A landslide on a mudslide? Natural hazards and the right to life under the European Convention on Human Rights

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-131
Author(s):  
Kristian Cedervall Lauta ◽  
Jens Elo Rytter
2021 ◽  
pp. 159-170
Author(s):  
Majida Lubura

A basic human right - the right to life, even today faces numerous questions when it comes to its scope. One of those questions is the issue of the right to abortion, which is the subject of numerous controversies among lawyers, philosophers, medical workers, theologists, as well as among citizens in the broadest sense. Debates that exist in various scientific disciplines indicate the complexity of these issues that needs to be legally regulated at the domestic and international level. For that reason, it is necessary to follow and study the judgments of international bodies that have been passed in connection with this issue. As the most developed system of Human Rights protection has been established within the European Convention on Human Rights, and at the same time the most relevant for our country, in this paper the author studies the current practice of the European Court of Human Rights related to the right to abortion. It is evident, from the case law presented in this paper that the Court had a very delicate and difficult task to balance between diametrically opposing rights and interests of various interested parties. The Court's judgments show a consensus only regarding the question of the existence of the right to abortion in cases where the right to life and health of women is endangered. Opponents of abortion claim that in this case, it is not the right to abortion, but the right to life of a woman and that only then an abortion is allowed and justified to be performed, as well as that it is a conclusion that can be deduced from the Court's case law. However, the author of this paper believes that even though the practice of the court is quite neutral, it still tends more towards granting the right to safe abortion.


2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 433-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakob Pichon

In the July 8, 2004 case of Vo v. France, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) dealt with the question of whether the embryo/fetus (“the fetus”) enjoys the protection of the right to life provided by Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”). Below, a pregnant woman lost her fetus due to an error made by the attending doctor, and the Cour de Cassation, the French court of last instance, acquitted the doctor of involuntary homicide on the grounds that a fetus is not a person within the meaning of the French Criminal Code. Claiming a violation of her child's right to life within the meaning of the Convention, the woman appealed to the ECtHR. The ECtHR left open the question whether or not a fetus falls within the scope of Article 2; declaring that, even assuming Article 2 was applicable to a fetus, there had been no failure by France to comply with its obligations under Article 2, because the ECtHR deemed the institution of criminal proceedings unnecessary. Rather, it considered the possibility for the applicant to bring an action for damages as sufficient and therefore found that there had been no violation of the fetus's right to life.


2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 231-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dimitris Xenos

In the liberal tradition, there has always been scepticism about the state's involvement in the activities of industry. Instead, internal measures by way of self-regulation and collective action have been preferred. In recognition of the reality that exclusive reliance on such solutions has not prevented violations of human rights, to which a high constitutional importance is attached, other arrangements have to be provided. In the system of the European Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter the Convention), positive obligations are imposed engaging the state in the active protection of human rights. The need to protect human rights against the hazards of industry has been the main issue in the case of Öneryildiz v. Turkey, in which, for the first time in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter the Court), a claim under the right to life (Article 2 of the Convention) has successfully been asserted in the context of industry.


Author(s):  
Bernadette Rainey

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter first explains the background and rationale for the formation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), tracing its roots to the Council of Europe that was formed in 1949 and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) established a year later. It then looks at the different kinds of human rights embedded in the ECHR, including the right to life, right to a fair trial, freedom of expression, right to property, and right to free elections. The chapter also provides an overview of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), along with the major changes made to its complaints system and how it interprets the Convention rights. Finally, it considers the ECtHR’s use of proportionality and margin of appreciation doctrines to find the balance between the rights of the individual and the community when deciding upon qualified rights.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 162-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Baker

AbstractThis paper examines the role of coroners in investigating and reporting on cases of death after police contact (DAPC) in England and Wales. It considers how Article 2 (the right to life) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has affected coronial processes and practices. It argues that the effects of Article 2 represent an evolutionary shift in accountability processes surrounding cases of DAPC in England and Wales, but that this shift has in turn been mediated by aspects of institutional structure in the coronial system. It discusses how this shift demonstrates the dynamic relationship between the coronial system, state and society and how this has continued to evolve as a result of external demands.


2020 ◽  
pp. medethics-2020-106280
Author(s):  
Charles Foster

The question a judge has to ask in deciding whether or not life-sustaining treatment should be withdrawn is whether the continued treatment is lawful. It will be lawful if it is in the patient’s best interests. Identifying this question gives no guidance about how to approach the assessment of best interests. It merely identifies the judge’s job. The presumption in favour of the maintenance of life is part of the job that follows the identification of the question.The presumption is best regarded as a presumption of law. It has long been recognised as part of the way in which the English law discharges its obligations under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to life). But even if it is a ‘mere’ evidential presumption it cannot, on the facts of most cases involving applications for the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from patients in prolonged disorders of consciousness, be rebutted.


2004 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 347-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosamund Scott

AbstractFollowing the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 in English law, there was speculation as to whether the English legal position that the fetus has no right to life is compatible with Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Vo v. France provides an opportunity to reflect on the current English and ECtHR approaches to the fetus. The problems of finding a fetal right to life, which Vo sidesteps, are noted. At the same time, the "all or nothingness" of rights language is not without difficulties and troubled the judges in Vo. In particular, the idea that the fetus has no right to life gives the impression that neither English nor ECHR law values the fetus. In this light, we find English and ECtHR judges trying to express a concern for the fetus which does not undermine a pregnant woman's legal interests. This article considers these issues and highlights the importance, in a highly genetic age, of developing ways of valuing the fetus without invoking the language of rights and thus without affecting the current legal balance of interests in the maternal-fetal relationship. The idea of valuing the fetus in this way is briefly explored with particular reference to aspects of selective abortion.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document