Thickness record of varves from glacial Ojibway Lake recovered in sediment cores from Frederick House Lake, northeastern Ontario

The thicknesses of 384 rhythmic couplets were measured along a composite sequence of glacial Lake Ojibway glaciolacustrine deposits recovered in two sediment cores from Frederick House Lake, Ontario. The visual comparison of distinctive couplets in the CT-scan radiographs of the Frederick House core samples to photographs of core samples from Reid Lake show a match of ±1 varve number from v1656-v1902, and ±5 varve numbers between v1903-v2010, relative to the regional numbering of the Timiskaming varve series. There are two interpretations for the post-v2010 couplets that fall within the Connaught varve sequence of the regional series. In the first, the interpreted numbering spans from v2066-v2115, which produces a gap of 55 missing varves equivalent to v2011-v2065, and corresponds to the original interpretation of the Connaught varve numbering. The second spans v2011a-v2060a, and represents alternative (a) numbering for the same varves. Varve thickness data are listed in spreadsheet files (.xlsx and .csv formats), and CT-Scan radiograph images of core samples are laid out on a mosaic poster showing the interpreted varve numbering and between-core sample correlations of the varve couplets.

Robert Merton and Ibn Sina: A Roll Call of Moral Imperatives

The paper attempts to expand the authentic understanding of the imperatives of the scientific ethos given by R.K. Merton in 1942. In the original interpretation, Merton’s Code referred only to the European science of the New Age and subsequent centuries. As Merton himself and his followers have seen, the applicability of this code to other societies is not relevant. However, the author of the paper believes that the original four maxims of Merton in one way or another work effectively outside the specified space-time frame and, in particular, work in medieval Arab-Muslim science. The philosophical allegorical parable "The Message of Birds" written by Ibn Sina in the XI century is used as a text in which the imperatives that semantically coincide with Merton's maxims are found. The analysis shows that the text of the medieval scientist is transparently articulated: 1) Mertonian "communism" which assumes the collective ownership of epistemological discourse participants of the products received in its process (new empirical facts, theoretical and methodological innovations); 2) "universalism" that excludes any discrimination of discourse subjects on external, non-scientific criteria; 3) "disinterestedness", according to which the scientist builds his activities as if he had no other interests but to understand the truth; 4) "organized skepticism" according to which there is no presumption of innocence in science, and whoever comes forward with epistemological innovation must calmly and patiently prove his rightness to those who are standing in defence of the existing body of knowledge. Since the author of "The Message of Birds", despite his chosen artistic and mystical form for this work, is one of the largest figures of medieval Arab-Muslim science, his parable should be interpreted, first of all, as a text, which reflects the very process of cognitive search in pre-classical science. A closer familiarity with the nature and content of epistemological discourse in ancient and medieval traditional societies provides a good reason here to see one of the attempts to systematize the ethical rules that have actually been in force among scientists for many centuries.

Footprint evidence of early hominin locomotor diversity at Laetoli, Tanzania

Bipedal trackways discovered in 1978 at Laetoli site G, Tanzania and dated to 3.66 million years ago are widely accepted as the oldest unequivocal evidence of obligate bipedalism in the human lineage1–3. Another trackway discovered two years earlier at nearby site A was partially excavated and attributed to a hominin, but curious affinities with bears (ursids) marginalized its importance to the paleoanthropological community, and the location of these footprints fell into obscurity3–5. In 2019, we located, excavated and cleaned the site A trackway, producing a digital archive using 3D photogrammetry and laser scanning. Here we compare the footprints at this site with those of American black bears, chimpanzees and humans, and we show that they resemble those of hominins more than ursids. In fact, the narrow step width corroborates the original interpretation of a small, cross-stepping bipedal hominin. However, the inferred foot proportions, gait parameters and 3D morphologies of footprints at site A are readily distinguished from those at site G, indicating that a minimum of two hominin taxa with different feet and gaits coexisted at Laetoli.

Nyayasutra against the Pasupata Conception of God

In this paper, I present some possible interpretations of the Nyaya theistic argument, mostly following the analysis of C. Bulcke, highlighting his original interpretation. Other interpretations, which follow the explanations in the Nyayabhasya and the Nyayavarttika, are also presented, as well as an anthropocentric reading introduced by D. H. H. Ingalls, and a sixth possible interpretation suggested by Ferenc Ruzsa. Of course, there are other scholarly accounts of the theistic sutras of the Nyayasutra, but they fall outside the scope of this paper. Before I progress to an analysis of these interpretations, I briefly discuss the development of early Nyaya literature so that we can have a better understanding of this system and the legitimacy of numerous interpretations of the very same sutras.

