It gives us pleasure to publish extracts from a remarkable unpublished work by an Australian author, Ian Harding. In four chapters (Antiquity, Islam, Some European Developments, Henry Dunant) it covers the origins of the Geneva Conventions from ancient civilizations, and then goes on to explain their significance in international law and action (The Conventions, The Propositions, The Conclusions). The passages we quote below deal with the history of humanitarian ideas and the laborious efforts, repeated time and time again throughout the centuries, for the ever more effective protection of human dignity. (Ed.).
Over the last ten years, international relations (IR) theory, a branch of political science, has animated some of the most exciting scholarship in international law.1 If a true joint discipline has not yet emerged,2 scholars in both fields have clearly established the value of interdisciplinary cross-fertilization. Yet IR—like international law—comprises several distinct theoretical approaches or “methods.” While this complexity makes interactions between the disciplines especially rich, it also makes them difficult to explore concisely. This essay thus constitutes something of a minisymposium in itself: it summarizes the four principal schools of IR theory—conventionally identified as “realist,” “institutionalist,” “liberal” and “constructivist”—and then applies them to the norms and institutions governing serious violations of human dignity during internal conflicts (the “atrocities regime”).
In this paper, I look into the moral foundation of humanitarian intervention in international law and its Islamic counterpart. My objective is to identify the traits shared by both sets of laws, and to see if the same or similar justification can be used across cultures to reach the same goal. In other words, one goal is to assess the claims that the basis upon which humanitarian intervention is justified has a universal appeal. Both international and Islamic law justify humanitarian intervention on moral grounds. International law bases its justification upon the human rights discourse. Islamic law provides enough bases for legitimizing humanitarian intervention, and Qur’anic verses, scholarly opinions, and Islamic principles provide a sound background for it. Paramount in this task is the concept of human dignity (karamah al-insan). We found no disagreement on this fundamental issue between the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Islamic law. Human dignity, as understood in international human rights and its Islamic counterpart, thus could form the jus cogens of international law, a common human heritage upon which everybody can agree.
The discussion on the relationship of democracy and development has only become meaningful after being freed from a purely dogmatic approach. International law, in particular international human rights instruments, commit States' Parties to establish and sustain a government based upon democratic elections and which is politically accountable. Development requires a policy towards achieving conditions where human beings can enjoy freedom from want and fear. Both policies, on democratization and development, are meant to achieve conditions in which human dignity is fully respected and they are therefore mutually reinforcing.
An army attacks a neighborhood where the enemy is hiding among civilians. To what extent is the army required to expose its combatants to life-threatening risks in order to spare enemy civilians? This Article seeks to interpret the pertinent standards and rules of international law from the perspective of the principle of human dignity. The human dignity principle informs the interpretation of the law on the conduct of hostilities and provides a built-in mechanism for improving armies' treatment of enemy civilians. It inspires additional remedial and institutional norms that could overcome armies' distrust of each other during the height of battle. The principle of human dignity recognizes a general duty to strive to reduce harm to enemy civilians as well as specific rules against using them as human shields, hostages, or objects for retaliation. This Article concludes that in general there is no requirement to risk combatants to reduce the risk to enemy civilians, although a number of the specific rules do entail the assumption of such risks.
The вiscussion about the legal regulation of biomedical technologies flared up with renewed vigor after the data on the He Jiankui experiment, the essence of which was artificial editing of the genome of human embryos. This work investigates the problem of applying the principle of personality achievement in the discourse of legal regulation of genetic editing technology. Given the fact that there are a number of rules governing certain cases of genome editing, this work focuses on the study of cases prohibited by current international law. Most of these cases of application of this biomedical technology are associated with humiliation of human dignity, for this reason, this article examines exclusively the connection of this universal value with genetic editing. The article highlights the main problems of the concept of achievement, the use of genetic editing technology, as well as its legal regulation. In addition, the basis of arguments is considered separately, on the basis of which opponents of the application of the technology under consideration apply to the concept of achievement and its humiliation.
The problem of dignity in the context of genetic editing technology