The New Dispute Settlement:From the GATT to the WTO

1995 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amelia Porges

On 30 December 1994 in Geneva, the four major players in world trade -the United States, the European Union, Japan, andCanada - accepted the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement).The entry into force of the Agreement on 1 January 1995 brings both expanded and improved trade rules and greatly improved enforcement. We have entered a new era in international dispute settlement. This brief article discusses the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes in Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement, the negotiating process that led to it, and the implementation of the Understanding in the United States.

Author(s):  
Sophia Kalantzakos

Once a leader in the production and trading of rare earths, the United States relinquished the reins to China in the 1990s. The People’s Republic of China declared rare earths “protected and strategic materials” and proceeded to control production and processing, introduced export quotas, and sought to dominate the supply chain for crucial applications. It also made investments in mines worldwide. The 2010 crisis caused a parabolic rise in prices, leading the United States, the European Union, and Japan to file a complaint against China at the World Trade Organization, in 2012, and to launch trilateral cooperation workshops, starting in 2011, to promote recycling, substitution, and innovation. China lost its WTO appeal and removed the export quotas in May 2015. The market corrected itself, and it may seem today that China lost an initial battle; but closer examination indicates that it may not have lost the war.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (9) ◽  
pp. 88
Author(s):  
Jean-Sylvain Ndo Ndong

The financial crisis of the late 2000s gave rise to protectionist hints which called into question the consensus on the liberalization of world trade since the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. This trend towards protectionism has taken on new magnitude with the arrival of Donald Trump as President of the United States of America. In fact, since the beginning of 2018, the American administration has carried out its threats by imposing customs duties on imports of the various products from China and the European Union. In retaliation, the countries concerned responded with restrictions on American exports to their territory. Also the rationality of the market economy, there is more and more opposed the power of emotions and impulses embodied by the populists at the head of which D. Trump, the American President. Globalization is therefore required to adapt its rules to survive. The purpose of this paper is to show that for a good adaptation of its rules, it is necessary to activate one of the most powerful levers of gains in international trade, the differentiation of products. This is a response to the exploitation of the diversification and heterogeneity of demand in terms of tastes and incomes. Because, by allowing the firm to differentiate its products to distinguish them from those of competitors, differentiation offers the opportunity to soften competition, increase profits and improve product quality.


Author(s):  
Jens Ladefoged Mortensen

In a time of trade wars, free trade skepticism, tech rivalry, and multipolar disorder, the European Union (EU) cannot evade its responsibilities the last defender of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Yet, it raises the question of whether the EU has power to defend the WTO. The EU is a multilateralist-oriented power of global magnitude. Unlike the United States, the EU is openly defending the WTO in the current crisis created by continued refusal to appointment WTO Appellate Body members. Like the United States, the EU is concerned with the illegitimate trade practices of China. Yet, the EU uses diplomatic pressure on China within the rules of the WTO. The EU is actively trying to rescue the rule-based trade system. Yet, it cannot do so alone. It needs support, not just form other WTO members but also from within Europe itself. The current crisis is in part rooted in the inability of the WTO members to update the WTO rulebook. The focus will be on the potential clash between a more assertive EU on sustainability and the absence of updated WTO rules on sustainable trade issues. This may force the EU to confront a deep-rooted policy dilemma. The question is whether the EU should continue to refrain from using its market power to promote sustainable trade in respect of the WTO. As the EU is about to ratify several bilateral trade agreements of commercial, geo-economic, and indeed geo-political importance, such as the EU–Mercosur or EU–Vietnam agreements, the rule-orientation of the EU faces growing domestic opposition as well as external contestation. Furthermore, the EU is modernizing its trade defense weaponry, the antidumping instrument, and has recently declared its intent to impose unilateral climate-related trade policy measures, the carbon-adjustment tariff, in the future. Thus, an incident such as the burning of the Amazon forest may force the EU to take a tougher stance on sustainability at the risk of bringing the EU on a collision course with the WTO itself, its rules, process, and member states. Consequently, the complex setup of the EU as a trade power could make it difficult to ratify WTO-compatible trade agreements in the future.


