A Selfish Court? The Court of Justice and the Design of International Dispute Settlement Beyond the European Union

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 425-453
Author(s):  
Philip Strik

AbstractWhile investor–State arbitration is to a large extent detached from the EU legal order, EU law has recently started to be invoked in investor-State arbitration proceedings. In the context of intra-EU bilateral investment treaties, the Commission has expressed the view that investor-State arbitration gives rise to a number of ‘arbitration risks’ for the EU legal order. Not only can it solicit investors to engage in forum-shopping, but it can also result in questions of EU law not being litigated in Member State or Union courts. This chapter explores the extent to which the compatibility of investor–State arbitration with the EU legal order is in issue. It examines the main features of investor-State arbitration as concerns its interplay with the EU legal order, as well as the Court of Justice’s case law on issues of compatibility between systems of international dispute settlement and the EU legal order. The chapter highlights that the way in which investor–State arbitral tribunals handle issues of EU law, as well as the involvement of interested parties, may foster the synergy between investor–State arbitration and the EU legal order.


2010 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 425-453
Author(s):  
Philip Strik

Abstract While investor–State arbitration is to a large extent detached from the EU legal order, EU law has recently started to be invoked in investor-State arbitration proceedings. In the context of intra-EU bilateral investment treaties, the Commission has expressed the view that investor-State arbitration gives rise to a number of ‘arbitration risks’ for the EU legal order. Not only can it solicit investors to engage in forum-shopping, but it can also result in questions of EU law not being litigated in Member State or Union courts. This chapter explores the extent to which the compatibility of investor–State arbitration with the EU legal order is in issue. It examines the main features of investor-State arbitration as concerns its interplay with the EU legal order, as well as the Court of Justice’s case law on issues of compatibility between systems of international dispute settlement and the EU legal order. The chapter highlights that the way in which investor–State arbitral tribunals handle issues of EU law, as well as the involvement of interested parties, may foster the synergy between investor–State arbitration and the EU legal order.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 295-320
Author(s):  
Jed Odermatt

The question of how disputes arising from Brexit are to be resolved, and by which body, is one of the most sensitive issues in the negotiations on the uk’s withdrawal from the European Union and the envisaged future relationship between the uk and the eu. The legal issues related to withdrawal are further magnified in complexity due to the nature of the eu itself, which does not neatly fit into the category of a traditional international organization. The uk has repeatedly stated that it will not accept the continued role of the eu Court of Justice in the uk legal system after withdrawal. Any dispute settlement system must also respect the constitutional requirements of the eu legal order, most notably, by not infringing on the autonomy of eu law. This article discusses some of the various models from international dispute settlement that could be used to inspire a dispute settlement system in the Brexit context. It discusses dispute settlement in the withdrawal agreement and the role of the Court of Justice during and after a transition period. It then discusses the challenges of designing a dispute settlement system for the future relationship agreement. While aspects of these various models could be replicated, there is no dispute settlement system that is fully appropriate to deal with the various complexities and challenges of Brexit. The paper proposes the establishment of a standing international tribunal to resolve disputes arising from Brexit.


The 2018 edition of The Global Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence both updates readers on the important work of long-standing international tribunals and introduces readers to more novel topics in international law. The Yearbook continues to provide expert coverage of the Court of Justice of the European Union and diverse tribunals from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to criminal tribunals such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, to economically based tribunals such as ICSID and the WTO Dispute settlement procedures. The contents of this part have been enriched with the inclusion of a new section devoted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), the oldest global institution for the settlement of international disputes. This edition contains original research articles on the development and analysis of the concept of global law and the views of the global law theorists such as: whether the Paris Declaration of 2017 and the Oslo Recommendation of 2018 deals with enhancing their institutions’ legitimacy; how to reconcile human rights, trade law, intellectual property, investment and health law with the WTO dispute settlement panel upholding Australia’s tobacco plain packaging measure; Israel’s acceptance of Palestinian statehood contingent upon prior Palestinian “demilitarization” is potentially contrary to pertinent international law; and a proposal to strengthen cooperation between the ECJ and National Courts in light of the failure of the dialogue between the ECJ and the Italian Constitutional Court on the interpretation of Article 325 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European union. The Yearbook provides students, scholars, and practitioners alike a valuable combination of expert discussion and direct quotes from the court opinions to which that discussion relates, as well as an annual overview of the process of cross-fertilization between international courts and tribunals.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Fathi Hussain ◽  
Mahdi Zahraa

Abstract Dispute settlement mechanisms (DSM) are the heart of international organisations without which organisations would be ineffective. The European Union (EU) is probably the most effective regional body whose efficacy is largely due to its powerful judicial organ, the Court of Justice (CJEU). This article also examines the DSM available in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in order to assess its effectiveness. It briefly discusses aspects of the EU and CJEU to help provide suggestions to improve the GCC DSM. This article concludes that the GCC DSM lacks effectiveness due to an inherent defect in its DMS organs. This defect is twofold: first, the GCC has yet to establish an effective judicial organ to deal with its disputes; and, second, there is a lack of political will to establish an organ that is vested with a supranational power that can override the individual will of the Member States.


1995 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amelia Porges

On 30 December 1994 in Geneva, the four major players in world trade -the United States, the European Union, Japan, andCanada - accepted the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement).The entry into force of the Agreement on 1 January 1995 brings both expanded and improved trade rules and greatly improved enforcement. We have entered a new era in international dispute settlement. This brief article discusses the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes in Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement, the negotiating process that led to it, and the implementation of the Understanding in the United States.


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