Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast)

Subject Proposed reform of the EU comitology procedure. Significance The little-known ‘comitology’ procedure plays a key role in EU regulation. In recent years, this process has been breaking down as member-state expert representatives in comitology committees often abstain from voting, forcing the European Commission to take controversial decisions on its own (and accept any blame for them). In response, the Commission has proposed reforms that would pressure member states to take a position on (and hence political ownership of) controversial regulatory decisions. Impacts Government representatives, interest-group representatives and corporate lobbyists will be most affected by comitology reform. Despite adding transparency and avoiding blame-shifting to Brussels, the reforms would probably not help the EU’s image with citizens. The European Parliament might demand -- as part of any final reform package -- an increase in its involvement in the comitology process.


Author(s):  
Dimitry Kochenov

On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European Parliament or by the European Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its members after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2. Before making such a determination, the Council shall hear the Member State in question and may address recommendations to it, acting in accordance with the same procedure.


Res Publica ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-28
Author(s):  
Guido Van Den Berghe

Between 7 June and 10 June 1979, the first elections of the representatives of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage will be held in all the Member States of the European Community.Within that period, the elections shall be held on a date fixed by each Member State. The electoral procedure, except for the common provisions of the annexed Act to the Council Decision on directelections of 20 September 1976, shall be governed in each Member State by its national procedures. There will be nine parallel national elections.  The Council Decision and the annexed Act of 20 September 1976 are considered in retrospect and then analysed, as are the national electoral laws, which will be used for the European elections in the different Member States. Their mutual differences and contradictions are discussed.Changes from the electoral procedure in use for national elections are traced.  Broadly speaking, one of the aims of the article is to show that the potential influence of an individual vote of a «European citizenl» on the composition of the European Parliament wilt differ considerably from one Member State to another.In the closing remarks, the European elections are put into the perspective of furthering the  democratisation of the European Communities.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-154
Author(s):  
Gabriella Eleonóra Bonyhai

Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council in matters of succession is based on the principles of uniformity and predictability. The succession procedure should be governed by a single statutory provision in each Member State, uniformly with regard to all types of property, in terms of quality of succession, provisions on the opening and place of the succession, ineligibility for inheritance, survivor’s rights. The harmonization that has begun runs counter to the different national laws and regulations of the Member States, which will only be possible to approximate over time, but uniform rules would significantly facilitate and resolve the legal problems that arise in succession proceedings.


2014 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-62
Author(s):  
Thomas Karner ◽  
Sylvia Scharl ◽  
Brigitte Weninger

Transport statistics provide information about transport volume and performance on defined territories (e.g. for the European Union as a whole or for the individual member states) and are therefore necessary for political, economic and ecological decisions. Complying with the current European legal basis[1] the surveys for the modes of transport rail, aviation and inland waterways are performed according to the territoriality principle and hence the data on total transport volume is collected in each member state. Alone the road freight transport survey is based on the nationality principle, which means that only freight vehicles registered in the respective member state take part in the national surveys. Thus the single member states have no information about the total transport volume and performance on their own territory derived from road freight vehicles registered in other member states. In contrast the member states have information about the transport volume and performance provided by their freight vehicles in the other European countries. This situation implies a significant limitation of the usability of the results of the national road freight surveys as well as the usefulness of the modal split of the single modes of transport based solely on the national surveys.[1] Regulation (EC) No 91/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on rail statistics, OJ No L14, 21.2.2003 p 1 - 15; Regulation (EC) No 437/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2003 on statistical returns in respect of the carriage of passengers, freight and mail by air; OJ No L 66, 11.3.2003 p 1 – 8; Regulation (EC) No 1365/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on statistics of goods transport by inland waterways and repealing Council Directive 80/1119/EEC, OJ L No 264; 25.9.2006 p 1 – 11; Regulation (EU) No 70/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 18 January 2012 on statistical returns in respect of the carriage of goods by road (recast), OJ No L 32, 3.2.2012 p 1-18


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (8) ◽  
pp. 785-799 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes Jarlebring

According to Article 48 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), the founding treaties of the Union can only be amended through a three-step procedure. First, the Council calls an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), after having consulted the European Parliament (EP) and the Commission. Second, within the framework of the IGC, representatives of the governments of the Member States negotiate and sign the amendments to the treaties by common accord. Third, the agreement is submitted to national ratification procedures. When all three steps are concluded, each Member State having ratified the amendments to the treaty, the changes enter into force.


