scholarly journals Right to abortion in modern law and in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights

2021 ◽  
pp. 159-170
Author(s):  
Majida Lubura

A basic human right - the right to life, even today faces numerous questions when it comes to its scope. One of those questions is the issue of the right to abortion, which is the subject of numerous controversies among lawyers, philosophers, medical workers, theologists, as well as among citizens in the broadest sense. Debates that exist in various scientific disciplines indicate the complexity of these issues that needs to be legally regulated at the domestic and international level. For that reason, it is necessary to follow and study the judgments of international bodies that have been passed in connection with this issue. As the most developed system of Human Rights protection has been established within the European Convention on Human Rights, and at the same time the most relevant for our country, in this paper the author studies the current practice of the European Court of Human Rights related to the right to abortion. It is evident, from the case law presented in this paper that the Court had a very delicate and difficult task to balance between diametrically opposing rights and interests of various interested parties. The Court's judgments show a consensus only regarding the question of the existence of the right to abortion in cases where the right to life and health of women is endangered. Opponents of abortion claim that in this case, it is not the right to abortion, but the right to life of a woman and that only then an abortion is allowed and justified to be performed, as well as that it is a conclusion that can be deduced from the Court's case law. However, the author of this paper believes that even though the practice of the court is quite neutral, it still tends more towards granting the right to safe abortion.

2008 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Thym

AbstractApplying the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to immigration cases has always been a balancing exercise between the effective protection of human rights and the Contracting States' autonomy to regulate migration flows. In its recent case law, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (ECtHR) has considerably extended the protective scope of Article 8 ECHR by granting autonomous human rights protection to the long-term resident status independent of the existence of family bonds under the heading of ‘private life’. This has important repercussions for the status of legal and illegal immigrants across Europe, since the new case law widens the reach of human rights law to the legal conditions for leave to remain, effectively granting several applicants a human right to regularize their illegal stay. The contribution analyses the new case law and develops general criteria guiding the application of the ECHR to national immigration laws and the new EU harmonization measures adopted in recent years.


2021 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 479-493
Author(s):  
Dimitrije Đukić

Confidentiality of communication is a very important human right that gains in importance when the communication is conducted between a lawyer and a client. Namely, for a lawyer to be able to adequately represent their client, the client must be sure that the information they entrust to the lawyer will not reach third parties, i.e. that the communication will remain confidential. In this sense, protecting the confidentiality of communication between a lawyer and a client is very important not only for representing the client in each case, but also for the proper functioning of the legal system. This paper aims to establish which articles of the European Convention protect the right to a confidential communication between a lawyer and a client and how this communication is protected in practice by the European Court of Human Rights. The paper also examines whether it is possible to prescribe a measure by which such an important right as the right to privileged and confidential communication between a lawyer and a client could be limited and if so under what conditions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 188-204
Author(s):  
Mykhailo Buromenskyi ◽  
Vitalii Gutnyk

Abstract The European Convention on Human Rights and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights have a significant impact not only on national legal order but also on international criminal courts. The article is dedicated to analyzing that impact in the context of the right to legal assistance. We ascertain the purpose of the establishment of international criminal courts, the specificity of the right to legal assistance in the European system of human rights protection, the impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on the drafting of statutes of the international criminal courts and influence of the European Convention on Human Rights and case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on the interpretation of the right to legal assistance in the international criminal courts. Also the primacy of the right to legal assistance is proved, which is provided in the ECHR to the statutes of international criminal courts. At the same time, the international criminal courts, taking into account the purpose of their establishment and jurisdiction, give additional guarantees of the right to legal assistance.


Author(s):  
Elzbieta Hanna Morawska

The aim of this article is pointing out to the process of redefining the nature, subject and structure of the obligations of States Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights in the field of the right to life (Article 2 of the Convention). The main author of the above redefinition is the European Court of Human Rights, hence it takes place during the interpretation and application of Art. 2 the Convention. As a result, in addition to primary negative obligations, the positive obligations are imposed on States. Strasbourg case law identifies a variety of positive measures that States are obliged to undertake in order to fulfill these positive obligations, including appropriate preventive measures. They are to prevent the materialisation of risks to the right to life, both in the case of threats from private individuals, as well as during the use of lethal force by State officials. The Court has not settled the precise catalog of these measures and the conditions for taking them. They are formulated case by case and are constantly being expanded. It can therefore be said that they are still in statu nascendi.


