International Criminal Law

1985 ◽  
Vol 20 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 206-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoram Dinstein

The individual human being is manifestly the object of every legal system on this planet, and consequently also of international law. The ordinary subject of international law is the international corporate entity: first and foremost (though not exclusively) the State. Yet, the corporate entity is not a tangible res that exists in reality, but an abstract notion, moulded through legal manipulation by and within the ambit of a superior legal system. When the veil is pierced, one can see that behind the legal personality of the State (or any other international corporate entity) there are natural persons: flesh-and-blood human beings. In the final analysis, Westlake was indubitably right when he stated: The duties and rights of States are only the duties and rights of the men who compose them.That is to say, in actuality, the international rights and duties of States devolve on human beings, albeit indirectly and collectively. In other words, the individual human being is not merely the object of international law, but indirectly also its subject, notwithstanding the fact that, ostensibly, the subject is the international corporate entity.

Author(s):  
Robert McCorquodale

This chapter examines the role of the individual in the international legal system. It considers the direct rights and responsibilities of individuals under the international legal system; their capacity to bring international claims; and their ability to participate in the creation, development, and enforcement of international law. Particular examples from a wide range of areas of international law, including international human rights law, international criminal law, and international economic law, are used to illustrate the conceptual and practical participation of individuals in the international legal system. It is argued that individuals are participants in that system, and are not solely objects that are subject to States’ consent, though their degree of participation varies depending on the changing nature of the international legal system.


1995 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vicki L. Lee

This paper considers the question “What is a psychological unit?”. The ubiquity of units in daily life and in science is considered. The assumption that the individual human being or animal is the psychological unit is examined and rejected. The units represented by the data collected in operant laboratories are interpreted as a subset of the well-defined changes that individual human beings or animals can bring about. The departure of this interpretation from the traditional interpretation in terms of the behaviour of the organism is acknowledged. The paper concludes by noting the relation of the present interpretation of operant research to the problem of identifying psychological units.


Author(s):  
Miikka Ruokanen

Luther underscores sin as unbelief which cuts off the relationship between the human being and his/her Creator resulting in the imprisonment of the human by sin, death, and transcendental evil. He/she exists in the state of infirmity, incapable of changing his/her basic orientation of life. Sin is weakness, inability to be free. Paradoxically, the enslavement of sin entered humanity when the human being was deceived by an illusion of absolute freedom, independence from the Creator: “man himself wants to be God, and does not want God to be God.” Erasmus criticized Luther for using the deterministic concept of “absolute necessity.” In fact, Luther is not a determinist, but he uses a hamartiological idea of “the necessity of immutability”: the sinner necessarily must continue to be a captive of unfaith until efficient Pneumatological grace liberates him/her. Luther’s thought does not include any notion of “the necessity of coaction.” The sinner freely enjoys sinning unless changed by God. The necessity of immutability concerns the human being’s relation to the “things above oneself,” not to those “below oneself” where natural freedom of will prevails. Luther represents no theodicy, he leaves open the question about where the ultimate origin of evil will lies. God is not the cause of evil will, but he may sometimes use it as an “instrumental cause” for his good purposes. In Luther’s treatise there is no trace of a doctrine of predestination applied to individual human beings. Any notion of double predestination is impossible in Luther’s doctrine of grace.


Vox Patrum ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 64 ◽  
pp. 205-230
Author(s):  
Oleksandr Kashchuk

In St. Maximus the Confessor’s teaching human nature consists of the soul and the body, in which logos of power that unifies them together is inscribed. Human nature manifests itself in the individual human being. The human being as the body and the soul naturally longs for God. This longing is fulfilled by the movement, which is connected to dynamism of the entire human structure. The dynamism is inscribed in the mind, reason, spirit, will, sense, passionate powers and body. The dynamic aspiration for God does not imply getting rid of any of the human elements, even passionate and bodily, but on the contrary, it demands ap­preciation and proper use of all the natural powers of the human being. Maximus the Confessor treats the human being as a whole. The human is not only mind, reason and spirit, but also will, sense, passionate powers and body. The dynamism of mental and spiritual sphere should be extended in the senses, passionate pow­ers and body, so that the body also becomes the source of virtues, and is deified together with the soul through unity with the Absolute. This unity as the goal of human longing will never be static, but dynamic, because the fulfillment of this longing is the state with eternal movement. So human being will constantly strive for even more perfect unity with God. Through this unity the human being becomes more human. The originality of the Author consists in the fact that using the anthropological views of the earlier tradition and interpreting them mystically and symbolically, he intertwined the entire dynamism of human being with the structure of the Platonic world. The human being through the longing for God and through the proper use of natural powers mystically unites with God not only himself/herself, but also the entire universe, because the structure of the human being is analogous to the structure of the universe.


