La responsabilidad de los diarios digitales por los comentarios de sus usuarios

Author(s):  
M.ª Nieves ARRESE IRIONDO

RESUMEN: Una de las caracteristicas de los diarios digitales es que permiten que los usuarios introduzcan comentarios en sus plataformas. La normativa comunitaria, y en su desarrollo, la interna de cada Estado, especifican en que supuestos los diarios estan exentos de responsabilidad por el tenor de dichos comentarios. No obstante, una sentencia de la Seccion Primera del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos ha cuestionado los citados supuestos al llevar a cabo una interpretacion distinta. Las reacciones a dicha sentencia por parte de asociaciones en defensa de la libertad de expresion no se han hecho esperar, y el planteamiento del asunto ante la Gran Sala del Tribunal de Estrasburgo abre una nueva oportunidad para que reconsidere su postura y dicte un pronunciamiento acorde con la normativa de la Union. LABURPENA: Egunkari digitalen ezaugarria da erabiltzaileek iruzkinak sar ditzaketela haien plataformetan. Europar Batasuneko araudiak, eta hori garatuz, Estatu bakoitzekoek, zehazten dute zein kasutan ez diren egunkari digitalak iruzkin horiengatik erantzule izango. Hala ere, Giza Eskubideen Europar Auzitegiaren Lehenengo Atalak emandako epai batek kasu horiek zalantzan jarri ditu beste bat izan baita egin duen interpretazioa. Adierazpen-askatasunaren aldeko erakundeek epai horren aurka erreakzionatu dute, eta uzia Estrasburgoko Auzitegiaren Areto Nagusiaren aurrean planteatu denez, aukera berria ireki da bere jarrera berriz pentsatu eta Europar Batasuneko araudiarekin bat etorriko den ebazpena emateko. ABSTRACT: Digital newspapers allow users to include their own comments. European and Member States’ laws specify in which cases those newspapers are exempted from liability owing to those opinions. However, the European Court of Human Rights (First Section) has questioned those exemptions. Freedom of speech associations have criticized the ECHR’s standpoint. In fact, an appeal is pending before the Grand Chamber of the ECHR providing a fresh opportunity to amend the current interpretation of applicable laws and adopt a position much closer to European Union law.

2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 325-363
Author(s):  
Aistė Mickonytė

This article examines national regulations relating to the recognition of names in official documents by focusing on Article 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, having particular regard to the judgment of the European Court of Justice in the case of Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn. It also assesses the potential impact that this and other cases before the ecj and the European Court of Human Rights may exert on national minorities. The recognition of names is not regulated in European Union law; thus, the eu member states may freely determine the usage of names in official documents, as the state language represents a constitutional value and part of the national identity of many eu member states. Therefore, only regulation of names that causes excessive interference with the exercise of freedom of movement or respect for private and family life is unlawful under eu law. This issue will also be discussed in light of Article 4(2) of the Treaty on the European Union, by which the ecj assesses these types of interference with the eu’s duty to respect the national identities of its member states.


Author(s):  
Pablo Cruz Mantilla de los Ríos

La identidad nacional es una categoría jurídica central del Derecho de la Unión Europea que está siendo invocada cada vez con mayor frecuencia entre la doctrina, así como entre los Tribunales Constitucionales nacionales y el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea. En estas circunstancias, está surgiendo una, aún incipiente e inmadura, literatura académica que, con base en una serie de recientes pronunciamientos del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, está interpretando si existe en el marco del sistema del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos una figura análoga. Este artículo tiene por objeto analizar en, clave comparada, la posible emergencia de dicha categoría en ese nuevo contexto jurídico. National identity is an essential legal category in European Union law which has increasingly been invoked by scholars as well as constitutional courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union. In this connection, it is emerging a, still incipient and immature, legal literature which, on the basis of a series of recent judgments coming from the European Court of Human Rights, is interpreting whether there is an analogous figure in the framework of the European Convention of Human Rights system. This article aims to analyse, in a comparative key, the possible advent of the above-mentioned figure in this new legal context.


2020 ◽  
pp. 203228442097974
Author(s):  
Sibel Top ◽  
Paul De Hert

This article examines the changing balance established by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) between human rights filters to extradition and the obligation to cooperate and how this shift of rationale brought the Court closer to the position of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in that respect. The article argues that the ECtHR initially adopted a position whereby it prioritised human rights concerns over extraditions, but that it later nuanced that approach by establishing, in some cases, an obligation to cooperate to ensure proper respect of human rights. This refinement of its position brought the ECtHR closer to the approach adopted by the CJEU that traditionally put the obligation to cooperate above human rights concerns. In recent years, however, the CJEU also backtracked to some extent from its uncompromising attitude on the obligation to cooperate, which enabled a convergence of the rationales of the two Courts. Although this alignment of the Courts was necessary to mitigate the conflicting obligations of European Union Member States towards both Courts, this article warns against the danger of making too many human rights concessions to cooperation in criminal matters.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-23
Author(s):  
Marija Daka

The paper presents some of the most relevant aspects of European nondiscrimination law established th rough European Union law and the European Convention on Human Rights, looking also at the evolution of the norms and milestones of case-law on equal treatment within the two systems. The paper gives an overview of the non-discrimination concept as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union and by the European Court of Human Rights. We examine the similar elements but also give insight into conceptual differences between the two human rights regimes when dealing with equal treatment. The differences mainly stem from the more complex approach taken by EU law although, based on analysed norms, cases, and provisions, the aspects of equal treatment in EU law are largely consistent with the practice of the ECtHR. Lastly, the paper briefl y places the European non-discrimination law within the multi-layered human rights system, giving some food for thought for the future potential this concept brings.


