The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, a legal anomaly?

2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-88
Author(s):  
Vanessa Sant’Anna Bonifacio Tavares

It is well-recorded that nuclear attacks happened twice in history, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but it is often overlooked that nuclear explosions were more frequent, with over 2,000 tests taking place in more than 60 locations worldwide. These special circumstances prompted the General Assembly to adopt a comprehensive ban treaty (CTBT) in 1996, which has yet to enter into force. Borrowing from Kelman’s social conformity theory, this article explains how and why states chose to conform to a non-binding agreement. It argues that, as interested parties developed an anti-testing narrative that seemed simultaneously hopeful and realistic, they stabilized actor’s reaction and catalyzed a shift in attitudes towards nuclear testing from forbearance to an authoritative global moratorium, which accounts for the complete eradication of the atmospheric experiments. C’est un fait bien établi que l’histoire a connu deux attaques nucléaires, à Hiroshima et Nagasaki. Ce que l’on sait moins, c’est que les explosions nucléaires étaient bien plus fréquentes, avec plus de 2 000 tests effectués sur une soixantaine de sites de par le monde. Ces circonstances particulières ont poussé l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies à adopter, en 1996, un traité d’interdiction complète des essais nucléaires (TICE), qui n’est pas encore entré en vigueur. S’inspirant de la théorie du conformisme social de Kelman, cet article explique comment et pourquoi des États ont choisi de respecter un accord non contraignant. Il avance que, à mesure que les parties intéressées développaient un discours anti-essais nucléaires qui paraissait à la fois réaliste et porteur d’espoir, elles ont stabilisé les réactions des acteurs et déclenché un changement des mentalités à l’égard des essais nucléaires, passant de l’indulgence à un moratoire général faisant autorité, ce qui explique la disparition complète des essais atmosphériques. Het is algemeen bekend dat er in de geschiedenis twee kernaanvallen zijn geweest, in Hiroshima en Nagasaki, maar vaak wordt over het hoofd gezien dat er nog andere kernexplosies hebben plaatsgevonden, met ruim 2000 proeven op meer dan 60 locaties over de hele wereld. Deze bijzondere omstandigheden hebben de Algemene Vergadering ertoe aangezet om in 1996 een alomvattend verbodsverdrag (CTBT) goed te keuren, dat nog steeds niet in werking is getreden. Aan de hand van de sociale-conformiteitstheorie van Kelman wordt in dit artikel uitgelegd hoe en waarom staten ervoor kiezen zich te conformeren aan een niet-bindende overeenkomst. Het betoogt dat, naarmate de betrokken partijen een narratief tegen kernproeven ontwikkelden dat tegelijk hoopvol en realistisch leek, zij de reactie van de actoren stabiliseerden en als katalysator werkten voor de verschuiving in de houding ten opzichte van kernproeven van gedoging naar een wereldwijd officieel moratorium, wat de volledige uitroeiing van de atmosferische experimenten verklaart. Está bien documentado que los ataques nucleares han sucedido dos veces en la historia, en Hiroshima y Nagasaki, pero en ocasiones pasa desapercibido que las explosiones nucleares han sido más frecuentes, con más de 2.000 ensayos llevándose a cabo en más de 60 emplazamientos a escala mundial. Estas circunstancias especiales llevaron a la Asamblea General a adoptar el tratado de prohibición completa (TPCEN) en 1996, el cual aun no ha entrado en vigor. Basándose en la teoría de la conformidad social de Kelman, este artículo explica cómo y porqué los Estados eligieron conformarse con un acuerdo no vinculante. Se argumenta que a medida que las partes interesadas desarrollaron una narrativa anti-ensayo que parecía esperanzadora y realista a la vez, ello mismo llevó a apaciguar la posible reacción de los actores y a catalizar un cambio en relación a los ensayos nucleares que fuera de la tolerancia a una moratoria global fidedigna, lo cual equivale a una completa erradicación de los experimentos atmosféricos. É ben noto che nella storia siano avvenuti due attacchi nucleari, a Hiroshima e Nagasaki, ma è spesso trascurato che le esplosioni nucleari siano state molto più frequenti, con oltre 2000 test che hanno avuto luogo in più di 60 sedi nel mondo. Queste circostanze speciali hanno indotto l'Assemblea generale nel 1996, ad adottare un trattato di messa al bando globale (CTBT), che deve ancora entrare in vigore. Prendendo spunto dalla teoria della conformità sociale di Kelman, questo articolo spiega come e perché gli Stati hanno scelto di conformarsi a un accordo non vincolante. Sostiene che, dato che le parti interessate hanno sviluppato una narrativa anti-test che sembrava allo stesso tempo speranzosa e realistica, esse hanno stabilizzato la reazione degli attori e catalizzato un cambiamento negli atteggiamenti nei confronti dei test nucleari dalla tolleranza a un'autorevole moratoria globale, che spiega la completa eliminazione degli esperimenti atmosferici. Es ist bekannt, dass es in der Geschichte zweimal zu nuklearen Angriffen kam, in Hiroshima und Nagasaki. Es wird aber oft übersehen, dass es häufiger nukleare Explosionen gegeben hat, mit über 2.000 Tests an mehr als 60 Orten weltweit. Diese besonderen Umstände veranlassten die Generalversammlung 1996 zur Verabschiedung eines umfassenden Verbotsvertrags (CTBT), der noch nicht in Kraft getreten ist. In Anlehnung an die soziale Konformitätstheorie von Kelman erklärt dieser Artikel, wie und warum Staaten sich dafür entschieden haben, sich einem unverbindlichen Abkommen zu fügen. Er argumentiert, dass je nachdem die beteiligten Parteien ein Anti-Test-Narrativ entwickelten, das gleichzeitig hoffnungsvoll und realistisch erschien, diese die Reaktion der Akteure stabilisierten und eine Verschiebung in der Haltung gegenüber Atomtests von der Duldung zu einem autoritativen globalen Moratorium herbeiführten, was die vollständige Abschaffung der atmosphärischen Experimente erklärt.