2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 443-467
Author(s):  
Hamdija Šarkinović

The paper deals with property, which is guaranteed by Article 58 of the Constitution of Montenegro and Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The constitutional-law concept of the right to property in Montenegro is broader than the traditional civil law concept, as it includes all real rights, as the European Court under the notion of property, in addition to the usual, includes all acquired rights of a person. The autonomous concept of property and possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was separately covered, consisting of three rules: principle of peaceful enjoyment of possessions, deprivation of possessions, and control of the use of property. The application of the text of justification of interference with property in the case law of the European Court is explained, which includes the text of legality, the text of a legitimate aim in the general or public interest and the text of proportionality. However, the case law of the ordinary courts in the field of guarantees of property rights, constitutional and convention’s is not harmonized with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and represents one of the main tasks of the Constitutional Court in the coming period. The Constitutional Court of Montenegro follows the concept of property enshrined in the Constitution and gives the property meaning as the constitutional and convention human right guaranteed by the Constitution, and its inviolability as one of the fundamental values of the constitutional order, although the case law of the Constitutional Court has not fully and always been coherent with the aforementioned principles.


2020 ◽  
pp. 105-110
Author(s):  
Maryna Kyrsanova

Problem setting. Increasingly, European countries are legalizing euthanasia nationally. At the same time, this issue is a circle for scientific debate, as some experts believe that it is a natural human right that can be disposed of at its discretion. Others emphasize that no one can interrupt a person’s life, even herself. In order to summarize all positions and to determine unanimity on certain aspects of euthanasia, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights, which in art. 2 proclaims the right to life and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which has argued for the possibility of a “right to die” as part of the right to life. The purpose. Analysis of the legal position of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the possibility of applying the euthanasia procedure, exploring the prospects of introducing this procedure into the national law. Analysis of recent research and publications. The problem of euthanasia is a matter of debate in the scientific community. This topic was researched by А.В. Malko, AS Nikiforova, O.V Khomchenko, I.O Koval, O.M Mironets, O.A Miroshnichenko, Yu.S. Romashova, K. Basovskaya, Yu.M. Rybakova, O.M Shchokin, S.V Chernichenko. Article’s main body. In science will distinguish 2 types of euthanasia - active and passive. Active euthanasia involves actions aimed at ending the life of a sick person, for example, by administering a lethal injection. Passive euthanasia involves discontinuation of medical care for a patient at his will, which in the future leads to death. Considering the issue of passive euthanasia, the European Commission concluded that it could not be interpreted art. 2 of the Convention as such, which gives the right to death, but everyone has the right to dispose of his life by giving appropriate instructions in the event of an incurable disease.. The issue of the “right to die”, the right to active euthanasia has been resolved in the case of Pritty v. The United Kingdom. The European Court of Human Rights in this case was not convinced that the “right to life” guaranteed by Article 2 of the Convention could be interpreted negatively. As for Ukraine, euthanasia in our country is being prosecuted and considered a crime. In particular, according to the Fundamentals of Healthcare Legislation, medical professionals are prohibited from taking deliberate actions aimed at ending the life of a patient who is terminally ill to end his or her suffering. The Civil Code of Ukraine contains a similar warning about the prohibition to deprive a person of his life at his request. Conclusions.The European Court of Human Rights does not consider that the content of art. 2 of the Convention it is possible to derive the “right to die”. This right does not come from the right not life, is not an independent right, can not be a fundamental right, to which all the guarantees of art. 2 of the Convention. With regard to passive euthanasia, the ECtHR does not, in fact, prohibit it; it proceeds from the human right to dispose of one’s life. Speaking about the introduction of the euthanasia procedure in the national legal order, the ECtHR did not give a clear assessment on this issue. In fact, the ECtHR has taken the position that it is not entitled to assess national legislation in terms of introducing effective mechanisms to protect their citizens’ right to life.


