Prosecutor v. Laurent Koudou Gbagbo: Judgment on the Appeal Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I on Jurisdiction and Stay of the Proceedings (Int’l. Crim. CT.)

2014 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 477-501
Author(s):  
Inbal Djalovski

On December 12, 2012, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court (Court) in the case of Prosecutor v. Laurent Koudou Gbagbo unanimously confirmed the Pre-Trial Chamber I decision to dismiss Mr. Gbagbo’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court. In the Judgment, the Appeals Chamber, for the first time, was called to interpret Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute (Statute), which allows a non-party State to accept the jurisdiction of the Court on an ad hoc basis without acceding to the Statute. The Judgment further includes two procedural issues. Firstly, the Appeals Chamber found that although the Pre-Trial Chamber erred by not rendering a separate decision on Côte d’Ivoire’s request for leave to submit its observations, this error did not materially affect the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision. Secondly, the Appeals Chamber dismissed, in limine, Mr. Gbagbo’s request for a stay of proceedings based on allegations of violations of his fundamental rights, since it was not jurisdictional in nature and thus fell outside the scope of the appealable matter.

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (1) ◽  
pp. 126-132
Author(s):  
Uzma S. Bishop-Burney

On September 27, 2016, the Trial Chamber (Chamber) of the International Criminal Court (ICC or tribunal) rendered its judgment in Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, wherein the defendant was convicted of the war crime of intentionally directing attacks on protected cultural objects. It is the ICC's first such conviction and the first time that an accused has entered a guilty plea at the tribunal pursuant to Article 65 of the Rome Statute (Statute). Al Mahdi pled guilty to co-perpetrating attacks on protected objects pursuant to Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Statute for his role in the attack on, and destruction of, ten mosques and mausoleums in Timbuktu. The Trial Chamber sentenced him to nine years in prison.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 6 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 6 defines the crime of genocide, one of four categories of offence within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. The first important ruling on genocide by one of the ad hoc tribunals — the September 2, 1998 judgment of a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Prosecutor v. Akayesu — was issued several weeks after the adoption of the Rome Statute. Since then there have been several important judicial pronouncements by the Appeals Chambers of the ad hoc tribunals addressing a range of issues relevant to the interpretation of article 6 as well as two judgments of the International Court of Justice. The Court has indicated that the definition of genocide in article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (and therefore article 6 of the Rome Statute) reflects customary law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 306
Author(s):  
Bugivia Maharani Setiadji Putri ◽  
Sefriani Sefriani

<p><em>This research aims to comprehensively analyze the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction in adjudicating gross violations of human rights involving a non-party state of the 1998 Rome Statute and its application to the perpetrators of deportation against the Rohingya with Myanmar as the non-party state. The results showed that this jurisdiction can be implemented under three conditions, first, the crime is committed by nationals of a non-party state on the territory of a state party to the Statute. Second, the UN Security Council refers a situation to the International Criminal Court in its resolution. Third, through an ad hoc declaration that a non-party state of the Rome Statute accepts the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction. Since the territorial jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court covers crimes that occur wholly or partly on the territory of a state party, it can be applied to the deportation against the Rohingya in Myanmar. This involved the fleeing of this ethnic group from attacks by the Government of Myanmar to Bangladesh, a state party to the 1998 Rome Statute</em></p>


Author(s):  
Micheal G Kearney

Abstract In 2018, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) held that conduct preventing the return of members of the Rohingya people to Myanmar could fall within Article 7(1)(k) of the Statute, on the grounds that denial of the right of return constitutes a crime against humanity. No international tribunal has prosecuted this conduct as a discrete violation, but given the significance of the right of return to Palestinians, it can be expected that such an offence would be of central importance should the ICC investigate the situation in Palestine. This comment will review the recognition of this crime against humanity during the process prompted by the Prosecutor’s 2018 Request for a ruling as to the Court’s jurisdiction over trans-boundary crimes in Bangladesh/Myanmar. It will consider the basis for the right of return in general international law, with a specific focus on the Palestinian right of return. The final section will review the elements of the denial of right of return as a crime against humanity, as proposed by the Office of the Prosecutor in its 2019 Request for Authorization of an investigation in Bangladesh/Myanmar.


