Domestic Incorporation of International Criminal Procedure

2015 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 273-275
Author(s):  
Nina H. B. Jørgensen

Rules of procedure define the relationship between the needs of effective enforcement of international criminal law—grounded in the interest of combating impunity—and the individual rights of those affected by the process. It has been said that criminal procedure is the “most vulnerable part of a liberal legal system.” It is vulnerable in part because it is adaptable. It can be adapted to promote fairness in the interactions between an individual and the state, or it can be manipulated to facilitate abuses by those in power. A fair system charts a course for the discovery of the truth but recognizes that this destination cannot be reached at all costs. For example, confessions obtained under torture are inadmissible under international rules of procedure and evidence.

2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 316-344
Author(s):  
BEATRICE I. BONAFÉ

AbstractInternational criminal law provides a particularly interesting case study for the proliferation of legal orders as it helps to understand the types of uncertainties their interaction may entail with respect to the position of the individual as well as the solutions that may be adopted in that respect. This article analyses a selected number of substantive and procedural uncertainties that originate in the relationship between international criminal law and domestic legal orders. The purpose of the discussion is to identify the particular legal devices that have been elaborated in order to ensure the coordination between these legal orders, and to suggest areas in which a better coordination is still to be achieved.


2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-94
Author(s):  
Muyiwa Adigun

The principle of complementarity is one of the most important concepts in international criminal law as it defines the relationship between international criminal tribunals and domestic courts. Certain claims have been made in respect of this concept thus this study examines the correctness of the claims made. The study finds that the concept is claimed to have originated from the sciences and that its expression in international criminal law has taken a distinctive form different from that in the sciences, that it is traceable to the First World War and that there are at least about four categories of the concept. The study, however, argues that while the concept originated from the sciences, its expression in international criminal law is no different from that in the sciences, that it is traceable to the trial of Peter von Hagenbach in 1474 (the Breisach Trial) and that there are at least five categories of the concept. The study therefore concludes that the claims made are incorrect.


2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 953-975 ◽  
Author(s):  
ATHANASIOS CHOULIARAS

AbstractThe article focuses on one of the most intriguing and, at the same time, controversial issues of international criminal law: whether the state policy requirement should be considered as a constitutive element in core international crimes. Adopting a criminal policy perspective, my intention is to contribute to the ongoing discussion by offering a doctrinal and criminological corroboration of the position that answers in the affirmative. Nevertheless, I am not necessarily promoting a normative choice entailing the amendment of the definition of core international crimes, but I rather call for a policy choice of focusing on cases that presume a state policy component.


2020 ◽  
pp. 175-186
Author(s):  
Sean Fleming

This concluding chapter summarizes the implications of the Hobbesian theory of state responsibility and then looks to the future. There are three ongoing trends that are likely to alter both the nature and the scope of state responsibility: the development of international criminal law, the proliferation of treaties, and the replacement of human representatives with machines and algorithms. Although the practice of holding individuals responsible for acts of state might seem to render state responsibility redundant, the rise of international criminal law will not lead to the decline of state responsibility. The two forms of international responsibility are complementary rather than competitive. If anything, the domain of state responsibility will continue to expand in the coming decades because of the proliferation of treaties. New technologies pose the greatest challenge to current understandings of state responsibility. Thomas Hobbes' theory of the state, which is mechanistic to begin with, is well suited to the emerging world of mechanized states.


2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 531-545 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuela Melandri

AbstractThis article explores the relationship between state sovereignty and the enforcement of international criminal law under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This doing, it attempts to map out the ambivalent and sometimes contradictory roles that different typologies sovereignty play in advancing or hindering the enforcement of international criminal law. After a brief survey of the literature on the debate over 'international law vs. state sovereignty', the paper focuses on one specific aspect of the newly established ICC: the conditions for case admissibility. The analysis will show that the relationship between state sovereignty and international criminal justice is a dynamic and complex one, which needs to be understood and contextualized within the current system of international relations.


2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
DARRYL ROBINSON

AbstractIn this article, I argue that two prominent frameworks for evaluating and developing international criminal law (ICL) can be reconciled into a new framework that absorbs the best insights of its predecessors. We cannot simply transplant fundamental principles from national legal systems, because they may be inapposite in the unusual contexts faced by ICL. However, this novelty does not mean that we are free to simply abandon culpability, legality, and our basic underlying commitment to the individual. Instead we must explore what that deontic commitment might entail in these new contexts. My primary aim is to show the possibility of bridging the apparent normative impasse. I also briefly sketch out the proposed framework, and suggest that it can generate new questions for current controversies in ICL. As an interesting by-product, the examination of ‘abnormal’ criminal law can raise new questions for general criminal-law theory, by exposing subtleties and parameters that we might not have noticed in a study of ‘normal’ contexts.


1969 ◽  
pp. 251
Author(s):  
L. C. Green

In this pragmatic discussion of international criminal law, the author provides both an analytic and historical overview of the jurisprudence. The roles of treaties, conventions, and the United Nations are presented as the relationship between international and domestic criminal law is explored. In this process, the author distinguishes international legal posturing from bona fide attempts to create an international criminal law.


1985 ◽  
Vol 20 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 206-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoram Dinstein

The individual human being is manifestly the object of every legal system on this planet, and consequently also of international law. The ordinary subject of international law is the international corporate entity: first and foremost (though not exclusively) the State. Yet, the corporate entity is not a tangible res that exists in reality, but an abstract notion, moulded through legal manipulation by and within the ambit of a superior legal system. When the veil is pierced, one can see that behind the legal personality of the State (or any other international corporate entity) there are natural persons: flesh-and-blood human beings. In the final analysis, Westlake was indubitably right when he stated: The duties and rights of States are only the duties and rights of the men who compose them.That is to say, in actuality, the international rights and duties of States devolve on human beings, albeit indirectly and collectively. In other words, the individual human being is not merely the object of international law, but indirectly also its subject, notwithstanding the fact that, ostensibly, the subject is the international corporate entity.


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