From Kyoto to Paris

The Earth Summit of 1992 held in Rio de Janeiro awakened the consciousness of the world to the danger of climate change. The establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change provided the platform for parties to negotiate on ways of moving forward. The global acknowledgement of the weightiness of the climate change and the future of the planet galvanized international agreements to this regard. Consequently, a landmark agreement was brokered in 1992 at Kyoto, Japan and 2015 in Paris, France. However, the strong issues of national interest tend to bedevil the implementation that would take the world forward on climate change. The chapter therefore examined multilateralism from the platform of climate change conferences and analyzed the political undertone behind disappointing outcomes even when most of the negotiators realized that the only way to salvage the impending doom is a multilateral binding agreement when nation-state can subsume their narrow interest.

cara mengajukan pinjaman

Credit provided by the bank contains risks so that in its implementation the bankmust pay attention to the principle of sound credit. The importance of collateral (collateral) forcreditors for granting credit is one of the efforts to anticipaterisks that may arise in the period between the release and settlement of acredit. The binding guarantee also applies to the credit guarantee binding agreement which isThe collateral is in the form of land whose proof of ownership has not been certified, namely the evidenceownership is in the form of a Land Certificate. The binding of the guarantee is done by letterThe power to sell is carried out by the debtor and bank under the hand and with stamp dutyenough

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, a legal anomaly?

It is well-recorded that nuclear attacks happened twice in history, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but it is often overlooked that nuclear explosions were more frequent, with over 2,000 tests taking place in more than 60 locations worldwide. These special circumstances prompted the General Assembly to adopt a comprehensive ban treaty (CTBT) in 1996, which has yet to enter into force. Borrowing from Kelman’s social conformity theory, this article explains how and why states chose to conform to a non-binding agreement. It argues that, as interested parties developed an anti-testing narrative that seemed simultaneously hopeful and realistic, they stabilized actor’s reaction and catalyzed a shift in attitudes towards nuclear testing from forbearance to an authoritative global moratorium, which accounts for the complete eradication of the atmospheric experiments. C’est un fait bien établi que l’histoire a connu deux attaques nucléaires, à Hiroshima et Nagasaki. Ce que l’on sait moins, c’est que les explosions nucléaires étaient bien plus fréquentes, avec plus de 2 000 tests effectués sur une soixantaine de sites de par le monde. Ces circonstances particulières ont poussé l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies à adopter, en 1996, un traité d’interdiction complète des essais nucléaires (TICE), qui n’est pas encore entré en vigueur. S’inspirant de la théorie du conformisme social de Kelman, cet article explique comment et pourquoi des États ont choisi de respecter un accord non contraignant. Il avance que, à mesure que les parties intéressées développaient un discours anti-essais nucléaires qui paraissait à la fois réaliste et porteur d’espoir, elles ont stabilisé les réactions des acteurs et déclenché un changement des mentalités à l’égard des essais nucléaires, passant de l’indulgence à un moratoire général faisant autorité, ce qui explique la disparition complète des essais atmosphériques. Het is algemeen bekend dat er in de geschiedenis twee kernaanvallen zijn geweest, in Hiroshima en Nagasaki, maar vaak wordt over het hoofd gezien dat er nog andere kernexplosies hebben plaatsgevonden, met ruim 2000 proeven op meer dan 60 locaties over de hele wereld. Deze bijzondere omstandigheden hebben de Algemene Vergadering ertoe aangezet om in 1996 een alomvattend verbodsverdrag (CTBT) goed te keuren, dat nog steeds niet in werking is getreden. Aan de hand van de sociale-conformiteitstheorie van Kelman wordt in dit artikel uitgelegd hoe en waarom staten ervoor kiezen zich te conformeren aan een niet-bindende overeenkomst. Het betoogt dat, naarmate de betrokken partijen een narratief tegen kernproeven ontwikkelden dat tegelijk hoopvol en realistisch leek, zij de reactie van de actoren stabiliseerden en als katalysator werkten voor de verschuiving in de houding ten opzichte van kernproeven van gedoging naar een wereldwijd officieel moratorium, wat de volledige uitroeiing van de atmosferische experimenten verklaart. Está bien documentado que los ataques nucleares han sucedido dos veces en la historia, en Hiroshima y Nagasaki, pero en ocasiones pasa desapercibido que las explosiones nucleares han sido más frecuentes, con más de 2.000 ensayos llevándose a cabo en más de 60 emplazamientos a escala mundial. Estas circunstancias especiales llevaron a la Asamblea General a adoptar el tratado de prohibición completa (TPCEN) en 1996, el cual aun no ha entrado en vigor. Basándose en la teoría de la conformidad social de Kelman, este artículo explica cómo y porqué los Estados eligieron conformarse con un acuerdo no vinculante. Se argumenta que a medida que las partes interesadas desarrollaron una narrativa anti-ensayo que parecía esperanzadora y realista a la vez, ello mismo llevó a apaciguar la posible reacción de los actores y a catalizar un cambio en relación a los ensayos nucleares que fuera de la tolerancia a una moratoria global fidedigna, lo cual equivale a una completa erradicación de los experimentos atmosféricos. É ben noto che nella storia siano avvenuti due attacchi nucleari, a Hiroshima e Nagasaki, ma è spesso trascurato che le esplosioni nucleari siano state molto più frequenti, con oltre 2000 test che hanno avuto luogo in più di 60 sedi nel mondo. Queste circostanze speciali hanno indotto l'Assemblea generale nel 1996, ad adottare un trattato di messa al bando globale (CTBT), che deve ancora entrare in vigore. Prendendo spunto dalla teoria della conformità sociale di Kelman, questo articolo spiega come e perché gli Stati hanno scelto di conformarsi a un accordo non vincolante. Sostiene che, dato che le parti interessate hanno sviluppato una narrativa anti-test che sembrava allo stesso tempo speranzosa e realistica, esse hanno stabilizzato la reazione degli attori e catalizzato un cambiamento negli atteggiamenti nei confronti dei test nucleari dalla tolleranza a un'autorevole moratoria globale, che spiega la completa eliminazione degli esperimenti atmosferici. Es ist bekannt, dass es in der Geschichte zweimal zu nuklearen Angriffen kam, in Hiroshima und Nagasaki. Es wird aber oft übersehen, dass es häufiger nukleare Explosionen gegeben hat, mit über 2.000 Tests an mehr als 60 Orten weltweit. Diese besonderen Umstände veranlassten die Generalversammlung 1996 zur Verabschiedung eines umfassenden Verbotsvertrags (CTBT), der noch nicht in Kraft getreten ist. In Anlehnung an die soziale Konformitätstheorie von Kelman erklärt dieser Artikel, wie und warum Staaten sich dafür entschieden haben, sich einem unverbindlichen Abkommen zu fügen. Er argumentiert, dass je nachdem die beteiligten Parteien ein Anti-Test-Narrativ entwickelten, das gleichzeitig hoffnungsvoll und realistisch erschien, diese die Reaktion der Akteure stabilisierten und eine Verschiebung in der Haltung gegenüber Atomtests von der Duldung zu einem autoritativen globalen Moratorium herbeiführten, was die vollständige Abschaffung der atmosphärischen Experimente erklärt.

