Providence, the Renaissance Atlantic, and Law

Author(s):  
Alexander B. Haskell

This chapter introduces the late Renaissance preoccupation with the interplay between God's will and earthly power by focusing on three issues. Envisioning the law as pathways of rightful conduct where Providence and human initiative intersected, colonizers viewed Christopher Columbus's discovery as as a divine sign that Christians were free to cross the ocean. Because distinguishing lawful pathways from erroneous ones was a matter of conscience, the literature that emerged to justify the Virginia venture took the familiar form of casuistry. Centered on the callings or divinely appointed offices by which humans contribute to bringing about the eschatological promise of the world's redemption, casuistry underlay, for instance, the magus and humanist John Dee's claim, in 1577, that Elizabeth I had a duty as a grace-filled empress to issue her first letters patent authorizing Sir Humphrey Gilbert's colonizing voyages. And colonization was inevitably defined as a project in forging commonwealths that brought everyone to his or her duties, for only in such a morally complete polity would Virginia satisfy God and contribute to coaxing sinners away from the primitive individualism left by the Fall.

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-93
Author(s):  
Prabowo Prabowo

It’s long time, churches debate on the application of the law to believers today. Some of the figures found grace is no longer relevant in the church. But some Christian leaders argue otherwise, saying that the law is still relevant and should be done. But, now a days many interpretations that are not right about Paul's theology on the application of the law in a period of grace. False interpretations of verses taken from Paul's letters caused God's people to be confused. Therefore, there is a need for proper interpretation through the process of exegesis of the Book of Romans 2-8, resulting in the existence of the correct interpretation of the law in a period of grace.From the background and the problems, this research focused to sharpen understanding of the problems related to the application of grace in the church today. Researchers used descriptive method to describe it. Then the authors conducted a study exegesis consisting of an observational analysis, textual analysis, structural analysis, grammatical analysis, lexical analysis, historical analysis or conceptual, analytical theological and exegetical analysis of Romans 2-8. The purpose of this study is the first, to understand the interrelationships of the law and grace; second, to understand the uniqueness of Paul's theology in describing the application of the law in a period of grace; Third, investigate exegesis mean passages from Paul's Letter to the Romans chapters 2-8 which discusses the relevance of the law and grace. The results of the discussion found several things: First, the assumption that Paul abolishes the law is not correct. Paul did not abolish the Law in a period of grace. Second, the law still relevant in the church today. Jesus fulfill the law for believers, so that believers can do the latter by the power of the Holy Spirit. And keep in mind that God has put His laws are no longer in tablets of stone dead, but in the mind of his people. Third, the law has a unique role and functions in the day of grace. The Law was God's will for believers because it still remains a self-revelation of God.Recommended for ministers, pastors, and teachers of theology seriously investigate the truth about the existence of the law in the church today, so that people are not confused by every falseteaching. Abstrak Indonesia  Sudah lama sekali, gereja berdebat tentang penerapan hukum kepada orang percaya hari ini. Beberapa tokoh menemukan kasih karunia tidak lagi relevan di gereja. Tetapi beberapa pemimpin Kristen berpendapat sebaliknya, dengan mengatakan bahwa hukum masih relevan dan harus dilakukan. Namun, sekarang ini banyak tafsir yang tidak benar tentang teologi Paulus tentang penerapan hukum dalam masa kasih karunia. Penafsiran yang salah dari ayat-ayat yang diambil dari surat-surat Paulus menyebabkan umat Tuhan menjadi bingung. Oleh karena itu, diperlukan penafsiran yang tepat melalui proses penafsiran Kitab Roma 2-8, sehingga terjadi penafsiran hukum yang benar dalam masa rahmat.Dari latar belakang dan permasalahan tersebut, penelitian ini difokuskan untuk mempertajam pemahaman tentang permasalahan terkait penerapan anugerah di gereja saat ini. Peneliti menggunakan metode deskriptif untuk mendeskripsikannya. Kemudian penulis melakukan studi tafsir yang terdiri dari analisis observasional, analisis tekstual, analisis struktural, analisis gramatikal, analisis leksikal, analisis historis atau konseptual, analisis teologis dan analisis eksegetik Roma 2-8. Tujuan dari studi ini adalah yang pertama, untuk memahami keterkaitan antara hukum dan rahmat; kedua, memahami keunikan teologi Paulus dalam menjelaskan penerapan hukum dalam masa kasih karunia; Ketiga, menyelidiki eksegesis yang berarti bagian-bagian dari Surat Paulus kepada Roma pasal 2-8 yang membahas relevansi hukum dan kasih karunia.Hasil diskusi menemukan beberapa hal: Pertama, anggapan bahwa Paulus menghapus hukum adalah tidak tepat. Paulus tidak menghapus Hukum dalam masa kasih karunia. Kedua, hukum masih relevan di gereja saat ini. Yesus menggenapi hukum untuk orang percaya, sehingga orang percaya dapat melakukan yang terakhir dengan kuasa Roh Kudus. Dan perlu diingat bahwa Tuhan telah meletakkan hukum-hukum-Nya tidak lagi di loh batu mati, tetapi di benak umat-Nya. Ketiga, hukum memiliki peran dan fungsi yang unik di hari kasih karunia. Hukum adalah kehendak Tuhan bagi orang percaya karena itu tetap merupakan wahyu Tuhan. Dianjurkan agar pendeta, pendeta, dan guru teologi menyelidiki dengan serius kebenaran tentang keberadaan hukum di gereja saat ini, agar masyarakat tidak dibingungkan oleh setiap kesalahan pengajaran.


