An Anselmian Approach to Divine Omnipotence

Author(s):  
Katherin Rogers
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Kathleen Long

Monsters take on many roles in Montaigne’s Essays, almost always in novel ways. They do not take on their usual roles as markers of other races, genders, or bodies, as threats or objects of repulsion. Rather, the authorial self and his work are seen as monstrous; Europeans and their culture are seen as monstrous; the knowledge systems that create monsters are themselves monstrous; man’s vanity is monstrous. But most of all, the monster is the provocation to meditation on man’s presumption, and on the limitations of human knowledge and power in the face of the world and the divine. As the sign of the diversity and mutability of the natural world and thus of divine omnipotence, the monstrous and unusual is valued by Montaigne over the normal or usual. It is also the mark of human creativity, dependent as it is on the vagaries of the imagination, new and radically different from the rhetorical, literary, and artistic norms. This is why the Essays themselves can be considered a monstrous work.


1969 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-17
Author(s):  
Gordon Leff

Ockhamism was a radical restatement of the relation of revealed truth to natural experience. Its force lay in the systematic application—one might say exploitation—of the different criteria appropriate to each. That they were different was universally accepted; but not until Ockham were their differences methodically shown to be unassimilable. The reasons were not only epistemological; they were also theological. The limits to natural knowledge set by Ockham's insistence upon verification had their counterpart in the absence of limits to God's omnipotence—save self-contradiction. Ockhamism was not just empiricism; it was an extreme restatement of Christian belief in divine omnipotence and the contingency of creation. The disruptive effects lay not in the belief itself but in the play upon it, especially by Ockham's followers.


Lumen et Vita ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily Linthicum

The two dominant concepts Catherine Keller examines in her study of creatio ex profundis, creation out of chaos, are the feminine tehomic language and refutation of divine omnipotence. She studies both these concepts through a feminist lens as well as with an overarching question as to why creatio ex nihilo, creation from nothing, has commandeered the thought behind Genesis exegesis and creation theology. Using various literary styles, both religious and secular, Keller attempts to deconstruct creation out of nothing and argue how a theology of becoming is more appropriate given the language of Genesis and creation as a whole. Rather than merely substitute the present masculine understandings of God and creation with the feminine, she persuades for a return to the foundation of tehomic language in an effort to reconstruct the negative feminine connotations of chaos and support a theology of becoming without a “divine dominology.” The purpose of this paper is to offer an examination of Keller’s text and counterarguments to her understanding of creatio ex nihilo and ex profundis. There are various examples of male dominant thought in theology throughout history; however, divine omnipotence, both in general and as associated with creation theology, is not an affront to the feminine and creatio ex profundis. Keller’s fault does not lie in the notion of creatio ex profundis and its validity; rather, her argument concerning the domineering power of divine omnipotence and its association with creatio ex nihilo remains insufficient.


Author(s):  
Saiful Hakam

Historically, In Indonesia, there are two interpretation of the first verse of Pancasila. The first is [Pengakuan adanya Tuhan] Recognition of the Divine Omnipotence. This translation is used to use by secular group including communist and non-Muslim group especially Buddhist and Hindus. This interpretation was dominant in 1945-1965 when Sukarno as the creator of Pancasila still dominated the political power. Or, this verse was dominant when the secular-nationalist group still had strong position in Indonesia. The fact of it is during the time there was no a policy about official religions from state and the requirement of religious teaching in schools and universities. And, it must be noted that Sukarno as the creator of Pancasila in Guided Democracy era, strongly interpreted Pancasila in his speech and address as the Nasakom that is National, Religion, and Communist. Sukarno as the creator of Pancasila strongly insisted that he was truly nationalist and in his heart he was a truly Muslim. So, it can be said the Recognition of the Divine Omnipotence is the original interpretation of the first verse of Pancasila. My argumentation is originally in the early beginning of the Republic the meaning of religion was religion as a faith not as an institution


2020 ◽  
Vol IV (4) ◽  
pp. 15-34
Author(s):  
Igor Gasparov

The article considers contemporary free will defences, proposed by A. Plantinga, R. Swinburne, according to which the existence of a world in which there is free will is something more valuable than the existence of a world in which there is no free will. It is shown that contemporary forms of free will defences share with atheistic arguments from evil an anthropomorphic model of God, in which God is thought as an individual among other individuals, although endowed with attributes such as omniscience and omnipotence to an excellent degree. It has also been shown that another important point of similarity between contemporary free will defences and atheistic arguments from evil is that both attempt to assess what our world would be like if created by such an individual. In contrast to atheistic arguments from evil, contemporary free will defences argue that divine omnipotence and omniscience are subject to some greater restrictions, as usually assumed, especially due to God's desire to give some of his creations the ability of free choice, which logically implies the possibility and even necessity of the existence of evil. It is demonstrated that classical theism does not share the anthropomorphic model of deity typical for many contemporary philosophers of religion. Classical theism rejects both the anthropomorphic model of deity and the unaccountability of free will to God as the supreme good. On the contrary, it assumes that free decision was initially an opportunity for the voluntary consent of man which had an innate aspiration towards God as his supreme good. Nevertheless, due to the creation of man out of nothing, this consent could not be automatic but implied forming a virtuous character, and man's transition from a state in which he was able not to sin, to a state in which he would be not able to sin.


Author(s):  
Amos Funkenstein

This chapter explores how eternal truths are created in a radical sense of the word; even mathematical theorems are contingent upon God’s will. What the most radical defenders of divine omnipotence in the Middle Ages hardly ever asserted, Descartes did without hesitation: that God could invalidate the most basic mathematical operations. Meanwhile, Spinoza argued that divine omnipotence and necessity of nature are one and the same, since all that is really possible in the world is also as necessary as any mathematical truth. The chapter shows how medieval theology introduced the distinction between the two aspects of God’s power so as to enlarge as far as possible the horizon of that which is possible to God without violating reason.


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