1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-280
Author(s):  
Huw Llewellyn

In 1954, following the US explosion of a large thermonuclear device in the South Pacific, Prime Minister Nehru of India led the first international call for a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. It took until 10 September 1996 for the General Assembly of the United Nations to adopt the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). As at the end of April 1997, it had been signed by 142 states including the five nuclear-weapon states.


1994 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
P. D. Marschall

The problem of verifying compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty is mainly a technical one. However the problem of detecting, locating and identifying nuclear explosions has, since the late 1950s, been intimately involved with the political problems associated with negotiating a treaty. In fact there are few other areas in which policy, diplomacy and science have been so interwoven. This paper attempts to illustrate how technology can. be applied to solve some of the political problems which arise when considering the role of an On Site Inspection (OSI) to determine whether or not a nuclear explosion, in violation of a treaty, has occurred or not. It is hoped that the reader, with a scientific background, but with little or no experience of treaty negotiations, will gain an. insight as to how technical matters can interact with political requirements. The demands made on scientists to provide technical support for negotiating and rnonitoring compliance of a treaty have increased significanfly over the last 40 years. This is a period in which a number of major treaties have contained a significant technical component e.g. the Limited Test Ban Treaty (Threshold Treaty) and the Chemical Weapon Convention. This paper gives an indication of some of the political decisions which will have to be made and suggests some of the technical methods which are of value in the identification of a clandestine nuclear explosion.


2020 ◽  
Vol 221 (3) ◽  
pp. 1789-1801
Author(s):  
Stephany Ortiz-Aguilar ◽  
Jonas D De Basabe ◽  
Mario Gonzalez-Escobar ◽  
Vanesa Magar

