Vertical restraints in an online world: competition authorities gear up their enforcement approach in the digital economy

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-28
Author(s):  
Marc Israel ◽  
Jacquelyn MacLennan ◽  
Jan Jeram
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
Gear Up ◽  
Price Setting ◽  
European Level ◽  
New Era ◽  
Digital Era ◽  
Online Marketplaces ◽  
National Competition

The regulation of vertical restraints is a long-standing facet of competition law, governed at the European level by Article 101 TFEU. However, in the new era of digitization, algorithmic price monitoring and price setting has the potential to lead to rapid and widespread price changes across entire online marketplaces for suppliers, often leading to lower prices, which benefit consumers. The manner in which suppliers react to these pressures has resulted in behaviours that may involve collusion, but more often are reminiscent of classic vertical restraints, albeit in the new digital era. The article considers how the European Commission and some Member States’ national competition authorities have been tackling vertical restraints in the online world, and considers the implications as the European economy continues to digitize.

A New Era for Private Antitrust Litigation in Germany? A Critical Appraisal of the Modernized Law against Restraints of Competition

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (8) ◽  
pp. 1173-1189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Wurmnest
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Critical Appraisal ◽  
German Law ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
New Era ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Injunctive Relief ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules

On July 1st, 2005, the 7th Amendment to the Law against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – GWB) became effective. The modernization of the GWB was indispensable in bringing German law in line with Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003. Regulation 1/2003 decentralized the enforcement of EC competition rules and aimed to pave the way for effective private antitrust litigation in Europe. Thus far, private parties have invoked Art. 81 and 82 EC Treaty primarily as shield by arguing that certain agreements were void. Only in very few instances were those rules used as sword to sue infringers for injunctive relief or damages. To stimulate private enforcement, Regulation 1/2003 inter alia abolished the European Commission's exclusive power to exempt practices which are prohibited pursuant to Art. 81 (1) EC Treaty and entitled national competition authorities and courts to apply Art. 81 (3) EC Treaty. Moreover, it empowered the European Commission to make written submissions in antitrust cases pending before national courts. In line with the new European approach, the German legislature has overhauled the hitherto existing rules of German competition law considerably. This article will briefly describe the general changes brought by the reform and take a closer look at the amended rules relating to private antitrust litigation before German courts.

The impact of data on EU merger control

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 151-161
Author(s):  
Stephen Whitfield ◽  
Richard J. Brown ◽  
Ingrid Rogers
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Global Competition ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Legal Frameworks ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Concentration Levels

There has been an increased focus of the European Commission and numerous national competition authorities on data-related mergers, which also fits more generally in the context of a broader global competition law focus on the ‘FAANGs’ (i.e., Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix and Google) and the wider tech sector. This article considers the impact of data on EU merger control and explores the theories of harm and legal frameworks which have been applied and developed in considering data-related competition concerns, in particular the notable developments in the Commission's recent consideration of Apple's acquisition of Shazam. The article considers that the impact of these developments is that data-related mergers should no longer be assessed by reference to traditional economic indicators such as market shares and concentration levels only, but rather also in the context of the broader global competition law focus on big tech.

5. Procedure: investigation

2019 ◽  
pp. 94-134
Author(s):  
Sandra Marco Colino
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Criminal Jurisdiction ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
The Way

This chapter deals with the way in which infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and Chapter I and II Prohibitions of the Competition Act 1998 are investigated and attacked. The European Commission has its own powers to investigate infringements of EU competition law by virtue of Regulation 1/2003. It may cooperate with national competition authorities (NCAs), who also have their own powers by virtue of EU law and their respective national competition laws. NCAs and the European Commission cooperate through the European Competition Network (ECN). The European Commission and the Competition Markets Authority (CMA) may obtain information, or may investigate on-site. The CMA also has criminal jurisdiction in some cases. Undertakings subject to investigation have rights that must be observed.

7. EU competition law: introduction and Article 101 TFEU

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Business Practices ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules

Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibit anti-competitive business practices. The European Commission, national competition authorities, and national courts enforce Articles 101 and 102 under powers conferred by Regulation 1/2003. From time to time, the European Commission issues non-binding notices providing clarification of the competition rules. This chapter focuses on Article 101, but begins with an outline of Articles 101 and 102 and the rules on enforcement. In broad terms, Article 101 prohibits business agreements or arrangements which prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the internal market and affect trade between Member States.

Part 1 Comparative Overview of Concepts of Attorney–Client Privilege, 5 European Union

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Möckesch Annabelle
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Competent Authority ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Level ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Competition Law

This chapter presents the applicable attorney–client privilege standard on the European level. It first describes the investigative powers of the European Commission as competent authority to uncover infringements of European competition law, such as requests for information and inspections. The second part of this chapter devotes itself to the attorney–client privilege as established by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in relation to European competition law investigations.

Part II Vertical Agreements Under Regulation 330/2010, 8 Article 6 (Non-Application) and Article 29 Regulation 1/2003 (Withdrawal)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wijckmans Frank ◽  
Tuytschaever Filip
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
Relevant Market ◽  
Market Withdrawal ◽  
Parallel Networks ◽  
Commission Regulation ◽  
National Competition

This chapter addresses the withdrawal or disapplication of Regulation 330/2010. It describes the relevant procedures and the powers of both the European Commission and the national competition authorities in this respect. Non-application occurs by Commission regulation in cases where parallel networks of similar vertical restraints cover more than 50 per cent of the relevant market. Withdrawal occurs by the Commission or an NCA when vertical agreements satisfying the conditions for a BER but nonetheless produce effects on competition that are incompatible with Article 101 TFEU.

INTRODUCTION: HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

2000 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 299-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Banta ◽  
Wija Oortwijn
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
Health Technology Assessment ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Technology Assessment ◽  
Health Technology ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Level

Health technology assessment (HTA) has become increasingly important in the European Union as an aid to decision making. As agencies and programs have been established, there is increasing attention to coordination of HTA at the European level, especially considering the growing role of the European Union in public health in Europe. This series of papers describes and analyzes the situation with regard to HTA in the 15 members of the European Union, plus Switzerland. The final paper draws some conclusions, especially concerning the future involvement of the European Commission in HTA.

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