2014 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Przemysław Florjanowicz-Błachut

The core function of the judiciary is the administration of justice through delivering judgments and other decisions. The crucial role for its acceptance and legitimization by not only lawyers, but also individulas (parties) and the hole society plays judicial reasoning. It should reflect on judge’s independence within the exercise of his office and show also judicial self-restraint or activism. The axiology and the standards of proper judicial reasoning are anchored both in constitutional and supranational law and case-law. Polish Constitutional Tribunal derives a duty to give reasoning from the right to a fair trial – right to be heard and bring own submissions before the court (Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution), the right to appeal against judgments and decisions made at first stage (Article 78), the rule of two stages of the court proceedings (Article 176) and rule of law clause (Article 2), that comprises inter alia right to due process of law and the rule of legitimate expactation / the protection of trust (Vertrauensschutz). European Court of Human Rights derives this duty to give reasons from the guarantees of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of European Convention of Human Rights. In its case-law the ECtHR, taking into account the margin of appreciation concept, formulated a number of positive and negative requirements, that should be met in case of proper reasoning. The obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions is also anchored in European Union law. European Court of Justice derives this duty from the right to fair trial enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Standards of the courts reasoning developed by Polish constitutional court an the European courts (ECJ and ECtHR) are in fact convergent and coherent. National judges should take them into consideration in every case, to legitimize its outcome and enhance justice delivery.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Léon E Dijkman

Abstract Germany is one of few jurisdictions with a bifurcated patent system, under which infringement and validity of a patent are established in separate proceedings. Because validity proceedings normally take longer to conclude, it can occur that remedies for infringement are imposed before a decision on the patent’s validity is available. This phenomenon is colloquially known as the ‘injunction gap’ and has been the subject of increasing criticism over the past years. In this article, I examine the injunction gap from the perspective of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I find that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights interpreting this provision supports criticism of the injunction gap, because imposing infringement remedies with potentially far-reaching consequences before the validity of a patent has been established by a court of law arguably violates defendants’ right to be heard. Such reliance on the patent office’s grant decision is no longer warranted in the light of contemporary invalidation rates. I conclude that the proliferation of the injunction gap should be curbed by an approach to a stay of proceedings which is in line with the test for stays as formulated by Germany’s Federal Supreme Court. Under this test, courts should stay infringement proceedings until the Federal Patent Court or the EPO’s Board of Appeal have ruled on the validity of a patent whenever it is more likely than not that it will be invalidated.


2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis Kurzon

In two English cases which reached the European Court of Human Rights in the mid-2000s, it was argued that the statutory requirement on the part of a motorist who has been caught speeding to give the police information concerning the identity of the driver of the car at the time of the offence is a violation of the right of silence by which a person should not be put into a position that s/he incriminates him/herself. The right of silence is one of the conventional interpretations of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. As well as a study on the right of silence with regard to written texts, this paper also investigates the two cases in terms of icons and indices: a text may be indexical of a basic human right, and then may become an icon of that right. The European Court of Human Rights considers the particular section of the relevant statute as an icon of the "regulatory regime".


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (s2) ◽  
pp. 9-17
Author(s):  
Pir Ali Kaya ◽  
Ceyhun Güler

Abstract According to The European Social Charter, the European Convention on Human Rights, the ILO Conventions, the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, the decisions of the European Social Rights Committee and the ILO supervisory bodies, the right to collective action is a democratic right that aims to protect and correct the economic and social interests of workers in the workplace or in another place appropriate for the purpose of action. The above-mentioned institutions accept the right to collective action as a fundamental human right. According to the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, the right to collective action is regarded as a democratic right, including strike. In particular, the right to collective action is being used as a resistance mechanism against new working relations, which are imposed on working conditions, right to work and the right to organize. However, the tendency of this right to political field, leads to some debate about the legality of the right to collective action. In this context, In the decision of the European Court of Human Rights, the ILO's supervisory bodies and the European Committee on Social Rights, it is emphasized that collective action rights should be a basic human right. In this study, the legal basis of the right to collective action will be discussed in accordance with the decisions and requirements of the European Court of Human Rights and the decisions of the ILO supervisory bodies.


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