Pashukanis commodity-form theory of law

2021 ◽  
pp. 115-138
Author(s):  
Matthew Dimick
Author(s):  
Raymond Koen

Nils Christie is acknowledged generally as the theoretical founding father of restorative justice. Evgeny Pashukanis may be taken as the premier Marxist theoretician of law. This essay represents an endeavour to read Christie through the lens of Pashukanism, that is, to comprehend the theory of restorative justice developed by Christie in relation to the general theory of law formulated by Pashukanis. The early part of the essay is expository: firstly, it sets out in abbreviated form the fundamental tenets of Pashukanis's so-called commodity form theory of law, with some attention being given to the Pashukanist approach to criminal justice; and secondly, it explains the core elements of Christie's theory of restorative justice, including his critique of western criminal justice and his advocacy of a system of "conflicts as property" as the answer to the crisis of criminality which plagues the western world. The latter part of the essay is critical: it compares and contrasts Christie's proprietary theory of restorative justice with Pashukanis's commodity form theory of law. On the one hand, it is argued that there exists a remarkable theoretical concordance between Christie and Pashukanis in the sense that Christie's idea of criminal conflict as property constitutes a non-Marxist vindication of Pashukanis's analysis of the legal form. On the other hand, it is posited that because Pashukanis proceeds from a Marxist perspective and Christie does not, there remain crucial areas of difference between them, especially as regards the historicity of the legal form, the concept of legal subjectivity, and the role of the state. In the light of these differences the essay concludes with a Pashukanist critique of the Christie thesis, seeking to assess the prospects of restorative justice replacing criminal justice as the generalised mode of disposition of criminal conflicts.


Author(s):  
R Koen

This essay presents an extended defence of the general theory of law formulated by the Bolshevik jurist, Evgeny Pashukanis, and published in his Law and Marxism: A General Theory in 1924. The general theory is a theory of the legal form. Although Pashukanis did not name his theory, it has become known as the commodity form theory of law because of its theorising the legal form as a homologue of the commodity form. However, despite having weighty Marxist and revolutionary Bolshevik credentials, the general theory has been subjected to sustained attack, especially from new left and neo-Marxist circles. This essay identifies and explicates six major objections to Pashukanism from its left critics. These are that the general theory is too abstract to comprehend the reality of legal relations; that it is infused with economic reductionism; that it derives the legal form wrongly from commodity exchange; that it classifies the legal form incorrectly as an attribute of capitalism only; that it lacks the generality required of a general theory of law; and that it is imbricated in the growth of anarchism and Stalinism. Following a brief exegetical exercise, the bulk of the essay is devoted to demonstrating in detail that each of the six objections to the general theory is without merit, and that none makes any serious incursion into its integrity as a theory of the legal form. The central submission of the essay is that the Pashukanist general theory of law is rooted in the first principles of classical Marxism and hence may lay claim legitimately to being the Marxist theory of law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 415-431
Author(s):  
Grietje Baars

Rosa Luxembourg’s 1900 pamphlet 'Reform or revolution', which critiqued reformist political strategy, has relevance to, and finds echoes in today’s debates on the possibility and desirability of using law to protect society from the market’s negative effects. It also summed up the nineteenth-century 'Polanyian' reformist and Marxist 'revolutionary' perspectives. Polanyi argued that 'the economic' must be 'embedded' in the social by means of legal regulation, an argument he illustrates with the help of the 'Speenhamland' example. Marx, while acknowledging the role of the legal struggle as part of class struggle, concludes that ultimately 'right can never be higher than the economic structure of society'. Marxist legal theorist Pashukanis developed this position in his 'commodity form theory of law' which points to the structural impossibility of law’s regulation of capitalism. While contemporary 'Polanyist' Ruggie again asserts that legal and soft law 'global governance' regimes can control capitalism’s main instrument, the corporation, Shamir contra Ruggie argues that the 'moralisation of markets' through corporate social responsibility (CSR) leads to the 'marketisation of morality' or a change in what we perceive law to be (and who has legitimate authority to regulate) rather than a 'taming' of markets. Following Shamir, I add that this corporate-led global governance hastens the collapse of capitalism, and confirms the inevitability of revolution and the subsequent creation of a law-free society.


Author(s):  
Вадим Леонидович Афанасьевский

В статье анализируется проблема взаимоотношений философии права и научной теории права. Рассматриваемая проблема стала особенно актуальной в российском образовательном пространстве в связи с введением после длительного перерыва в государственный образовательный стандарт магистратуры по юриспруденции учебной дисциплины «Философия права». Автор статьи в качестве базисного принимает тезис, согласно которому философия права, являясь сферой философской мысли, и теория права как область научного социогуманитарного знания представляют собой разные типы теоретического дискурса. Исходя из этого, в статье выстраивается теоретическая концепция, согласно которой задачей философии права как философского типа мышления является конструирование или экспликация онтологических, эпистемологических, аксиологических, феноменологических оснований для формирования и функционирования научных теоретико-правовых и историко-правовых построений. Для реализации поставленной в статье задачи подробно рассматриваются ключевые характеристики как теории философского типа, так и идеалов, норм и характеристик научного знания. Выявленное различие экстраполируется на взаимоотношение теории права как продукта научного творчества и философии права как конструкции, задающей базовые мировоззренческие смыслы. В качестве примера выработанных философией права и государства оснований научных теорий прогресса, государства, морали и права, автор приводит взгляды мыслителей западноевропейской философской классики: Т. Гоббса, Ж.-Ж. Руссо, И. Канта, Г.В.Ф. Гегеля. Именно их философские концепции предопределили образы теоретико- и историко-правовых учений XVIII, XIX, XX и даже начала XXI в. Таким образом, отношение философии права и теории права выстраивается по «вертикали»: от онтологического основания к возведению теоретико-правовых и историко-правовых научных построений. The article analyzes the problem of the relationship between the philosophy of law and the scientific theory of law. The problem under consideration has become especially urgent in the Russian educational space in connection with the introduction of the Philosophy of Law discipline master's degree in law after a long break. The author of the article takes as the basis the thesis that the philosophy of law, being the sphere of philosophical thought, and the theory of law as a field of scientific socio-humanitarian knowledge are different types of theoretical discourse. Based on this, the article builds a theoretical concept according to which the task of the philosophy of law as a philosophical type of thinking is the construction or explication of ontological, epistemological, axiological, phenomenological grounds for the formation and functioning of concrete scientific theoretical and legal and historical and legal constructions. To implement the task posed in the article, the key characteristics of both a theory of a philosophical type and ideals, norms and characteristics of scientific knowledge are examined in detail. The revealed difference is extrapolated to the relationship between the theory of law as a product of scientific creativity and the philosophy of law as a construction that sets basic philosophical meanings. As an example of the foundations of the scientific theories of progress, state, morality and law developed by the philosophy of law and the state, the author gives the views and thinkers of the West European philosophical classics T. Hobbes, J.-J. Russo, I. Kant, G.V.F. Hegel. It was their philosophical concepts that predetermined the images of theoretical and historical-legal doctrines of the XVIII, XIX, XX and even the beginning of the XXI centuries. Thus, the attitude of the philosophy of law and the theory of law is built along the «vertical»: from the ontological foundation to the construction of theoretical and historical and historical legal scientific constructions.


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