Article 7 TEU

Author(s):  
Dimitry Kochenov

On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European Parliament or by the European Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its members after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2. Before making such a determination, the Council shall hear the Member State in question and may address recommendations to it, acting in accordance with the same procedure.

Subject Proposed reform of the EU comitology procedure. Significance The little-known ‘comitology’ procedure plays a key role in EU regulation. In recent years, this process has been breaking down as member-state expert representatives in comitology committees often abstain from voting, forcing the European Commission to take controversial decisions on its own (and accept any blame for them). In response, the Commission has proposed reforms that would pressure member states to take a position on (and hence political ownership of) controversial regulatory decisions. Impacts Government representatives, interest-group representatives and corporate lobbyists will be most affected by comitology reform. Despite adding transparency and avoiding blame-shifting to Brussels, the reforms would probably not help the EU’s image with citizens. The European Parliament might demand -- as part of any final reform package -- an increase in its involvement in the comitology process.


Author(s):  
Petr YAKOVLEV

The decision on Britain’s secession from the European Union, taken by the British Parliament and agreed by London and Brussels, divided the Union history into “before” and “after”. Not only will the remaining member states have to “digest” the political, commercial, economic and mental consequences of parting with one of the largest partners. They will also have to create a substantially new algorithm for the functioning of United Europe. On this path, the EU is confronted with many geopolitical and geo-economic challenges, which should be answered by the new leaders of the European Commission, European Council, and European Parliament.


2019 ◽  
pp. 208-248
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter considers the actions commenced before the Court of Justice. These include actions by the European Commission and other member states against a member state (Articles 258–60 TFEU); judicial review of acts of the institutions (Article 263 TFEU); the action against the institutions for a failure to act (Article 265 TFEU); actions for damages (Articles 268 and 340 TFEU); and the right to plead the illegality of an EU regulation (Article 277 TFEU). The chapter also considers interim measures under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU and enforcement actions arising from the Commission enforcement of EU competition law against individuals.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-125
Author(s):  
Ágoston Korom

The scope of action of EU Member States’ land policies lies at the intersection of positive and negative integration. Therefore, if a Member State restricts the ownership and use of agricultural land, it implies both the legitimate restriction of fundamental freedoms and that it achieves the targets listed under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on improving the quality of living for farmers in keeping with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Despite this, it is worrisome that the EU’s control over negative integration does not allow Member States to create sustainable regulations. In contrast, the EU law leaves it entirely to the Member States to introduce restitution measures vis-à-vis the properties that were confiscated before their accession. The EU’s control prohibits direct discrimination against the citizens of other Member States. Under certain circumstances, according to the European Commission, the general principles of EU law and the provisions of the Charter can help individuals enforce restitution provisions. Bearing this in mind, we analysed the practice of the European Commission, its statements, and procedures against Member States, given that these are based on professional and/or political considerations. We examine the practice of the Commission and the CJEU vis-à-vis a Hungarian legislation on the so-called ‘zsebszerződések’. We also propose recommendations.


IG ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-100
Author(s):  
Nicolai von Ondarza

The Brexit negotiations constituted unchartered political and institutional territory for the European Union (EU). This analysis shows how a new institutional approach enabled the EU-27 to present an unusually united front. The “Barnier method” is characterised by five elements: a strong political mandate from the European Council, a single EU negotiator based in the European Commission in the person of Michel Barnier, very close coordination with the Member States and the European Parliament, and a high degree of transparency. Lessons can also be drawn from this for the next phase of the Brexit negotiations and the EU’s relations with other third countries.


2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-182
Author(s):  
Biserka Rukavina ◽  
Loris Rak ◽  
Silvana Buneta

This paper provides an overview of activities of the European Commission for establishing a single European maritime transport space and indicates whether and to what extent the adopted strategy documents have established their operations in practice. Directive 2010/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on reporting formalities for ships arriving in and/or departing from ports of the Member States and repealing Directive 2002/6/ EC, as well as Directive 2002/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Community vessel traffic monitoring and information system, which represent significant legislative achievements of the European Union in the process of reducing administrative burdens to which ships are exposed in the maritime transport, are particularly analyzed. Reasons for amending Directive 2002/59/EC are especially explained. In the last part of the paper, authors review the achievements of the Republic of Croatia regarding the implementation of measures for the establishment of a single European maritime transport space. Based on the results of a comparative overview of solutions contained in the Directives and Croatian bylaws, authors point to the existence of non-compliance and to the need for further action.


Res Publica ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-28
Author(s):  
Guido Van Den Berghe

Between 7 June and 10 June 1979, the first elections of the representatives of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage will be held in all the Member States of the European Community.Within that period, the elections shall be held on a date fixed by each Member State. The electoral procedure, except for the common provisions of the annexed Act to the Council Decision on directelections of 20 September 1976, shall be governed in each Member State by its national procedures. There will be nine parallel national elections.  The Council Decision and the annexed Act of 20 September 1976 are considered in retrospect and then analysed, as are the national electoral laws, which will be used for the European elections in the different Member States. Their mutual differences and contradictions are discussed.Changes from the electoral procedure in use for national elections are traced.  Broadly speaking, one of the aims of the article is to show that the potential influence of an individual vote of a «European citizenl» on the composition of the European Parliament wilt differ considerably from one Member State to another.In the closing remarks, the European elections are put into the perspective of furthering the  democratisation of the European Communities.


2020 ◽  
pp. 65-89
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood

This chapter discusses articles in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) that provide for actions that are brought directly before the Court. Under Articles 258 and 259 TFEU (ex Articles 226 and 227 EC), respectively, the European Commission and Member States may bring enforcement proceedings against a Member State in breach of Treaty obligations. Article 260 TFEU (ex Article 228 EC) requires compliance with the Court’s judgment. Article 263 TFEU (ex Article 230 EC) concerns judicial review of EU acts. The outcome of a successful action is annulment. Article 265 TFEU (ex Article 232 EC) provides for actions against the EU institutions for failure to act.


2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magali Gravier ◽  
Camille Roth

Abstract This article analyzes the evolution of the staff composition of the European Commission from 1980 to 2013 using the theory of representative bureaucracy. The article first demonstrates how the Commission formulates guidelines which aim at offering fair levels of representation to each member state. However, comparing recruitment targets and actual staffing figures reveals very heterogeneous staff levels. Some member states enjoy unexpectedly high levels of representation whereas others present very low levels. The latter are particularly intriguing and open the door to the formulation of a “rejection hypothesis.” This hypothesis challenges one of the foundations of the theory of representative bureaucracy and leads us to suggest that the theory be enhanced in order to take into account its context of implementation in terms of consolidated or contested statehood, which in turn may explain the phenomena of rejected offers of bureaucratic representation.


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