Is Voting for a Cartel a Sign of Cooperativeness?

This paper tests the hypothesis that a (partial) reason why cartels—collective but costly and non-binding price agreements—lead to higher prices in a Bertrand oligopoly could be because of a selection effect: decision-makers who are willing to form price agreements are more likely to be less competitive and pick higher prices in general. To test this hypothesis we run an experiment where participants play two consecutive Bertrand pricing games: first a standard version without the opportunity to form agreements; followed by a version where participants can vote whether to have a (costly) non-binding agreement as a group to pick the highest number. We find no statistically significant difference between the numbers picked in the first game by participants who vote for and against an agreement in the second game. We do confirm that having a non-binding agreement to cooperate leads to higher numbers being picked on average. Both participants who voted for and against the agreement increase the number they pick in situations with an agreement. However, this effect is bigger for participants who voted in favour.

AUTENTIKASI PERJANJIAN PENGIKATAN JUAL BELI TANAH YANG ANTIDATIR

This research aims to analyze the problem of the authentication of the antidatir sale and purchase land binding agreement where the deed is in violation of Law on the Notary Position. In analyzing the authentication of the antidatir sale and purchase land binding agreement, this normative research uses statute and conceptual approach by gathering data through librarian research. The results of this research concludes that the antidatir deed has violated the formal requirements of an authentic deed, starting from the failure to fulfill the obligations of a notary based on article 15 and 16 of the Amendment of Notary Position Law, not fulfilling the principles of good faith in making deeds and not fulfilling the nature of formal proof of authentic deed. Therefore, the antidatir PPJB is null and void.

Penomoran dan Penanggalan Akta Notaris Berdasarkan Putusan Pengadilan (Analisis Putusan PN Denpasar Nomor 530/Pdt. G/2016/PN. Dps.)