SUMMARY The proliferation of nuclear tests is a problem that threatens the safety and health of everybody. In order to tackle this problem, the UN is promoting the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which includes protocols for monitoring and On-Site Inspections (OSI). The purpose of OSI is to verify if a nuclear test has been carried out by identifying with a geophysical technique the presence of a cavern, hole or some device that indicates the violation of the treaty. In this context, it is desirable to be able to use exploration-seismology techniques to detect caverns created by an underground nuclear explosion. However, there is scarce information about the seismic signature of this type of cavern. We present the results of elastic wave propagation simulations, in the time domain, with a cavern created by an underground nuclear explosion. The wave equation is solved using the spectral element method with 4th order basis functions and quadrilateral elements. We show the results for models with cavities and caverns corresponding to explosions of 1, 20 and 100 kilotons, and obtain seismic traces in which we can observe the effect of the structures. We conclude that caverns created by nuclear explosions can be detected using seismic data and distinguished from caves because they behave like two concentric diffractor bodies, as opposed to caves-like diffractors.


1969 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
pp. 49-52
Author(s):  
Tine B. Larsen ◽  
Peter H. Voss ◽  
Trine Dahl-Jensen ◽  
Søren Gregersen

Any major shaking of the Earth can be recorded on a seismograph regardless of the nature of the source. Earthquakes and large explosions generate waves with similar frequency content. This fact has been used for decades to construct systems to monitor detonations of underground nuclear explosions. The quality of the monitoring system has increased significantly in recent years, and we demonstrate here that the data are useful in Danish earthquake research.


2019 ◽  
Vol 91 (2A) ◽  
pp. 573-580 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith D. Koper

Abstract The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits the testing of all nuclear weapons, no matter how small. Although the CTBT is not yet in force, its verification is supported by the International Monitoring System (IMS), which is about 90% complete. Using IMS data, seismologists are able to detect well-coupled underground nuclear explosions with yields larger than ∼0.5–1  kt anywhere in the world with high confidence. Lowering the detection threshold significantly, say to yields of 10−4–10−1  kt fully coupled, will require augmenting IMS data with records from thousands of seismometers that are deployed in various regional, national, and global networks. It will also require routine analysis (detection, location, and characterization) of small seismic events (M 0–3) that are well recorded only at local distances (<150–200  km). This is the same problem faced by operators of regional seismic networks, who are tasked with developing earthquake catalogs as complete as possible without contamination from explosions and other nonearthquake sources. In the future, verification seismology is likely to become increasingly intertwined with the data, methods, and expertise of regional seismic network operators. Here, I highlight some of the important contributions to verification seismology that have recently been made using data recorded by regional seismic networks in North America, with a focus on small events recorded at local distances.


Author(s):  
Josef Havíř

Seismic station VRAC operated by IPE (Institute of Physics of the Earth) is part of the International Monitoring System CTBTO (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization). This monitoring system is built for verifi cation of the compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Station VRAC provided important registration of the nuclear explosions. Last explosions were carried out on the territory Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), latest North Korean nuclear test was conducted this year (12. 2. 2013). Station VRAC recorded signal of all North Korean nuclear explosions. Registrations by stations of International Monitoring System, including station VRAC, significantly contributed to improving of the discrimination techniques, mainly to improving the discrimination between natural earthquakes and explosions based on the analyses of Ms and mb magnitudes.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Kalinowski

<p>Global radioactivity monitoring for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) includes the four xenon isotopes 131mXe, 133Xe, 133mXe and 135Xe. These four isotopes are serving as important indicators of nuclear explosions. The state-of-the-art radioxenon emission inventory uses generic release estimates for each known nuclear facility. However, the release amount can vary by several orders of magnitude from year to year. The year 2014 was selected for a single-year radioxenon emission inventory that avoids this uncertainty. Whenever 2014 emissions reported by the facility operator are available these are incorporated into the 2014 emission inventory. This presentation summarizes this new emission inventory. The overall emissions by facility type are compared with previous studies. The global radioxenon emission inventory for 2014 can be used for studies to estimate the contribution of this anthropogenic source to the observed ambient concentrations at IMS noble gas sensors to support CTBT monitoring activities, including calibration and performance assessment of the verification system as described in the Treaty as well as developing and validating methods for enhanced detection capabilities of signals that may indicate a nuclear test. One specific application will be the third ATM Challenge that was announced in December 2019.</p>


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