Suicide in the Military as a Breach of the Right to Life, under the Provisions of Art. 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sotirios Kyrkos
Author(s):  
Tilmann Altwicker

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has developed a rights-based conception of precautions that has implications both for law enforcement and military operations alike. In the military context, the rights-based conception bears some resemblance with the IHL concept of precautions in and against the effects of attacks. The ECtHR’s builds its conception of precautions on a wide interpretation of the right to life contained in Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In human rights doctrine, precautions in attack can be addressed as positive obligations relating to organization and procedure, precautions against the effects of attack can be classified as positive obligations to protect. In contrast to its IHL counterpart, the rights-based conception of precautions does not only entail operational obligations, but also legislative obligations. A rights-based conception of precautions can be of particular value especially with regard to precautions against the effects of attacks in non-international armed conflict. The ECtHR is, however, well-advised to develop its rights-based conception of precautions in close alignment with its IHL counterpart.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 1439-1444
Author(s):  
Miodrag N. Simović ◽  
Marina M. Simović ◽  
Vladimir M. Simović

The paper is dedicated to ne bis in idem principle, which is a fundamental human right safeguarded by Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This principle is sometimes also referred to as double jeopardy.The principle implies that no one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which s/he has already been finally convicted or acquitted (internal ne bis in idem principle), and that in some other State or before the International Court (ne bis in idem principle in respect of the relations between the states or the State and the International Court) the procedure may not be conducted if the person has already been sentenced or acquitted. The identity of the indictable act (idem), the other component of this principle, is more complex and more difficult to be determined than the first one (ne bis).The objective of this principle is to secure the legal certainty of citizens who must be liberated of uncertainty or fear that they would be tried again for the same criminal offence that has already been decided by a final and binding decision. This principle is specific for the accusative and modern system of criminal procedure but not for the investigative criminal procedure, where the possibility for the bindingly finalised criminal procedure to be repeated on the basis of same evidence and regarding the same criminal issue existed. In its legal nature, a circumstance that the proceedings are pending on the same criminal offence against the same accused, represents a negative procedural presumption and, therefore, an obstacle for the further course of proceedings, i.e. it represents the procedural obstacle which prevents an initiation of new criminal procedure for the same criminal case in which the final and binding condemning or acquitting judgement has been passed (exceptio rei iudicatae).The right not to be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which s/he has already been finally convicted or acquitted is provided for, primarily, by the International Documents (Article 14, paragraph 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). The International framework has also been given to ne bis in idem principle through three Conventions adopted by the Council of Europe and those are the European Convention on Extradition and Additional Protocols thereto, the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, and the European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments.Ne bis in idem principle is traditionally associated with the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Likewise, no derogation from Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention at the time of war or other state of emergency which is threatening the survival of the nation (Article 4, paragraph 3 of Protocol No. 7). Thereby it is categorised as the irrevocable conventional right together with the right to life, prohibition of torture, prohibition of slavery, and the legality principle. Similarly, ne bis in idem principle does not apply in the case of the renewed trials by the International criminal courts where the first trial was conducted in some State, while the principle is applicable in the reversed situation. The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia could have conducted a trial even if a person had already been adjudicated in some State, in the cases provided for by its Statute and in the interest of justice.


2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 831-853
Author(s):  
Elisabeth Hoffberger

If thinking about weapons, one generally thinks about lethal technology. However, an abundance of so-called non-lethal weapons, a technology not aimed at killing but merely incapacitating the human target or military objective, is also being deployed both within and outside the ambit of armed conflict. Since non-lethal weapons do not necessarily implicate a zero chance of mortality, but often lead to severe wounds and tremendous suffering, the use and deployment of such weapons raise strong humanitarian and human rights concerns. The prohibition to cause superfluous injuries and unnecessary suffering, as well as the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks are, amongst others, one of the most relevant provisions potentially having an influence on the deployment of nonlethal technology in armed conflict. However, the invocation of the principle of proportionality may lead to the justification of the use of non-lethal weapons on the grounds that the military advantage anticipated was greater than the human suffering caused. Insofar, one must ask whether there is a “red-line”; where the almost inflationary invocation of the principle of proportionality may defeat the object and purpose of the Geneva Conventions and therefore render the deployment and use of non-lethal technology illegal. Apart from the battlefield, non-lethal weapons are also being deployed in lawenforcement scenarios, where human rights law plays a pivotal role. In this regard, one must not look merely at the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading suffering and the right to life but also at the right to health, a presumably underestimated principle curbing and shaping the use of non-lethal technology outside the ambit of armed conflict.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 368-385
Author(s):  
Yana Litins’ka ◽  
Oleksandra Karpenko