Author(s):  
Sunneva Gilmore

The Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda case at the International Criminal Court (ICC) represents the long awaited first reparation order for sexual violence at the court. This will hopefully see the implementation of reparations for the war crimes and crimes against humanity of rape and sexual slavery among civilians and former child soldiers, after previous cases such as against Jean-Pierre Bembe and Laurent Gbagbo were acquitted of rape. This article drawing from the author's role as a reparation expert in the case, is a reflection on the challenges of designing and providing reparations at the ICC against convicted individuals, as well as amidst insecurity and the COVID-19 infectious disease pandemic. It begins by discussing how the Ntaganda reparation order expanded reparation principles for the first time since the Lubanga case, in particular for crimes of a sexual nature. This is followed by an outline of some of the harms as a result of sexual violence from the perspective of an expert with a medical background. The analysis then turns to the appropriate reparations in this case and the details contained within the chamber's reparation order. Final conclusions consider how the procedural and substantive elements of reparations in this case will be instructive to future cases that address sexual violence. Ultimately, key insights are offered on the modest contribution an appointed reparation expert can do in assisting a trial chamber in the reparation process.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 100-111
Author(s):  
Denis Pechegin

The increasing interpenetration of the main models of the process and the approval of international standards for the production of criminal cases raise the question of the development and improvement of the form of legal proceedings in the category of the most relevant in modern science. On the one hand, the attention of many scientists is focused on strengthening the competitive core of the process and ensuring, as far as possible, a balance of power between the parties. On the other hand, it is stated that legal proceedings that do not pursue the goal of achieving material truth, especially due to the absolute nature of the principle of competition, lead to excessive formalism that has nothing to do with fair trial. The solution to the problem of combining trial models (the balance of adversarial and investigative cores) is seen in the International Criminal Court. The procedure of criminal proceedings in the International Criminal Court is the result of special scientific modeling taking into account the indicated doctrinal trends, and the degree of generalization of approaches of leading legal families in the structure of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is so high that it allows us to speak about the universality of this procedural system. If the predecessors of the International Criminal Court preference were really given only one started (so, the ICTY was based on the example of the Anglo-Saxon adversarial procedure model with the “American accent”), the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court reflected the trend to the initial formation of a balanced trial procedures designed to overcome the deviations in the balance of power by introducing an adversarial process with “inquisitorial” elements: for example, the Pre-trial Chamber, duties of the Prosecutor fully and objectively investigate the circumstances of the case, the duties of the court of first instance to establish the truth in the case. However, this does not mean any disregard for the adversarial core at the pre-trial stage. The article is devoted to theoretical and practical aspects of the combination of adversarial and investigative cores in the activities of the pre-trial Chamber of the International criminal court and reflects the results of a study led by professor Anita Ušacka, honorary doctor of law, in the preparation of a Commentary to the Rome Statute in Russian.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 245-250
Author(s):  
Bing Bing Jia

Legacy is a matter that may become topical when its creator finally stops producing. Normally, the silent years would be many before the thought of legacy enters into open, formal discourse among lawyers and decision-makers. This comment treats the meaning of the word as relative to the circumstances in which it is invoked. The more closely it is used in relation to the present, the more distant it drifts from its literal meaning, to the extent that it denotes what the word “impact” signifies. This essay questions whether the word “legacy” is apt in describing the footprint of the work of the two ad hoctribunals in China, where its influence has, as a matter of fact, been waning ever since the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998 (“Rome Statute” ). The Chinese example suggests that the work of the tribunals is (at least so far) no more significant to international criminal law than the illustrious Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials of the 1940s. The most major impact (a more apposite term than legacy) of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) for China may be that China’s policy with regard to the tribunals, manifested mostly in the United Nations, has determined its approach to the International Criminal Court (“ICC” ). For that, the work of the tribunals could be considered as having left China something in the nature of an indirect legacy.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 76 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 76 governs the imposition of sentence in the event of a conviction. If the accused is convicted, the Trial Chamber is required to establish the ‘appropriate sentence’. In so doing, the Statute instructs it to consider the evidence presented and submissions made during the trial that are relevant to the sentence. Mitigating and aggravating factors relating to the commission of the crime itself, such as the individual role of the offender and of the treatment of the victims, will form part of the evidence germane to guilt or innocence and thus appear as part of the record of the trial.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 69 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 69 deals with specific evidentiary issues but lacks a general provision like the one in the Nuremberg Charter. This is addressed in article 64, stating that the Trial Chamber has the power to rule on the admissibility or reliability of evidence. According to a Trial Chamber, ‘the drafters of the Statute framework have clearly and deliberately avoided proscribing certain categories or types of evidence, a step which would have limited — at the outset — the ability of the Chamber to assess evidence “freely”’. Chambers enjoy ‘a significant degree of discretion in considering all types of evidence’. Another judge has said that article 69 provides for ‘the principle of free assessment of evidence. Hence, it is up to the competent Chamber to decide on the probative value of any piece of evidence introduced for the purpose of the confirmation hearing or the trial’.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 64 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 64 sets out the functions and powers of the Trial Chamber. It confirms that ‘[t]he functions and powers of the Trial Chamber set out in this article shall be exercised in accordance with this Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’. The general duties of the Trial Chamber include ensuring a ‘fair and expeditious’ trial, conducted with ‘full respect for the rights of the accused’ and ‘due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses’.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document