NARRATIVE APPROACH IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

2020 ◽  
pp. 96-99
Author(s):  
Vitaliy Karimov

The report is devoted to a narrative approach in history of philosophy. The narrative method opposes, but does not compete with traditional work of the history of philosophy. The dialogue way of writing and reading philo-sophical texts is one ofthe most suitable objects for a narrative approach and is able to give a new look at the problems facing the history of philosophy, since it gives the reader an opportunity to engage in dialogue and in-teract with the author. Thus, texts written in the dialogue genre in earlier eras could without prejudice to their content and understanding, be moved into a contemporary context and involved in a dialogue with modernity.

1984 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 421-443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Hausman

When Keats identified truth and beauty, he surely intended mere extensionality. I myself have never had much trouble with either half of the equivalence. Others have considerable difficulty. A case in point is the Watson-Allaire-Cummins interpretation of Berkeley's idealism, which I shall refer to henceforth as the inherence account (IA). That account is put forward to answer an extremely perplexing question in the history of philosophy: Why did Berkeley embrace idealism, i.e., why did he hold that esse est percipi, that to be is to be perceived, indeed that what is perceived must be perceived in order to exist? In essence, the IA answers these questions very simply and elegantly: perceived qualities are, for Berkeley, qualities of the mind in the same sense that, in the tradition of substance metaphysics, blue is a quality of a blue flower; just as the blue of the flower is inseparable from it, so the perceived blue is inseparable from the mind that perceives it.


2021 ◽  
pp. 172-188
Author(s):  
Charles Brittain

This chapter examines the doxographical, philosophical, and historical forms of the history of philosophy. The aim of doxography is to reconstruct and present philosophical views or positions that have been proposed in the past and to do so in a way that makes clear the interest they may retain for contemporary philosophical discussions. However, the inadequacy of ancient doxographical writers seems so great that the term ‘doxography’ itself has acquired a pejorative connotation. The criticism is twofold: first, one has the feeling that the ancient doxographers did not have historical awareness or a sensitivity to history; second, one tends to associate doxography with a kind of philosophical failure. People then abandoned the assumption that the positions of the past retain their philosophical importance in the contemporary context. In its place, they began to suppose that the views of the past were only of interest as stages, even if necessary ones, of the evolution of thought. This sort of history represents the philosophical study of the history of philosophy. It is precisely this philosophical position which, towards the middle of the nineteenth century, provokes a reaction. But this reaction takes two very different forms. On the one hand, it gives rise to the historical study of the history of philosophy and, on the other, to a modern form of doxography.


Author(s):  
Galen Strawson ◽  
Galen Strawson

John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves—yet it is widely thought to be wrong. This book argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point. The book argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word “person” as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like “human being.” In actuality, Locke uses “person” primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. This point is familiar to some philosophers, but its full consequences have not been worked out, partly because of a further error about what Locke means by the word “consciousness.” When Locke claims that your personal identity is a matter of the actions that you are conscious of, he means the actions that you experience as your own in some fundamental and immediate manner. Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-112
Author(s):  
Pierre Legendre

"Der Beitrag reevaluiert die «dogmatische Funktion», eine soziale Funktion, die mit biologischer und kultureller Reproduktion und folglich der Reproduktion des industriellen Systems zusammenhängt. Indem sie sich auf der Grenze zwischen Anthropologie und Rechtsgeschichte des Westens situiert, nimmt die Studie die psychoanalytische Frage nach der Rolle des Rechts im Verhalten des modernen Menschen erneut in den Blick. </br></br>This article reappraises the dogmatic function, a social function related to biological and cultural reproduction and consequently to the reproduction of the industrial system itself. On the borderline of anthropology and of the history of law – applied to the West – this study takes a new look at the question raised by psychoanalysis concerning the role of law in modern human behaviour. "


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