De nationale kieswetten voor de Europese verkiezingen

Res Publica ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-28
Author(s):  
Guido Van Den Berghe
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
National Elections ◽  
Member States ◽  
European Elections ◽  
Council Decision ◽  
Universal Suffrage ◽  
Individual Vote ◽  
Electoral Laws ◽  
The Common

Between 7 June and 10 June 1979, the first elections of the representatives of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage will be held in all the Member States of the European Community.Within that period, the elections shall be held on a date fixed by each Member State. The electoral procedure, except for the common provisions of the annexed Act to the Council Decision on directelections of 20 September 1976, shall be governed in each Member State by its national procedures. There will be nine parallel national elections.  The Council Decision and the annexed Act of 20 September 1976 are considered in retrospect and then analysed, as are the national electoral laws, which will be used for the European elections in the different Member States. Their mutual differences and contradictions are discussed.Changes from the electoral procedure in use for national elections are traced.  Broadly speaking, one of the aims of the article is to show that the potential influence of an individual vote of a «European citizenl» on the composition of the European Parliament wilt differ considerably from one Member State to another.In the closing remarks, the European elections are put into the perspective of furthering the  democratisation of the European Communities.

Article 223 TFEU

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul-John Loewenthal
Keyword(s):  
European Parliament ◽  
Member States ◽  
Universal Suffrage

Article 190(4) and (5) EC The European Parliament shall draw up a proposal to lay down the provisions necessary for the election of its Members by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States or in accordance with principles common to all Member States.

THE RIGHT TO VOTE AS AN EU FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT AND THE EXPANDING SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

2016 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Kornezov
Keyword(s):  
European Parliament ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Council Decision ◽  
Universal Suffrage ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Scope Of Application ◽  
Right To Vote ◽  
The Right

IS the right to vote in European Parliament elections a matter for EU law? Until recently, the answer to this query seemed to be a clear “no”. Indeed, while Article 223(1) of the TFEU does confer on the European Union the competence to lay down a uniform procedure for the election of Members of the European Parliament (“MEPs”), this competence has not been exercised so far. Consequently, Article 8 of the Act concerning the election of the MEPs by direct universal suffrage, annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom (OJ 1976 L 278 p. 1, henceforth “the 1976 Act”), provides that the “electoral procedure shall be governed in each Member State by its national provisions”. Apart from the general principles of “direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot” and of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality, enshrined respectively in Article 14(3) of the TEU, Article 1(3) of the 1976 Act, and Article 20(2)(b) of the TFEU, there is nothing in EU law that governs specifically the eligibility to vote in EP elections.

Marine Natura 2000 and Fishery – The Case of Sweden

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Christiernsson ◽  
Gabriel Michanek ◽  
Pontus Nilsson
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Natura 2000 ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Exclusive Economic Zone ◽  
Habitats Directive ◽  
Member States ◽  
Fishing Vessels ◽  
Fisheries Policy ◽  
The Common ◽  
Economic Zone

Fishing operations likely to have a significant effect on a marine Natura 2000 area shall be subject to prior assessment and authorisation according to Article 6.3 of the Habitats Directive. This provision, partly also article 6.2, and in particular the cjeu case law, implies that this prior control should be applied rather often in practice, even for recurrent fishery irrespective of when the first fishing operation occurred in an area. Article 11 of the Common Fisheries Policy Regulation entails that Sweden and other Member States apply Article 6 of the Habitats Directive within the entire exclusive economic zone, to both own and foreign fishing vessels. A Member State is also, under certain preconditions, empowered to impose restrictions on fishery not supported by article 6 of the Habitats Directive, especially within the 12 nautical miles zone. A Member State is not formally hindered from excluding fishery from prior assessment and authorisation if instead general requirements on fishery in legislation can ensure that no future fishing operation is likely to have a significant effect on the Natura 2000 area. However, cjeu case law indicates that it would be difficult to fulfil that precondition.

scholarly journals Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council of the European Union

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-154
Author(s):  
Anna Doliwa-Klepacka
Keyword(s):  
Slovak Republic ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Council Decision ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
Management Measure ◽  
The Common ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Eu

In the commented judgment the Court of Justice has, for the first time, made an analysis of the legal nature of Article 78(3) TFEU including in particular the understanding of the concepts contained in that provision and the conditions for its application. This provision allows the Council to adopt the non-legislative acts in case of a sudden influx of migrants from third countries into the territory of the Member States. The Court also characterized the temporary relocation mechanism as a part of the common asylum system of the EU and a crisis management measure and examined the provisions of Council Decision 2015/1601, obligating the Member States to relocate 120000 persons staying in Italy and Greece – in the light of the notions used in Article 78(3) TFEU.