Experimental Philosophy on Free Will and Determinism

<p>In the debate over whether free will is compatible with determinism most philosophers on both sides think that folk intuitions are a constraint on philosophical theorising. Most also think that the same criteria are required for free will in all cases. But recent attempts to empirically study folk intuitions about free will appear to show that these two positions cannot be jointly maintained. That is because folk intuitions about free will appear to represent compatibilist and incompatibilist criteria for free will in different cases. In response to this some philosophers have run new studies to demonstrate problems with older ones and undermine their results. One such study has been claimed to show that some participants mistakenly inferred that an agent‘s mental states have no effect on their actions given determinism. In this thesis I argue that the questions about causation that were used in this study were too ambiguous to show this. My central point is that when considering the causal history of an action we tend to privilege the earlier causes over later ones. When participants responded that an agent‘s mental states have no effect on their actions they may have meant that there were earlier conditions that caused the agent‘s mental states which then caused their actions. This would show that the participants had made the correct inference that given determinism the causal histories of an agent‘s actions extend back in time to events outside of the agent‘s mind. Thus the problem of the apparent mismatch between folk intuitions and philosophical theories of free will remains. I also suggest that the results of these studies also appear to demonstrate a greater level of disagreement among folk intuitions about the same cases than philosophers seem to expect. This raises questions about whether the same theory of free will has to apply to everyone, and if so, whether folk intuitions support any such theory. In chapter one I begin by briefly describing the free will debate and the role that folk intuitions usually play within it. I describe some debate over the usefulness of folk intuitions in philosophy, and make some small contributions on behalf of their usefulness. I describe and defend the recent movement towards attempting to empirically study folk intuitions on philosophical issues. In chapter two I describe the empirical studies that seem to show that folk intuitions about free will represent compatibilist criteria in some cases and incompatibilist criteria in others. I suggest that they also seem to show that when considering the same case some folk have compatibilist intuitions and some have incompatibilist intuitions. I raise some questions about the implications of rejecting the assumption, which most philosophers seem to make, that people generally have the same intuitions about the same cases. In chapter three I present the study that is claimed to show that participants in the earlier studies were confused, and thus that they did not really have incompatibilist intuitions. I present my arguments against it and conclude that for now the original interpretation of those studies stands, along with the problems it raises.</p>

Experimental Philosophy on Free Will and Determinism

<p>In the debate over whether free will is compatible with determinism most philosophers on both sides think that folk intuitions are a constraint on philosophical theorising. Most also think that the same criteria are required for free will in all cases. But recent attempts to empirically study folk intuitions about free will appear to show that these two positions cannot be jointly maintained. That is because folk intuitions about free will appear to represent compatibilist and incompatibilist criteria for free will in different cases. In response to this some philosophers have run new studies to demonstrate problems with older ones and undermine their results. One such study has been claimed to show that some participants mistakenly inferred that an agent‘s mental states have no effect on their actions given determinism. In this thesis I argue that the questions about causation that were used in this study were too ambiguous to show this. My central point is that when considering the causal history of an action we tend to privilege the earlier causes over later ones. When participants responded that an agent‘s mental states have no effect on their actions they may have meant that there were earlier conditions that caused the agent‘s mental states which then caused their actions. This would show that the participants had made the correct inference that given determinism the causal histories of an agent‘s actions extend back in time to events outside of the agent‘s mind. Thus the problem of the apparent mismatch between folk intuitions and philosophical theories of free will remains. I also suggest that the results of these studies also appear to demonstrate a greater level of disagreement among folk intuitions about the same cases than philosophers seem to expect. This raises questions about whether the same theory of free will has to apply to everyone, and if so, whether folk intuitions support any such theory. In chapter one I begin by briefly describing the free will debate and the role that folk intuitions usually play within it. I describe some debate over the usefulness of folk intuitions in philosophy, and make some small contributions on behalf of their usefulness. I describe and defend the recent movement towards attempting to empirically study folk intuitions on philosophical issues. In chapter two I describe the empirical studies that seem to show that folk intuitions about free will represent compatibilist criteria in some cases and incompatibilist criteria in others. I suggest that they also seem to show that when considering the same case some folk have compatibilist intuitions and some have incompatibilist intuitions. I raise some questions about the implications of rejecting the assumption, which most philosophers seem to make, that people generally have the same intuitions about the same cases. In chapter three I present the study that is claimed to show that participants in the earlier studies were confused, and thus that they did not really have incompatibilist intuitions. I present my arguments against it and conclude that for now the original interpretation of those studies stands, along with the problems it raises.</p>