Author(s):  
Risto Saarinen ◽  
Derek R. Nelson

The law both is and functions in Martin Luther’s theology. To the extent that it simply is, the law is wholly good, just, and pure. It reveals God’s benevolent providence for creation by instantiating structures of human relationships, natural processes, and social arrangements within which human life and all of creation can flourish. Luther regards the essential character of the law in a way reminiscent of the haggadah tradition of Rabbinic Judaism, where the law is a narrative which reveals features of the lawgiver. Under the conditions of sin, however, the law can be experienced as wrath by humans who cannot fulfill what it requires, and who suffer as a result of their own transgression of the Word of God or as a result of the transgressions of others. It functions thus as a curb against wickedness and as a means of exposing sin to be sin. Its continued presence in the life of the believer is necessary, as Luther clarified in his various debates with Johann Agricola and the so-called “Antinomians.” When the law is understood only in its antinomy with the gospel, the life-affirming elements of the law are occluded, even as the gospel’s life-redeeming elements are thereby rendered clear. While numerous fine distinctions can be found in Luther’s theology of the law, it maintains a basic unity-in-diversity. God wills singly in dealing with human beings as his creatures. Therefore “civil law,” the Decalogue, and other manifestations of the law are facets of the one will of God for the flourishing of creation. Recent Pauline scholarship has criticized Luther for eisegesis on Paul’s view of the law; Luther needed to see his contemporary Roman partisans as Paul’s legalistic Jewish opponents, they say, and so he read Romans as a critique of 16th-century “works righteousness.” This view ignores the fact that Luther (and Augustine) viewed the post-conversion Paul as “continent” in doing the works of the law, neither weak-willed nor perfectly virtuous. Law is necessary for doctrine, but it is also important for the “Christian life” because it helps the believer to understand the reciprocity that underlies interpersonal relationships, seen especially in the “golden rule” that functions as the epitome of the Christian life. The radical receptivity (i.e., passivity) that characterizes the life of faith in believers enables the experience of God’s will, understood as law or command, in a constructive and beneficial way. While Christian life should employ a “faith approach” rather than a “law approach,” genuine faith in God does, in fact, reveal the true meaning of the law. This might be called the “second use of the gospel” in that God’s command (Gebot), viewed in light of the gospel, becomes a source of guidance for the Christian life, the ten commandments, the double love command, and the Sermon on the Mount chief among them.


1997 ◽  
Vol 4 (21) ◽  
pp. 700-708 ◽  
Author(s):  
Conrad Russell

In October 1993, I had to decide whether it was proper for me, as an unbeliever, to go to Parliament to vote in favour of a Church of England measure. Was it proper that laymen, not members of the church, not involved in the decisions taken, should be allowed to sit in Parliament to decide what the law of the church should be? After some discussion, I was persuaded it was proper, and cast my vote accordingly. In that decision, I recognized the triumph of one version of the Royal Supremacy over another. It is the triumph of Christopher St. German over Bishop Stephen Gardiner, of Sir Francis Knollys over Queen Elizabeth I, of Chief Justice Coke over Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, and of John Pym over Archbishop Laud. That triumph took a century to arrive after Henry VIII's Act of Supremacy, and, like many other triumphs, it threw out a promising baby with its mess of popish bath-water.


1984 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Dempsey Douglass
Keyword(s):  

Christian freedom was a major concern for Calvin from the very beginning of his theological career. The very long sixth and final chapter of the first edition of the Institutes is devoted to this question. He opens the chapter by calling this freedom “a matter of prime necessity; … without a knowledge of it consciences dare undertake almost nothing without faltering, often hesitate and draw back, constantly waver and are afraid … unless this freedom be grasped, neither Christ nor gospel truth is rightly known.” From this first edition till the last Calvin continues to talk at length about three aspects of Christian freedom: freedom of the conscience and freedom from the law because of justification by grace alone; freedom of the liberated Christian to obey God's will voluntarily and not out of necessity; and freedom in outward things which are “indifferent,” that is, in themselves neither necessary nor forbidden. For much of this understanding Calvin is deeply indebted to Luther and Melanchthon.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Theo De Witt