Author(s):  
Cristina-Marilena Gheorghe

In the spirit of the Treaty of institution of the European Community and consideringthe need to maintain and develop a space of freedom, security and justice in the purpose ofthe free circulation of individuals, of goods, services and commodities, the Communityconsidered as opportune the adoption of certain measures in the field of judicial cooperationin civil and commercial field, which to have a cross-border incidence, therefore instituting, onEuropean level, a new freedom, the one of free circulation of the legal decisions. Therefore, itwas adopted the (EC) Regulation no. 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and Council asof 12.12.2006 regarding the institution of an European procedure of payment order, of whichpurpose is the one to simplify, to accelerate and reduce the procedure costs in the crossbordercauses regarding non-challenged pecuniary receivables, also ensuring the freecirculation of the European orders for payment within all the member states by establishingsome minimum standards of which compliance removes any other intermediary procedure inthe member state of execution before acknowledging the execution1.


Author(s):  
Nick Sitter ◽  
Elisabeth Bakke

Democratic backsliding in European Union (EU) member states is not only a policy challenge for the EU, but also a potential existential crisis. If the EU does too little to deal with member state regimes that go back on their commitments to democracy and the rule of law, this risks undermining the EU from within. On the other hand, if the EU takes drastic action, this might split the EU. This article explores the nature and dynamics of democratic backsliding in EU member states, and analyses the EU’s capacity, policy tools and political will to address the challenge. Empirically it draws on the cases that have promoted serious criticism from the Commission and the European Parliament: Hungary, Poland, and to a lesser extent, Romania. After reviewing the literature and defining backsliding as a gradual, deliberate, but open-ended process of de-democratization, the article analyzes the dynamics of backsliding and the EU’s difficulties in dealing with this challenge to liberal democracy and the rule of law. The Hungarian and Polish populist right’s “illiberal” projects involve centralization of power in the hands of the executive and the party, and limiting the independence of the judiciary, the media and civil society. This has brought both governments into direct confrontation with the European Commission. However, the EU’s track record in managing backsliding crises is at best mixed. This comes down to a combination of limited tools and lack of political will. Ordinary infringement procedures offer a limited toolbox, and the Commission has proven reluctant to use even these tools fully. At the same time, party groups in the European Parliament and many member state governments have been reluctant to criticize one of their own, let alone go down the path of suspending aspect of a states’ EU membership. Hence the EU’s dilemma: it is caught between undermining its own values and cohesion through inaction on one hand, and relegating one or more member states it to a second tier—or even pushing them out altogether—on the other.


Author(s):  
Wolfgang Bogensberger

Article 32 TEU The Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, shall lay down the conditions and limitations under which the competent authorities of the Member States referred to in Articles 82 and 87 may operate in the territory of another Member State in liaison and in agreement with the authorities of that State. The Council shall act unanimously after consulting the European Parliament.


2021 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 67-92
Author(s):  
Hanna Kuczyńska

This article analyses the admissibility of evidence gathered by the Polish procedural authorities as a  result of issuing an European Investigation Order, on the basis of provisions implemented due to the adoption on the 3th of April 2014 of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters. This Directive created a mechanism that allows for transfer of evidence between EU Member States. In this text the question will be answered how to deal with results of investigative measures that have been legally obtained in the executing state but despite acting in accordance with the legality principle by both states, happen to be illegal in the issuing Member State. Another discussed problem is how the rules of admissibility of evidence obtained from the result of issuing an EIO work in Poland – or at least how they should operate. The second discussed issue thus will refer to the current provisions in force in Poland regulating the method of dealing with evidence obtained abroad – that is also with evidence transferred from other Member States. It will be shown that they are unclear and may lead to undesirable results. In addition,  suggested changes in Polish law will be proposed.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document