The battle of the tests: a Pyrrhic victory? A case note on the Supreme Court judgment in Peninsula Securities Ltd v. Dunnes Stores (Bangor) Ltd

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 143-150
Author(s):  
Mark Jephcott ◽  
◽  
Max Kaufman ◽  
Ben Gordon ◽  
◽  
...  

In Peninsula Securities, the Supreme Court held that a restrictive covenant, granted in a lease to an anchor tenant of a shopping centre not to allow any retail unit in the centre to be leased to competing shops, does not engage the doctrine of restraint of trade. The question of its enforceability therefore hinges on whether the relevant covenant breaches competition law, and specifically whether it is anti-competitive by object or effect. This relatively straightforward conclusion of the Supreme Court in Peninsula Securities masks over 50 years of conflicting judgments and uncertainty in the area. Prior to Peninsula Securities, the majority decision of the House of Lords in Esso Petroleum v Harper's Garage gave rise to a ‘battle of the tests’: the majority opined that the doctrine of restraint of trade would only be engaged if the covenantor contracts to give up a freedom they already had (what has come to be known as the ‘pre-existing freedom test’; Lord Wilberforce, dissenting, formulated what came to be known as the ‘trading society test’ which is basically a rule of reason test. In Peninsula Securities, the Supreme Court clearly sided with the latter, but in reality neither test is likely to be considered in future challenges to an anchor tenancy restrictive covenant – the key question is whether it is anti-competitive, something which only the relevant facts of the case will determine.

2020 ◽  
pp. 405-434
Author(s):  
Jack Beatson ◽  
Andrew Burrows ◽  
John Cartwright

This chapter considers what counts as illegality and the effect of illegality on a contract (and consequent restitution). The approach of the Courts to illegality has been transformed for the better, and simplified, by the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza in 2016. Illegal conduct, tainting a contract, can vary widely from serious crimes (eg murder) to relatively minor crimes (eg breach of licensing requirements) through to civil wrongs and to conduct that does not comprise a wrong but is contrary to public policy. As regards the effect of illegality, where a statute does not deal with this, the common law approach is now to apply a range of factors. A final section of the chapter examines contracts in restraint of trade.


Contract Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 363-379
Author(s):  
Ewan McKendrick

This chapter focuses on the principles applied by the courts when interpreting contracts, as set out by the House of Lords in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v. West Bromwich Building Society and the Supreme Court in Arnold v. Britton and Wood v. Capita Insurance Services Ltd. The chapter discusses the scope of these principles (in particular, the ‘factual matrix’, the exclusion of pre-contractual negotiations, the meaning of words, ‘corrective interpretation’, and the balance to be struck between the natural and ordinary meaning of the words and giving to the words a commercial sensible construction.


Author(s):  
Ewan McKendrick

This chapter focuses on the principles applied by the courts when interpreting contracts, as set out by the House of Lords in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v. West Bromwich Building Society and the Supreme Court in Arnold v. Britton and Wood v. Capita Insurance Services Ltd. The chapter discusses the scope of these principles (in particular, the ‘factual matrix’, the exclusion of pre-contractual negotiations, the meaning of words, ‘corrective interpretation’, and the balance to be struck between the natural and ordinary meaning of the words and giving to the words a commercial sensible construction.


1978 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claude Klein

In his case note on the famous Bergmann decision of the Supreme Court, Professor Akzin wrote: While the Court's conclusions seem to be perfectly justified and went so far as they could in the circumstances, the reasoning in its decision shows serious flaws… [others] seem to have sprung from the Court's unwillingness to look for help to the very thorough discussion of the issues by several Israeli scholars, notably Messrs. Sternberg, Akzin, Klinghoffer and Rubinstein. The dignity of the Court would not have suffered if the opinion-writing judge had taken a look at academic writing in a case where precedents offer little or no guidance.These remarks probably express the most original view ever put forward on this land mark case. They emphasize the crux of the complex constitutional problem discussed in the Bergmann case, i.e., the definition of the legal nature of the basic laws in the legal order of Israel. The extremely abstract questions involved in that discussion, indeed, the most abstract that exist in public law, concern the definition of the nature of the power which adopts the Constitution and more specifically, of the power which amends the Constitution.


1951 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert B. Dishman

The “rule of reason” remains after almost forty years the most curious obiter dictum ever indulged in by the Supreme Court of the United States. Mistaken though it was in its basic assumptions, the rule nevertheless persists as the Court's standard for construing the Sherman Act. This is not to say, as some critics have said, that the rule has seriously hampered the Department of Justice in enforcing the antitrust laws. We have it on the authority of Thurman Arnold that without the rule die Sherman Act would be “unworkable … because every combination between two men in business is in some measure a restraint of trade.” The rule, he has said, “has the effect of preventing the antitrust laws from destroying the efficiency of diose combinations that are actually serving, instead of exploiting, the consumer.” The fact remains, however, that in adopting the rule the Court erred in at least two respects: first, in applying a test of reasonableness where in the early cases at least none was called for and, second, in basing that rule on a misunderstanding of the common law. For the first of its sins the Court has been scolded many times; for the second, it has received surprisingly litde criticism.


2004 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petra Butler

The paper examines whether there was any basis for Parliament to enact section 3(2) of the Supreme Court Act 2003 in regard to human rights decisions of the Court of Appeal. The paper asks whether the Court of Appeal has indeed been "activist" in its human rights decisions. The discussion focuses on the areas where judicial activism might be suspected, firstly the filling of legislative gaps, and secondly statutory interpretation, with a special focus on implied repeal. Relevant decisions of the House of Lords under the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) are used as a contrast to the decisions of the New Zealand Court of Appeal. The paper comes to the conclusion that the New Zealand Court of Appeal has not been activist in the area of human rights.


Author(s):  
Emma Charlene Lubaale

The techniques used in DNA profiling are well established and scientifically validated. The scientific validity of DNA evidence can, however, be so persuasive that such evidence risks being reduced to proof of guilt or innocence. Thus, the incorrect use of DNA evidence could lead to a miscarriage of justice where the innocent are convicted and the guilty are acquitted. Drawing from the Supreme Court of Appeal decision in Bokolo v S (Bokolo case), this case note discusses how DNA evidence can be placed in its proper forensic context. The article sets out the ideal role of expert witnesses, the role of opposing or neutral experts, and the active role of judicial officers in evaluating DNA evidence.


2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (3) ◽  
pp. OA35-OA48
Author(s):  
James C Fisher

This note discusses the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Singularis Holdings v Daiwa Capital Markets in the context of other recent decisions on corporate attribution and the illegality principle in English law. It particularly considers Daiwa’s implications for the relationship between the illegality doctrine and other legal principles in the wake of Patel v Mirza. The court employed a context-sensitive, teleological approach to attribution, one consequence of which was the conclusive consignment of the House of Lords’ decision in Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens to irrelevance. It nonetheless privileges orthodox, pre-Patelian authority in the disposal of the case. The court’s approach suggests that Patel is perceived as the high-water mark for expansive, policy-sensitive understanding of the illegality principle, and that its disruptive potential is likely to be carefully constrained in future decisions of the Supreme Court.


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