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1850222
Author(s):  
John Olienyk ◽  
Robert J. Carbaugh

For decades, Boeing and Airbus have struggled for dominance in the large commercial aircraft market. In 2010 and 2011, the World Trade Organization ruled that each firm has received illegal subsidies from the governments of the United States and the European Union, which have enhanced their competitive positions. This paper considers the nature of these rulings and the future competitive environment in the global jetliner industry.


2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 133-150
Author(s):  
Montej Abida ◽  
◽  
Ilhem Gargouri ◽  

Today we are witnessing a serious crisis that could lead to the collapse of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This crisis is the consequence of the uncooperative behavior of the triad: the United States, the European Union and East Asia. When there is a confrontation between these three most powerful regional blocs, there is inevitably a blockage and a destructive trade war similar to that of the 1930s. In these times of crisis, each country tries to save its economy by relying on the strategy of protectionism. The negotiation and regulatory functions of the WTO are paralyzed: the Dispute Settlement Body is seriously affected by the refusal of the United States, since 2016, to renew the members of the Appellate Body (AB) whose mandates were expiring. This jeopardizes international rules negotiated since 1947, when the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created. The existence of liberalization fatigue and a growing rejection of globalization raises questions about the future of the WTO.


Author(s):  
Gregory Shaffer ◽  
Manfred Elsig ◽  
Sergio Puig

This chapter discusses how the authority of the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) rapidly became extensive. It nonetheless remains fragile given geopolitical shifts that have helped catalyze the rise of neo-nationalist trade politics in the United States. The establishment of extensive AB authority represented a legalization leap in which international dispute settlement moved from limited narrow authority under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to significantly more expansive authority. However, the WTO is an interstate dispute settlement system, so private parties have no direct access to the AB. The AB thus confronts state pressure and at times shapes its decisions to facilitate WTO Member compliance with them. The AB’s authority appears threatened by the US refusal to approve the launching of the selection process to replace retiring AB members. The United States is reacting, in particular, to AB rulings against US import relief practices.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muriel Lightbourne

Abstract While the negotiations on geographical indications within the World Trade Organization have been stalled since their inception in 1996, many new developments resulting from bilateral or regional endeavours may be observed in this field. The present article will first briefly retrace the evolution of the concept and recall the different entrenched positions within the World Trade Organization (WTO). It will then show the impact of WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) reports on the European Union system and discuss the recent bilateral agreements between China and the European Union on one side, and the United States of America on the other. It will also look at the entry into force of the Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement on appellations of origin and geographical indications. Whether the latter will manage to bridge the divide between the countries that promote the sui generis model of protection of indications of origin and common law jurisdictions remains to be seen, as does the outcome of the discussions on geographical indications and place names within the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Biba

Abstract As the Sino-American Great Power competition continues to intensify, newly-elected US President Joe Biden's administration now seeks to enlist the support of its allies and partners around the world. As Europe's largest economy and a, if not the, leading voice within the European Union, Germany represents an important puzzle-piece for Biden. But Germany, at least under outgoing chancellor Angela Merkel, has been reluctant to take sides. It is against this backdrop that this article looks into Germany's past and present trilateral relationships with the US and China through the theoretical lens of the so-called strategic triangle approach. Applying this approach, the article seeks to trace and explain German behaviour, as well as to elucidate the opportunities and pitfalls that have come with it. The article demonstrates that Germany's recently gained position as a ‘pivot’ (two positive bilateral relationships) between the US and Chinese ‘wings’ (positive bilateral relations with Germany and negative bilateral relations with each other) is desirable from the perspective of the strategic triangle. At the same time, being pivot is also challenging and hard to maintain. Alternative options, such as entering a US–German ‘marriage’ directed against China, are also problematic. The article therefore concludes that Germany has tough decisions to take going forward.


Author(s):  
Carson H. Varner ◽  
Katrin C. Varner

This paper examines developing issues and attitudes that unite and divide the United States and the European Union as the discussion and regulation of agriculture evolves. While some terms, such as “organic,” are defined in law in both the United States and European Union, the increasingly used “sustainability” is an evolving concept. The main sustainability issue is how to provide food and fiber for a rapidly growing world population. In this context, the role of biotechnology is questioned. Americans tend to favor what are sometimes called genetically modified crops, while Europeans remain cautious. Europeans lean more toward organic farming, while Americans assert that much of the world will starve if organic methods are required. This paper reviews the directions that the discussion of these issues is taking and will show areas of agreement and where the two sides diverge.


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