Abstract COVID-19 became a stress-test for many legal systems because it required that a balance be found between rapid action to prevent the spread of the disease, and continued respect for human rights. Many states in Europe, including Ukraine, chose to enforce an obligation to self-isolate. In this article we review what the obligation to self-isolate entails in the case of Ukraine. We also analyse whether such an obligation should be viewed as a deprivation or a mere restriction of liberty, and if it is permissible under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.


Legal Studies ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 430-464 ◽  
Author(s):  
Normann Witzleb

In Campbell v MGN Ltd, the House of Lords endorsed an expansive interpretation of the breach of confidence action to protect privacy interests. The scope and content of this transformed cause of action have already been subject to considerable judicial consideration and academic discussion. This paper focuses on the remedial consequences of privacy breaches. It undertakes an analysis of the principles which govern awards for pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss, the availability of gain-based relief, in particular an account of profits, and exemplary damages.Even in its traditional scope, the monetary remedies for breach of confidence raise complex issues, mainly resulting from the fact that this doctrine draws on multiple jurisdictional sources such as equity, contract and property law. The difficulties of determining the appropriate remedial principles are now compounded by the fact that English law also aims to integrate its obligation to protect the right to privacy under Art 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 into the conceptual framework of the breach of confidence action.The analysis provided in this paper supports the contention that not only the scope of the cause of action but also important remedial issues are likely to remain in doubt until the wrong of ‘misuse of private information’ is freed from the constraints of the traditional action for breach of confidence. A separate tort would be able to deal more coherently and comprehensively with all wrongs commonly regarded as privacy breaches.


1975 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rupert Emerson

The new Asian and African states have laid much stress on human rights, but have often not lived up to them. The basic right of self-determination has been limited to colonies only. Democratic institutions have generally given way to authoritarian regimes, often run by the military, with popular participation denied rather than encouraged. The right to life, liberty, and security of person has been grossly violated in the cases of millions of refugees, temporary and permanent, in Africa and the Asian subcontinent. Many hundreds of thousands have been killed in domestic conflicts, as in Indonesia, Nigeria, and Burundi. One of the results is the emergence of a double standard: an all-out African and Asian attack upon the denial of human rights involved in colonialism and racial discrimination, but a refusal to face up to massive violations of human rights in the Third World itself.


2012 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Gilles Cuniberti

In Sabeh el Leil v. France, the European Court of Human Rights (‘‘ECtHR’’ or ‘‘the Court’’) ruled for the second time that a contracting state had violated the right to a fair trial afforded by Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘‘Convention’’) by denying access to its courts to an embassy employee suing for wrongful dismissal on the grounds that the employer enjoyed sovereign immunity. The ECtHR had first ruled so a year earlier in Cudak v. Lithuania, where the plaintiff was also an embassy employee.


2021 ◽  
pp. 159-170
Author(s):  
Majida Lubura

A basic human right - the right to life, even today faces numerous questions when it comes to its scope. One of those questions is the issue of the right to abortion, which is the subject of numerous controversies among lawyers, philosophers, medical workers, theologists, as well as among citizens in the broadest sense. Debates that exist in various scientific disciplines indicate the complexity of these issues that needs to be legally regulated at the domestic and international level. For that reason, it is necessary to follow and study the judgments of international bodies that have been passed in connection with this issue. As the most developed system of Human Rights protection has been established within the European Convention on Human Rights, and at the same time the most relevant for our country, in this paper the author studies the current practice of the European Court of Human Rights related to the right to abortion. It is evident, from the case law presented in this paper that the Court had a very delicate and difficult task to balance between diametrically opposing rights and interests of various interested parties. The Court's judgments show a consensus only regarding the question of the existence of the right to abortion in cases where the right to life and health of women is endangered. Opponents of abortion claim that in this case, it is not the right to abortion, but the right to life of a woman and that only then an abortion is allowed and justified to be performed, as well as that it is a conclusion that can be deduced from the Court's case law. However, the author of this paper believes that even though the practice of the court is quite neutral, it still tends more towards granting the right to safe abortion.


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