The Denpasar District Court (PN) in its decision Number 530 / Pdt.G / 2016 / PN.Dps stated that it has punished the Notary to immediately give the number and date to the Sale and Purchase Binding Agreement Deed and the Power of Attorney. This is interesting and important to examine in this research in relation to the basis of authority and the method of assigning the number and date of the deed signed by the parties before the notary after the Denpasar District Court decision. This normative legal research aims to examine the contents of a positive legal level, concerning the Numbering and Dating of Notary Deeds, using primary, secondary and tertiary legal materials, while the analysis method uses grammatical and systematic interpretation. The results showed that the basic authority of the Denpasar District Court to decide disputes regarding the numbering and dating of notary deeds, namely Article 130 HIR / 154 Rbg, Article 1851 of the Civil Code, Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 48 of 2009, Perma RI Number 1 of 2016, and the principle of ius curia novit. In connection with the numbering and dating of the Notary deed, it can be done based on the provisions of the UUJNP and refers to the Denpasar District Court decision.

Money creation and the revolution. Along the Path to Real Change

When you store your belongings in a private locker, does the owner of the locker pay you? On the contrary, you pay the owner, for he is providing you with a service called safe-keeping. In effect, the owner holds your belongings safe until you take them back. So, why is it that you accept money from a bank to hold your money for you? The obvious answer is that the bank is not holding your money; it is lending it out and rewarding you with a portion of what it collects in interest. If you are happy with this arrangement, you have likely sought out a bank in your neighborhood that provides you with the greatest return on your deposit. Unfor tunately, there are several things very wrong with this type of transaction. Most important is that you are engaging in a tran saction that is commercially unsound. You and your bank engage in a legally non-binding agreement when, on the one hand, your bank promises to return your deposit on demand, and on the other hand, loans a portion of it to others for a specified period of time. Contractually, these two acts are incompatible, as the same money cannot be both a de-mand deposit and a loan simultaneously. Either, you deposit your money, reserve the right to de-mand it back at any moment, and pay the bank for holding it on your behalf. This is called a demand deposit. Or, you surrender your right to your money for a specific period of time, permit your bank to lend it to others, and receive interest for your risk and sacrifice. This is called a time deposit. Commercially, treating your demand deposit as money that can be loaned to others is not an enforceable contract, for the law insists that there must be mutual assent when two parties enter into an agreement. You and the bank are simply at odds when you expect to retrieve your money at any moment on demand, and the bank lends a portion of it to others for a fixed period. Legally speaking, both parties to the transaction do not agree to the same contractual terms in the same sense.

KAJIAN HUKUM PIDANA TERHADAP NOTARIS YANG MEMBUAT PERJANJIAN PENGIKATAN TANPA DISERTAI SURAT-SURAT BUKTI KEPEMILIKAN (Studi Kasus Putusan Nomor 1362/Pid.B/2019/PN Jkt.Utr)

In practice, buying and selling transactions must meet the requirements according to legal provisions, especially now that there are many buying and selling problems that result in the emergence of disputes that cause losses incurred by the seller and the buyer as well as the notary as the deed maker. The problem in this research is to research and analyze the arrangements in making the Sale and Purchase Deed (PPJB), criminal forms related to the position of a notary in making the Sale and Purchase Deed and criminal law analysis of the Notary who makes the Sale and Purchase Deed) without being accompanied proof of ownership letters in decision Number 1362 / Pid.B / 2019 / PN Jkt.Utr.Keywords: Criminal Law, Notary, Binding Agreement

Pembebanan Hak Tanggungan dalam Pemberian Kredit Pada Lembaga Perkreditan Desa (LPD)

In 1984, the Provincial Government of Bali issued an idea to help the pakraman village in carrying out its cultural function. With Governor's Letter Number 972 of 1984, November 1, 1984 concerning Village Credit Institutions. This type of research is normative research, the source of legal material consists of primary and secondary legal materials. Analysis of legal materials with interpretation analysis. The results of the study show that the granting of credit to rural Credit Institutions with guaranteed mortgage rights, is set forth in a credit agreement between the LPD and the customer who is also required to get approval from adat Bendesa, in this case to apply adat sanctions when bad credit occurs. The position of adat "sanctions" is as a last resort after other efforts have not been successful with the aim that credit arrears can be repaid. In the application of strict and objective adat "sanctions", it is very necessary, because the adoption of adat "sanctions" based on the existence of nepotism elements can cause a crisis of the banjar / adat community members' trust in the existence of prajuru and awig-awig who have been highly respected and obeyed. Bali Provincial Governor Regulation No. 44 of 2017 binds to the imposition of mortgage rights in the granting of loans to the LPD that only applies to the local traditional village, in this case the LPD is a savings and loan business entity owned by the customary village. Therefore, from the very beginning in the credit agreement an effort was made to form a binding agreement according to the awig-awig of the traditional village and which appeared in the recommendations of the management. If a bad credit occurs, it can be resolved in a village paruman by imposing customary "sanctions" which are part of the power in resolving any violations or disputes that are there because of original autonomy, namely in an effort to provide legal protection for one of its assets. And bad credit customers who do not carry out the obligations as set forth in the credit agreement are imposed with confiscation of collateral that is bound by the imposition of mortgage rights for immovable property.