ICC investigation; the role of African domestic and traditional courts in the fight against impunity; and the recent withdrawal of some African states parties from the ICC.


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