Author(s):  
Katalin Ligeti

Since long before the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), the two highest courts in Europe, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have sought to develop their respective jurisprudence in such a way as to ensure a strong protection of individual rights, whilst avoiding clashes between the decisions taken in Luxembourg and Strasbourg. An important statement in this regard is provided by the Bosphorus judgment, in which the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR recognised the existence of a presumption of equivalent protection of fundamental rights under EU law. The presumption is rebuttable, but expresses the trustful attitude (and a certain degree of deference) of Strasbourg towards the ability of EU law (and of the CJEU) to protect Convention rights.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Bridgette K. McLellan

<p>European Union citizenship was established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Intended to fall within the exclusive prerogative of the Member States, it soon became clear that the autonomy of Member States to determine matters relating to nationality would be restricted by the ever-expansive reach of the European Court of Justice. As such, the European Court of Justice transformed the law on citizenship in the 2010 case of Rottmann where measures affecting or depriving the rights conferred and protected by the European Union were held to fall within the scope ratione materiae of European Union law. While Rottmann affirmed the law as to the deprivation of European Union citizenship, it left unanswered the question whether the acquisition of nationality also falls within the scope of European Union law. This paper aims to identify and analyse the law arising post-Rottmann to determine whether the acquisition of nationality could fall within the scope of European Union law. It shall then analyse whether fundamental principles of European Union law, namely the principle of proportionality, could be applied in order to regulate the conditions imposed by Member States in relation to the acquisition of nationality.</p>


2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Schorkopf

On 12 December 2001, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights unanimously found the case Bankovic et al. vs. 17 NATO and ECHR- Member States (NATO Bombing Case) inadmissible.


2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-323 ◽  
Author(s):  
H.G. Hoogers

On March 16, 2006, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its final judgment in the case of Tatjana Ždanoka against the Republic of Latvia. Although not the first decision under Article 3 of the first Protocol, the Ždanoka v. Latvia case was important, because it allowed the Court to come to a decision on an aspect of Article 3, first Protocol, which in earlier case law had not extensively been dealt with by the ECtHR: the right to be elected. Moreover, the case allowed the Court to make some statements of principle on another question with which numerous member states of the Council have been dealing throughout the 20th century: how far may a democracy go in protecting itself from (allegedly) undemocratic parties, groups or individuals?


2012 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina Casini

Il contributo prende in esame la sentenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo emanata dalla Grande Camera il 3 novembre 2011 (caso S.H. et Al.v. Austria n. 57813/00). Essa va ad arricchire positivamente il panorama biogiuridico europeo. La sentenza in oggetto riguarda il giudizio instaurato nei confronti dell’Austria, a proposito della disciplina che pone il divieto di fecondazione artificiale eterologa. Nella sentenza, resa in via definitiva, la Grande Camera ha superato, ribaltandolo, il giudizio espresso dalla Camera semplice il 1° aprile 2011, affermando che il divieto di fecondazione artificiale eterologa, contenuto nella legge austriaca, non contrasta con gli artt. 8 (diritto alla vita privata e familiare) e 14 (principio di non discriminazione) della Convenzione europea per la salvaguardia dei diritti e delle libertà fondamentali. La Corte non affronta le questioni bioetiche e biogiuridiche sollevate dalla fecondazione artificiale eterologa (si pensi al diritto del figlio all’unitarietà delle figure genitoriali), ma salva la legge austriaca facendo riferimento alla dottrina del c.d. “margine di apprezzamento” degli Stati membri. È auspicabile comunque che la sentenza influisca sul giudizio di costituzionalità in ordine al divieto di eterologa contenuto nella legge italiana. Nella prospettiva di valorizzare la voce degli Stati, merita sostegno iniziativa cittadina europea promossa ai sensi dell’art. 11 del Trattato di Lisbona per riconoscere il diritto alla vita di ogni essere umano fin dal concepimento. ---------- The article considers the decision of the European Court of Human Rights given by the Grand Chamber on November 3rd 2011 (case S.H. et Al. vs. Austria, application n. 57181/00). This ruling, which adds an important contribution to European Biolaw, concerns the Austrian law that prohibits heterologous artificial human reproduction and reversed the previous ruling (April, 1st, 2011) by the lower chamber of the European Court. So, the Grand Chamber affirmed that the ban on heterologous artificial reproduction does not violate article 8 (Right to respect for private and family life) and article 14 (Prohibition of discrimination) of Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Grand Chamber did not address the bioethical questions raised by heterologous artificial reproduction, but confirmed the law by referring to the theory of a “wide margin of appreciation” of member States. It is to be hoped that this decision will carry weight with the Italian Constitutional Court when it considers the Italian law prohibiting heterologous artificial reproduction. With regard to valorizing the beliefs of the member States, it would be good to support the European citizen’s initiative, promoted following article 11 of the Lisbon Treaty, to recognize the right to life of every human being from conception.


2021 ◽  
pp. 23-29
Author(s):  
Dmytro Boichuk ◽  
Kateryna Torhashova

The article focuses on the importance of the European Union's values in the development of the legal system of the member states of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and for the functioning of the European Union, further integration processes and their reflection in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The ideological interpretation and practical implementation of these decisions are reflected.


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