EU comitology reform could politicise regulation

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Member States ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Eu Regulation ◽  
Regulatory Decisions ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Final Reform

Subject Proposed reform of the EU comitology procedure. Significance The little-known ‘comitology’ procedure plays a key role in EU regulation. In recent years, this process has been breaking down as member-state expert representatives in comitology committees often abstain from voting, forcing the European Commission to take controversial decisions on its own (and accept any blame for them). In response, the Commission has proposed reforms that would pressure member states to take a position on (and hence political ownership of) controversial regulatory decisions. Impacts Government representatives, interest-group representatives and corporate lobbyists will be most affected by comitology reform. Despite adding transparency and avoiding blame-shifting to Brussels, the reforms would probably not help the EU’s image with citizens. The European Parliament might demand -- as part of any final reform package -- an increase in its involvement in the comitology process.

Article 7 TEU

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dimitry Kochenov
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
European Commission ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Member States

On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European Parliament or by the European Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its members after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2. Before making such a determination, the Council shall hear the Member State in question and may address recommendations to it, acting in accordance with the same procedure.

Het gebruik van de voorkeurstem bij de regionale en Europese parlementsverkiezingen van 13 juni 2004

Res Publica ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 46 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 377-412
Author(s):  
Bram Wauters ◽  
Karolien Weekers ◽  
Jean-Benoît Pilet
Keyword(s):  
European Parliament ◽  
European Elections ◽  
The Past ◽  
Preferential Vote ◽  
Electoral Laws ◽  
Campaign Expenditures

On 13 June 2003, elections for both the regional parliaments and the European Parliament were held in Belgium.The percentage of voters casting a preferential vote increased when compared with the previous regional and European elections of 1999, reaching scores clearly higher than 60%.  The new electoral laws are one explanation for this increase, together with societal evolutions, such as individualism, anti-party feelings, personalization of polities and the appearance of cartels. In comparison with the federal elections of 2003 however, there was a decrease in prererential voting, due to lower campaign expenditures and to the success of parties that traditionally do not attract many preferential votes.  Voters can also cast a vote for several candidates figuring on the same party list, which is contrary to the past done quite frequently now. Finally, more candidates than ever succeeded in becoming elected out oî the order of the party list.

A Vote Against Europe? Explaining Defection at the 1999 and 2004 European Parliament Elections

2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara B. Hobolt ◽  
Jae-Jae Spoon ◽  
James Tilley
Keyword(s):  
Contextual Factors ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Government Performance ◽  
National Elections ◽  
European Elections ◽  
Level Model ◽  
Multi Level ◽  
European Parliament Elections

Governing parties generally win fewer votes at European Parliament elections than at national electionsmost common explanation for this is that European elections are ‘second order national elections’ acting as mid-term referendums on government performance. This article proposes an alternative, though complementary, explanation: voters defect because governing parties are generally far more pro-European than the typical voter. Additionally, the more the campaign context primes Eurosceptic sentiments, the more likely voters are to turn against governing parties. A multi-level model is used to test these propositions and analyse the effects of individual and contextual factors at the 1999 and 2004 European Parliament elections. Both European and domestic concerns matter to voters; moreover, campaign context plays an important role in shaping vote choices.

scholarly journals El régimen constitucional de los partidos políticos en el derecho de la Unión Europea: un equilibrio sui generis

2016 ◽  
pp. 187
Author(s):  
Ángel Rodríguez
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Party Politics ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
National Party ◽  
Member States ◽  
European Elections ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
The Eu

El equilibrio en la regulación de los partidos políticos en las democracias contemporáneas se alcanza cuando la atribución a estos de funciones políticas relevantes se compensa con mecanismos de control. La aplicación de este principio a la regulación de los partidos políticos en el derecho de la UE pone de manifiesto una situación de equilibrio sui generis: las funciones de los partidos políticos europeos en las elecciones europeas o en el proceso legislativo del Parlamento Europeo está fuertemente limitada por el protagonismo de los Estados miembros y la política de partidos nacionales; por otro lado, los mecanismos de control establecidos sobre los partidos políticos europeos, incluidos los de democracia militante, deben coexistir con las normas nacionales al respecto, generando los problemas típicos de los escenarios multinivel.Balance in political parties regulation is met in contemporary democracies when the attribution of relevant political functions to political parties is counterweighed with mechanisms of control. The application of this principle to the regulation of political parties under the EU legal order reveals a sui generis balance: the functions of European political parties in European elections or in the legislative process within the European Parliament is significantly limited by the leading role played by member States and national party politics; besides, the mechanisms of control on European political parties, including those of militant democracy, must coexist with national laws governing the same subject, creating the typical problems of multilevel scenarios.

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