2015 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 273-275
Author(s):  
Nina H. B. Jørgensen

Rules of procedure define the relationship between the needs of effective enforcement of international criminal law—grounded in the interest of combating impunity—and the individual rights of those affected by the process. It has been said that criminal procedure is the “most vulnerable part of a liberal legal system.” It is vulnerable in part because it is adaptable. It can be adapted to promote fairness in the interactions between an individual and the state, or it can be manipulated to facilitate abuses by those in power. A fair system charts a course for the discovery of the truth but recognizes that this destination cannot be reached at all costs. For example, confessions obtained under torture are inadmissible under international rules of procedure and evidence.


Author(s):  
David Boucher

The classic foundational status that Hobbes has been afforded by contemporary international relations theorists is largely the work of Hans Morgenthau, Martin Wight, and Hedley Bull. They were not unaware that they were to some extent creating a convenient fiction, an emblematic realist, a shorthand for all of the features encapsulated in the term. The detachment of international law from the law of nature by nineteenth-century positivists opened Hobbes up, even among international jurists, to be portrayed as almost exclusively a mechanistic theorist of absolute state sovereignty. If we are to endow him with a foundational place at all it is not because he was an uncompromising realist equating might with right, on the analogy of the state of nature, but instead to his complete identification of natural law with the law of nations. It was simply a matter of subject that distinguished them, the individual and the state.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 ◽  
pp. 193-199
Author(s):  
Sean D. Murphy ◽  
Claudio Grossman

Our conversation might begin by looking backward a bit. The human rights movement from 1945 onward has been one of the signature accomplishments of the field of international law, one that refocused our attention from a largely interstate system to a system where the individual moved in from the periphery to the center. Human rights champions point to numerous landmark treaties, numerous institutions, and the rise of NGOs as a critical vehicle for developing and monitoring human rights rules. Yet others look at the international human right system and still see the state as overly central, tolerating and paying lip service to human rights, but too easily discarding them when they prove to be inconvenient. The persistence of racism comes to mind. As a general matter, how would you assess the strengths and weaknesses of the system that was built essentially during your lifetime?


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-49
Author(s):  
Paul Kucharski

My aim in this essay is to advance the state of scholarly discussion on the harms of genocide. The most obvious harms inflicted by every genocide are readily evident: the physical harm inflicted upon the victims of genocide and the moral harm that the perpetrators of genocide inflict upon themselves. Instead, I will focus on a kind of harm inflicted upon those who are neither victims nor perpetrators, on those who are outside observers, so to speak. My thesis will be that when a whole community or culture is eliminated, or even deeply wounded, the world loses an avenue for insight into the human condition. My argument is as follows. In order to understand human nature, and that which promotes its flourishing, we must certainly study individual human beings. But since human beings as rational and linguistic animals are in part constituted by the communities in which they live, the study of human nature should also involve the study of communities and cultures—both those that are well ordered and those that are not. No one community or culture has expressed all that can be said about the human way of existing and flourishing. And given that the unity and wholeness of human nature can only be glimpsed in a variety of communities and cultures, then part of the harm of genocide consists in the removal of a valuable avenue for human beings to better understand themselves.


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 573-599
Author(s):  
Alex Batesmith ◽  
Jake Stevens

This article explores how ‘everyday’ lawyers undertaking routine criminal defence cases navigate an authoritarian legal system. Based on original fieldwork in the ‘disciplined democracy’ of Myanmar, the article examines how hegemonic state power and a functional absence of the rule of law have created a culture of passivity among ordinary practitioners. ‘Everyday’ lawyers are nevertheless able to uphold their clients’ dignity by practical and material support for the individual human experience – and in so doing, subtly resist, evade or disrupt state power. The article draws upon the literature on the sociology of lawyering and resistance, arguing for a multilayered understanding of dignity going beyond lawyers’ contributions to their clients’ legal autonomy. Focusing on dignity provides an alternative perspective to the otherwise often all-consuming rule of law discourse. In authoritarian legal systems, enhancing their clients’ dignity beyond legal autonomy may be the only meaningful contribution that ‘everyday’ lawyers can make.


1978 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 348-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne C. Thompson

In August 1914 Kurt Riezler accompanied Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg to the Supreme Headquarters in Koblenz and Luxembourg. His duties were not clearly defined and included a variety of things: He worked on war aims, parliamentary speeches, revolutionary movements, and domestic political questions. He helped interpret the chancellor's policies to the press, establish guidelines for censorship, and write anonymous articles supporting Bethmann Hollweg's policies. He could be called Bethmann Hollweg's assistant for political warfare.Unlike most Germans Riezler sensed from the beginning that a German victory was not assured. On August 14, 1914, in his first diary entry after the outbreak of war, he noted that although “everybody was apparently happy to be able for once to dedicate himself unreservedly to a great cause, … no one doubts or appears to consider even for an instant what a gamble war is, especially this war.” Riezler also realized that the “ideas of 1914” would not retain their strength forever. “Just as the storm frightens the vermin out of the air—when it becomes quieter again, everything crawls out of its refuge—and emerges again in the state as well as in individual human beings.” This realization protected Riezler from the naive belief that Germany could bear a long war without an obvious effort to achieve a negotiated peace, without a new European order which at most allowed Germany indirect control, and without domestic political concessions to the German masses.


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