Institutional Reform and the Enforcement of Competition Policy in the Uk

2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Wilks
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Institutional Reform ◽  
The Uk

28. Competition Law: Article 102

EU Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1126-1162
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
The Core ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Per Se ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
Number Of Firms

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter focuses on another principal provision concerned with competition policy: Article 102 TFEU. The essence of Article 102 is the control of market power, whether by a single firm or, subject to certain conditions, a number of firms. Monopoly power can lead to higher prices and lower output than would prevail under more normal competitive conditions, and this is the core rationale for legal regulation in this area. Article 102 does not, however, prohibit market power per se. It proscribes the abuse of market power. Firms are encouraged to compete, with the most efficient players being successful. The UK version contains a further section analysing issues concerning EU competition law and the UK post-Brexit. EU law

scholarly journals Interoperability as a tool for competition regulation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Brown
Keyword(s):  
Operating Systems ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Regulatory Mechanisms ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Policy Goal ◽  
Software Developers ◽  
Computing Systems ◽  
Policy Tool ◽  
Online Platforms ◽  
The Uk

Interoperability is a technical mechanism for computing systems to work together – even if they are from competing firms. An interoperability requirement for large online platforms has been suggested by the European Commission as one ex ante (up-front rule) mechanism in its proposed Digital Markets Act (DMA), as a way to encourage competition. The policy goal is to increase choice and quality for users, and the ability of competitors to succeed with better services. The application would be to the largest online platforms, such as Fa-cebook, Google, Amazon, smartphone operating systems (e.g. Android/iOS), and their ancil-lary services, such as payment and app stores. This report analyses up-front interoperability requirements as a pro-competition policy tool for regulating large online platforms, exploring the economic and social rationales and pos-sible regulatory mechanisms. It is based on a synthesis of recent comprehensive policy re-views of digital competition in major industrialised economies, and related academic litera-ture, focusing on areas of emerging consensus while noting important disagreements. It draws particularly on the Vestager, Furman and Stigler reviews, and the UK Competition and Markets Authority’s study on online platforms and digital advertising. It also draws on interviews with software developers, platform operators, government officials, and civil so-ciety experts working in this field.

No automation please, we’re British: technology and the prospects for work

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Spencer ◽  
Gary Slater
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Reform ◽  
Full Potential ◽  
Real Wages ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Impact

Abstract This article assesses the impact and probably limits of automation. It looks, in particular, at the case of the UK economy. The prospects for automation are seen as necessarily uncertain and potentially regressive in their effects, with technology likely to sustain a large number of low-quality jobs. The deep-seated problems of the UK economy—low-investment, low-productivity and low-real wages—are seen as key impediments to forms of automation that work for all in society. It is argued that, without wider institutional reform, the UK will be unable to reap the full potential of automation.

Exclusionary Abuses

2021 ◽  
pp. 79-112
Author(s):  
Renato Nazzini
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Pharmaceutical Sector ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Third ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
The Eu

Chapter 4 deals with exclusionary abuses under the Competition Act 1998, covering both public and private enforcement cases. The analysis concerns the approach to dominance as well as tests for abuse, focusing on retroactive rebates and bundled discounts, exclusion in multi-market settings, exclusivity, most favoured nation and equivalent clauses, discrimination, and exclusionary abuses in the pharmaceutical sector. This chapter argues that, in its second decade, modern UK competition law continued a trend that was already clear in the first decade: the prohibition of abuse of dominance is applied in a more economically robust and commercially reasonable way than it is by the EU institutions - the Commission and the EU courts - and in certain other Member States. The chapter notes that the third decade of the Competition Act 1998 will see the UK develop its competition policy free from the constraints of EU law and may allow for some divergence in the approach to exclusionary abuses in the future.

Crystal ball gazing: where next for UK competition law and policy post-Brexit?

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 78-88
Author(s):  
Noel Beale ◽  
Paschalis Lois
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Cooperation Agreement ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Potential Interactions ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Eu

The Trade and Cooperation Agreement broadly sets out the nature of the relationship contemplated between UK and EU competition law and policy following Brexit. The question is whether the UK will capitalize on its newfound discretion to deviate its competition policy from the EU in the future. This article considers some of the potential new directions that might be taken within the UK's competition law landscape, specifically in relation to merger control, antitrust and subsidy control. It explores some of the problems and opportunities created in the wake of Brexit, as well as the legal and practical ramifications of future divergences between UK and EU competition policy. Furthermore, it considers how the Competition and Markets Authority may fare in enforcing new policy, as well as its potential interactions with regimes both within and outside the EU.

Vertical restraints, the single market imperative and UK competition policy after Brexit

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 122-129
Author(s):  
Patrick F. Todd
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Market Integration ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Single Market ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Uk

After Brexit, the United Kingdom is unlikely to continue pursuing integration with other Member States of the European Union, including through competition policy. As a result, the time is ripe to reconsider the role of the single market imperative in competition law, in particular in relation to vertical restraints where the goal of market integration plays a pivotal role. This article shows that recent European vertical restraints decisions and case law, in particular concerning territorial and online restraints, have been motivated in whole or in part by the single market imperative (SMI). It then examines how the law in the UK might follow a different path post-Brexit, taking the Ping case as an example. However, a similar change is not likely to be forthcoming in relation to the law governing pricing restraints, which are not obviously linked to the SMI and which have been the subject of much enforcement in the UK both before and during the UK's membership of the EU.

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