scholarly journals Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Consultative Document Simplified alternative to the standardised approach to market risk capital requirements - June 2017

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (2017) ◽  
pp. 3-4
Author(s):  
Marco Bianchetti ◽  
◽  
Umberto Cherubini ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Orgeldinger

The Basel Committee suggested new ways of dealing with market risk in banks’ trading and banking books, in its October 2013 consultative paper, and subsequent versions published thereafter, for revised market risk framework FRTB. The Basel Committee estimates that the new rules will result in an approximate median capital increase of 22% and a weighted average capital increase of 40% (BCBS 2016), compared with the current framework. Budget reports on FRTB implementation range from costs of 5-million USD to 250-million USD. Key changes can be found in the internal model approach, in the standard rules and in the approval process. Significant changes introduced by the FRTB include stricter separation of the trading and banking book. Regardless of whether they use standardized or internal models, banks will need to review their portfolios to determine if existing classifications of instruments and desks as trading or banking book are still applicable, or whether a revision of desk structure is needed. In its article ‘Critical appraisal of the Basel fundamental review of the trading book regulation’ (Orgeldinger 2017) the theoretical foundations of the internal model approach IMA were analysed and the criticisms for FRTB risk models were investigated. A recent onslaught of rules is rendering the existing timeline for implementation practically impossible. In this article we present and critically evaluate different approaches to implement the new rules suggested by academics and major consulting companies.


Author(s):  
Miroslava Mastná

In June 2004 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published the new capital adequacy framework commonly known as Basel II. Basel II contains international capital standards for banking organizations and will replace the relatively risk-invariant requirements in the current Basel I accord. The Committee intends Basel II to be available for implementation as of year-end 2006. The goal of this paper is to analyze the current situation in bank preparation for Basel II in the Czech Republic. For this reason a survey was done in the Czech banks in September and October 2004. Results of this survey are subject of this article. Results are separately discussed for four groups of banks (according to balance sum) – large, middle and small banks and building societies. The research is divided into three sections. The first section is concentrated on the current phase of preparation of Czech banks for Basel II. Results of this section showed that large banks are best prepared in comparison to other three groups of banks. The goal of the second section of the research was to find out how banks evaluate difficulty of activities connected with implementation of Basel II. Problems are mostly connected with changes in IT systems and lack of data. The goal of the third section was to find out which approach for calculating capital requirements on credit risk are banks most likely to adopt at the Basel implementation date. Majority of banks is most likely to adopt the Standardised approach.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerd Waschbusch ◽  
Sabina Kiszka

Operational risks have become increasingly important for banks, especially against the background of growing IT dependency and the increasing complexity of their activities. Further-more, the corona pandemic contributed to the increased risk potential. Therefore, banks have to back these risks with own funds. There are currently three measurement approaches for determining the capital requirements for operational risk. In recent years, and especially during the Great Financial Crisis of 2007/2008, however, some of the weaknesses inherent in these approaches have become apparent. Thus, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision revised the current capital framework. Therefore, this article examines the various measurement approaches, addresses inherent weaknesses and moreover, presents the future measurement approach developed by the supervisory authorities.


Author(s):  
Monika Gładysz

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published in 2004 the New Capital Adequacy Framework. A special importance is assigned in this document to the external assessment agencies. Banks will have to determine the minimum capital requirements on the basis of assessments by the external agencies. The role of the external assessment agencies in the New Capital Adequacy Framework and potential threats and benefits from using by banks the external assessments for determination of the. minimum capital requirements are presented in the paper.


2014 ◽  
Vol 64 (Supplement-2) ◽  
pp. 257-274
Author(s):  
Eliška Stiborová ◽  
Barbora Sznapková ◽  
Tomáš Tichý

The market risk capital charge of financial institutions has been mostly calculated by internal models based on integrated Value at Risk (VaR) approach, since the introduction of the Amendment to Basel Accord in 1996. The internal models should fulfil several quantitative and qualitative criteria. Besides others, it is the so called backtesting procedure, which was one of the main reasons why the alternative approach to market risk estimation — conditional Value at Risk or Expected Shortfall (ES) — were not applicable for the purpose of capital charge calculation. However, it is supposed that this approach will be incorporated into Basel III. In this paper we provide an extensive simulation study using various sets of market data to show potential impact of ES on capital requirements.


Author(s):  
Gleeson Simon

This chapter begins by setting out the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision produced by the Basel Committee in September 1997, reissued in a revised version in October 2006, and further revised in the light of the crisis in 2012. The 2012 revision of these principles focused on four major areas: corporate governance within banks; an obligation on supervisors to ensure that banks are appropriately prepared for resolution; an obligation for supervisors to assess bank risks in the context of the macroeconomic environment; and the idea that supervisors should have higher expectations of banks which are globally systemically significant than for other banks. The discussions then turn to capital regulation, constraints on bank capital regulation, quantum of bank capital requirements, whether the banking crisis proves that risk capital-based regulation failed, market crisis and regulation, and protecting the public from the consequences of bank failure.


2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 224-234
Author(s):  
Maryam Abdulla Althawadi ◽  
Gagan Kukreja

The financial crisis which occurred in 2007 and 2008 has had a major impact on the global banking industry. As a result, many banks went bankrupt or the governments had bailed them out. Thus, to protect banks against such a situation, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) had scrutinized and altered the banking regulations, termed as the Basel III. The purpose of this study is to analyse the Basel III paradigm and its impact on the banks’ financial health of Bahrain. This kind of study will enhance the understanding of Basel III and its impact on banking sector for researchers of GCC in general and Bahrain in particular. The approach of the study is qualitative, whereas the theoretical framework has been used in the literature review. The empirical results were acquired from the interviews of various personnel from banks in Bahrain to gauge their perspective on Basel III paradigm. The overall perspectives of the banking personnel about Basel III were that it should have more stringent requirements. In this case, the capital requirements are considered to be too low and the risk weights are too unrealistic. However, majority of the banking personnel are still optimistic that Basel III does grant superior protection, but it doesn’t provide complete protection against the chance of failure. According to the research findings, majority of respondents were optimistic and feel that it does help in protecting the banks, while others consider it completely useless and failed to prevent failures.


2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdul Mongid ◽  
Izah Mohd Tahir

In January 2001, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published a proposal for a new capital framework, the “New Basel Capital Accord (Basel 11)” thus replacing Basel 1. One of the major motivations in the proposal is the introduction of explicit capital charge for operational risks in the business activities of banks. The objective of this paper is to estimate operational risk capital charge using historical data for 77 rural banks in Indonesia for a three-year period, 2006 to 2008. This study uses three approaches:  (i) Basic Indicator Approach (BIA), (ii) Standardized Approach (SA) and (iii) Alternative Standardized Approach (ASA). We found that the average capital charge required to cover operational risk is IDR 154 million (1.5% of asset). When the calculation is conducted using the SA method, we found, on average a requirement of IDR 123 million (1.23% of asset). When the calculation is conducted using the Alternative Standardized Approach (ASA), the capital required was IDR 43 million (0.43% of asset). The results provide evidence that banks using more advance model require less capital charge.


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