Competition policy and the economics of vertical restraints

2020 ◽  
pp. 146-173
Author(s):  
Ralph A. Winter
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Vertical Restraints

Vertical restraints, the single market imperative and UK competition policy after Brexit

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 122-129
Author(s):  
Patrick F. Todd
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Market Integration ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Single Market ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Uk

After Brexit, the United Kingdom is unlikely to continue pursuing integration with other Member States of the European Union, including through competition policy. As a result, the time is ripe to reconsider the role of the single market imperative in competition law, in particular in relation to vertical restraints where the goal of market integration plays a pivotal role. This article shows that recent European vertical restraints decisions and case law, in particular concerning territorial and online restraints, have been motivated in whole or in part by the single market imperative (SMI). It then examines how the law in the UK might follow a different path post-Brexit, taking the Ping case as an example. However, a similar change is not likely to be forthcoming in relation to the law governing pricing restraints, which are not obviously linked to the SMI and which have been the subject of much enforcement in the UK both before and during the UK's membership of the EU.

16. Vertical agreements

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Motor Vehicle ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
Online Commerce ◽  
Distribution Chain ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Block Exemption ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines the application of Article 101 TFEU and the Chapter I prohibition in the UK Competition Act 1998 to vertical agreements. The chapter begins by briefly describing the distribution chain, followed by sections on how the law applies to vertical integration and agency agreements. It discusses the competition policy considerations raised by vertical agreements, including the challenges presented by the emergence of online commerce. It explains the application of Article 101 to various vertical agreements while considering the case law of the EU Courts and the position of the Commission in its Guidelines on Vertical Restraints. The chapter goes on to discuss the provisions of Regulation 330/2010, the block exemption for vertical agreements; and the application of Article 101(3) to vertical agreements. The chapter then contains sections on Regulation 461/2010 on motor vehicle distribution and on sub-contracting agreements. Finally, it looks at the position in UK law.

11. Vertical Agreements

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Academic Debate

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter, which discusses EU competition policy towards vertical agreements, begins by outlining the choices available to a supplier when deciding how best to market and sell its products or services to customers, and the impact that the competition rules may have on a supplier's choice. It then discusses the EU approach to vertical restraints; the application of Article 101(1) and Article 101(3) to vertical agreements; sub-contracting agreements; and the possible application of Article 102 to distribution agreements.

11. Vertical Agreements

2019 ◽  
pp. 736-808
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
Parallel Trade ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Exclusive Dealing ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Block Exemption ◽  
The Eu

This chapter, which discusses EU competition policy towards vertical agreements, begins by outlining the choices available to a supplier when deciding how best to market and sell its products or services to customers, and the impact that the competition rules may have on a supplier's choice, including the treatment of agency agreements. It then discusses the EU approach to vertical agreements, in the light of the Commission’s Verticals Guidelines of 2010, including exclusive dealing, single branding, franchising andselective distribution agreements, and the review of the 2010 regime. It considers the importance in EU law of parallel trade between Member States and how this has influenced policy towards vertical restraints. It analyses the application of Article 101(1) and Article 101(3) to vertical agreements, including the Verticals block exemption of 2010; sub-contracting agreements; and the possible application of Article 102 to distribution agreements.

scholarly journals III. Competition

1998 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 713-719 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Newman ◽  
Robert Lane
Keyword(s):  
Technology Transfer ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Product Market ◽  
Pharmaceutical Products ◽  
Green Paper ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
Patent Licensing ◽  
Know How ◽  
Single Block ◽  
Block Exemption

The period under consideration (mid-1995 to March 1998) was a relatively quiet one for Article 85. Note should be taken of the publication in 1997 of the Commission's Green Paper on vertical restraints in competition policy,1 which is likely to lead to a significant overhaul of a number of block exemption regulations. The existing block exemptions on patent licensing and know-how agreements2 were merged into a new single block exemption on technology transfer.3 Perhaps the most interesting and potentially far-reaching development was the Commission decision in Bayer/Adalat,4 in which the Commission characterised as agreements—and so falling within Article 85—attempts by the German chemicals group Bayer to limit supplies of a range of pharmaceutical products from its wholly owned distributors in other member States to wholesalers there in order to stem parallel exports. This was not an Article 86 case (Bayer was not dominant in the relevant product market), of which refusal to sell is more commonly a feature, and an agreement between manufacturer and distributor/wholesaler which prohibits re-export of the contract goods has long been recognised as falling within Article 85(1). But in Bayer/Adalat the wholesalers never agreed to the (alleged) export ban, and in fact resisted Bayer's attempts to limit supplies both directly and by subterfuge. Nevertheless, the Commission found an agreement between the Bayer distributors and the wholesalers, effectively simply in continuing to deal, the former having committed “an infringement of Article 85(1) by imposing an export ban as part of their continuous commercial relations with [the latter]”,5 the ban having “been agreed [sic] as part of their ongoing business relations”.6

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