To the question “Are we as humans obliged to something because it is good, or because it is prescribed by God?”, the Christian Church father Tertullian answered: we obey because of God's will. Today, many are inclined to give the first answer, and even to distrust people who follow Tertullian. In this article, however, the author demonstrates the continuing relevance of Tertullian’s paradigm about reason/will in modern political philosophy: for example, in Thomas Hobbes’ “decisionist” maxim: not truth, but the will of formal authority establishes the law. Or in the democratic combination of rational discussion and decisive majority will. This gives modern democracy the character of a ritual instead of a rational machinery: a kind of secular divine judgement. Also another issue allows us to demonstrate the lasting actuality of Tertullian’s paired concepts: the issue that a political community not only needs democratic legitimacy, but also national unity. Here also the relationship with the question of violence becomes relevant. The author presents four “dangerous liaisons” between love and rational justice. The basic intuition here is that we “not only want to live in a world which we are able to consider just, but in a reality which we experience as valuable in and of itself” (Paul W. Kahn). Love can strengthen rational justice, and vice versa; love can get in conflict with justice; justice can try to expand itself at the expensive of love; and – the other way around – love can drive us to the universal and transcend legal boundaries. As a conclusion, we can distinguish clearly between nationalism and patriotism. And second, we must admit that, while love will always destabilize law, the opposite is also true: we have to make calculations, so that justice can also destabilize love.


2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 473-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Alan Orr

AbstractThis article examines the brutal massacre of up to six hundred Spanish and Italian papal troops on the order of the English Lord Deputy Arthur Grey, 14th Baron de Wilton (1536–1593), at Dún An Óir (Forto del Oro), Smerwick, County Kerry, on 10 November 1580. The article investigates the relationship between the religious and juridical rationales for the massacre, shedding new light on the broader relationship between the early modern law of nations, Protestantism, and what Brendan Bradshaw has characterized as “catastrophic violence” in the Elizabethan military conquest of Ireland. While Vincent Carey has emphasized the virulently anti-Catholic character of Grey's rationales for the massacre, my argument instead emphasizes the role of the received laws of nations and of war in justifying Grey's actions both to Queen Elizabeth I (1533–1603) and to the English public, from the period immediately following the massacre until the writing of Edmund Spenser's pro-Grey apologetic, A View of the Present State of Ireland (ca. 1596). On this view, the papal troops at Smerwick were considered brigands, pirates, or, in Marcus Tullius Cicero's words, “communis hostis omnium”—a common enemy to all—and enjoyed no standing as lawful enemies under the law of nations. In the sixteenth century, the established law of nations was hardly a seamless web but manifested significant cleavages and fissures allowing for the construction of localized spheres of legal exception in which the ordinary rules of warfare did not apply, thus providing a convenient juridical rationale for atrocity.


Author(s):  
Ceri Sullivan

Advice texts describe praying for, with, or as though a prince as both an act of grace and as an art of the courtier. Elizabeth I and James VI and I developed strongly differentiated profiles in private prayer. The queen published her addresses to God, addressing him as her fellow sovereign and as her superior. By contrast, the king never published what he said to God, only what God said to him, in the exclusive advisory consultations held in his conscience. Elizabeth joined her people in petitioning God to discern and do his will, James told his people what God’s will was. Prayers written for and about monarchs attempted to manage them within these approaches. Shakespeare’s Henry VIII explores political manoeuvres in prayer, and royal strategies to frustrate these; Richard II shows that grace can drain away from a royal prayer, leaving it theatrical.


Philosophy ◽  
1944 ◽  
Vol 19 (72) ◽  
pp. 3-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. D. Falk
Keyword(s):  

You have invited me to speak about Morals without Faith. Briefly, I take it, this question means: is there any moral law for agnostics? But it might be more interesting to put it rather differently: to ask, not simply whether there is a moral law for those who do not believe in God, but whether there is any such law even for those who do independent of their belief? We are then asking: Does being under a moral law mean nothing more than being commanded by God? Is the only incentive for obeying it in our love or fear of Him, the only criterion by which to judge the morality of actions in their conformity to a revealed standard? Or would it be more true to say that the law which God wishes us to obey is that law to which we ought to conform because it corresponds to our nature and conditions in this world, a law which, apart from being God's will, we can understand as being indispensable to the kind of beings we are?


2019 ◽  
Vol 112 (02) ◽  
pp. 160-183
Author(s):  
Matthew Puffer

AbstractDietrich Bonhoeffer’s unfinished and posthumously published Ethics was intended to be his magnum opus. However, its incomplete structure and the distinct ethical approaches evident in its unfinished essays have allowed for considerable debate about its overall coherence and contours, as well as the hermeneutics appropriate to the text. This essay reconsiders prior interpretations of Bonhoeffer’s Ethics through close readings that disclose three rival versions of moral reasoning operative in three manuscripts from Bonhoeffer’s Ethics. Retracing his reasoning regarding the ethics of lying, the place of guilt, and the relation between the law of God and God’s will, I argue that Bonhoeffer’s detractors and defenders alike have misconstrued the controversial ethic of “actively embracing guilt” (Schuldübernahme). Far from the paradigmatic expression of Bonhoeffer’s Ethics, its organizing theme, or the basis for his participation in the tyrannicide plot against Hitler, Bonhoeffer’s reflection on Schuldübernahme is properly understood as an outlier—a short-lived thought experiment that he critiques and reconceives in two alternative versions of moral reasoning in later chapters.


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