Theology of the family in the final documents of the General Latin American Episcopal Conferences

The final documents from the General Conferences of the Latin American Bishops (CELAM) held in Medellín (1968), Pueblo (1979), Santo Domingo (1992) and in Aparecida (2007) present the fruits of reflecting on the situation of the family in South America, Central America and the Caribbean, as well as its role in the Church and its importance in shaping social life. Consequently, one can speak of a Latin American theology of the family, which draws its impetus from the teaching of the universal Church, and at the same time has specific features. It is distinguished by the emphasis placed on the subjectivity of families in the saving mission of the Church and treating them as a “theological key”, opening the way to getting to know God's mysteries. It is a practice-oriented theology that gives concrete guidelines to families and their pastors. The character of Latin American theology of the family is influenced by the pastoral context and theological trends, born in South and Central America (liberation theology, indigenous theology and theology of the people). Latin American theology of the family is therefore not a repetition of the contents of the Magisterium of the universal Church, but their original interpretation, taking into account the social situation and the needs of people living in it.

“Scottish Question” and Its New Cultural Meanings in “Culture Capitalism” by Alasdair Gray

An interpretation of the story “Culture Capitalism”, placed in the authoritative anthology “Every Short Story: from 1951 to 2012” of the classic of Scottish literature Alasdair Gray, in the context of the original interpretation by the patriotic writer of the “Scottish question «is offered in the article. It is noted that the problems of the story, written in 1990, are closely related to the establishment in the same year of the status of Glasgow as a cultural capital. Gray’s doubt about the declared cultural messages is analyzed through the prism of the concepts of P. Bourdieu and S. Žižek. It is proved that certain plots and images indicate the development in Gray’s work of ideas close to researchers of postcolonial literature, and in particular the idea of “internal colonization" of Scotland. An interpretation of a number of images that have an allegorical meaning in the light of criticism of English cultural, political and economic hegemony is offered in the article. In addition, based on the ideas of J. Homberg-Schramm about the nature of the nation’s ideas about its gender, class and linguistic identity, the author considers the representation of national auto-stereotypes and their consistent revision. The author concludes that Alasdair Gray sees the possible peaceful coexistence of England and Scotland beyond the boundaries of the model of exploitative colonialism.

An interpretation of dependent type theory in a model category of locally cartesian closed categories

Locally cartesian closed (lcc) categories are natural categorical models of extensional dependent type theory. This paper introduces the “gros” semantics in the category of lcc categories: Instead of constructing an interpretation in a given individual lcc category, we show that also the category of all lcc categories can be endowed with the structure of a model of dependent type theory. The original interpretation in an individual lcc category can then be recovered by slicing. As in the original interpretation, we face the issue of coherence: Categorical structure is usually preserved by functors only up to isomorphism, whereas syntactic substitution commutes strictly with all type-theoretic structures. Our solution involves a suitable presentation of the higher category of lcc categories as model category. To that end, we construct a model category of lcc sketches, from which we obtain by the formalism of algebraically (co)fibrant objects model categories of strict lcc categories and then algebraically cofibrant strict lcc categories. The latter is our model of dependent type theory.

Unexpected Prosperity

Only a handful of economies have successfully transitioned from middle to high income in recent decades. One such case is Spain. How did it achieve this feat? Despite its relevance to countries that have yet to complete that transition, this question has attracted only limited attention. As a result, Spain’s development into a prosperous society is a success story largely underreported and often misunderstood. This book turns on their head the questions that usually frame the debate about Spain’s economic development. Instead of asking why Spain’s catching up was delayed, this book asks how it happened in the first place. Instead of focusing on how bad institutions undermined economic prospects, as the literature has done, this book explains how growth took place even in the presence of poor institutions. This wider lens opens up new perspectives on Spain’s development path. For example, comparisons are drawn not only with the richest countries but also with those that were in a similar stage of development as Spain. Drawing on a wide range of material, from archival sources to text analytics, the book provides a new account of why reforms were adopted, the role of external and internal factors, as well as that of unintended consequences. The result is an original interpretation of the economic rise of Spain that speaks also to the wider literature on the political economy of reform, the role of industrial and public policy more broadly, and the enduring legacy of political violence and conflict.