scholarly journals The myth of associative discrimination and the Court of Justice’s great vanishing act: part 2

2021 ◽  
Vol 72 (3) ◽  
pp. 510-541
Author(s):  
Michael Connolly

This article complements an article (part 1) recently published in this journal (72(1) NILQ 29–60) contending that the notion of associative discrimination as a term of art renders it so vulnerable to manipulation that it can be used to narrow the scope of the legislation. That argument was rooted in the UK Supreme Court’s reasoning in Lee v Ashers Bakery [2018] UKSC 49. Part 2 continues the theme, but this time to show that the vulnerability can work the other way, producing, first, an ‘extended’ notion of associative discrimination and, second, radically broad notions of direct and indirect discrimination. This limb of the thesis also argues that a case heralded as one of associative discrimination, CHEZ [2016] CMLR 14, was no such thing. It concludes that the ambitious approach of the European Court of Justice and its Advocates General will blur the traditional form-based distinction between direct and indirect discrimination.

2021 ◽  
Vol 72 (AD1) ◽  
pp. 1-32
Author(s):  
Michael Connolly

This article complements an article (part 1) recently published in this journal (72(1) NILQ 29–60) contending that the notion of associative discrimination as a term of art renders it so vulnerable to manipulation that it can be used to narrow the scope of the legislation. That argument was rooted in the UK Supreme Court’s reasoning in Lee v Ashers Bakery [2018] UKSC 49. Part 2 continues the theme, but this time to show that the vulnerability can work the other way, producing, first, an ‘extended’ notion of associative discrimination and, second, radically broad notions of direct and indirect discrimination. This limb of the thesis also argues that a case heralded as one of associative discrimination, CHEZ [2016] CMLR 14, was no such thing. It concludes that the ambitious approach of the European Court of Justice and its Advocates General will blur the traditional form-based distinction between direct and indirect discrimination.


Author(s):  
Nico van Eijk

The point of departure for this chapter is the decision of the European Court of Justice in the Digital Rights Ireland case, which annulled the European Data Retention Directive, in part because the use of retained data was not made subject to independent oversight. Next, it examines judgments from the national courts of the Netherlands and the UK, also focusing on the independent oversight issue, declaring invalid the data retention laws of those two countries. From the Digital Rights Ireland case and others, seven standards for oversight of intelligence services can be drawn: the oversight should be complete; it should encompass all stages of the intelligence cycle; it should be independent; it should take place prior to the imposition of a measure; it should be able to declare a measure unlawful and to provide redress; it should incorporate the adversary principle; and it should have sufficient resources.


2006 ◽  
Vol 78 (9) ◽  
pp. 395-412
Author(s):  
Dušan Nikolić

In the first part of the paper, the author has outlined some changes that have happened in the field of civil law during the history, and in the second part of the paper, the author has paid attention to the modern trends, produced by the process of globalization. By analyzing certain sectors, the author has come to the conclusion that ownership title and public office are being slightly shifted from state to non-state authorities. On the other hand, this trend of the global (re)privatization has contributed to the change of attitude toward the title. The owner is expected to ewoy his title both for his own and for the public benefit. One of the most recent judgments of the European Court of Justice speaks in favor of this and it has been mentioned in this paper. This judgment supports the view that the property is not absolute and that it has a social value. The special attention is paid to the so called new institutionalism and need to question the concept of separation of powers within the European Union.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1771-1790 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samo Bardutzky

In 2012 and 2013, we observed how the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was adjudicated by “EU courts, plural”: a number of high courts of the Member States (among them “Kelsenian” constitutional courts as well as representatives of a more hybrid model of judicial review of constitutionality) and the European Court of Justice (CJEU) were seized by challenges to the mechanism. What attracted attention was the fact that only one court, the Supreme Court of Ireland, decided to submit a preliminary reference to the CJEU, while the other courts, as would appear from their judgments, did not even consider the option. This was a suboptimal example of judicial dialogue in the case of ESM adjudication.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 118-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans van Meerten ◽  
Elmar Schmidt

Mandatory pension participation in the Netherlands is currently under review. This article examines the manner in which the system of mandatory participation in sectoral pension funds is presently organised as well as future proposals from the perspective of the freedom to provide services. It also briefly reviews mandatory participation in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France and Sweden and asks whether it constitutes a barrier to the freedom enshrined in Article 56 TFEU. Restrictions of this freedom in the field of mandatory participation are too easily excused in the Netherlands by pointing to decisions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in which it judged the system to be permissible. These decisions, however, were made from the perspective of competition law, and not on the basis of Article 56 TFEU. Grounds for justifying restrictions to this freedom exist, although different justifications are available for direct and indirect discrimination. The article questions how mandatory participation in the Member States considered in this article fare from this perspective?


EU Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 303-352
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter discusses the doctrine of supremacy of EU law, which was developed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) based on its conception of the ‘new legal order’. The ECJ ruled that the aim of creating a uniform common market between different states would be undermined if EU law could be made subordinate to national law of the various states. The validity of EU law can therefore, according to the ECJ, never be assessed by reference to national law. National courts are required to give immediate effect to EU law, of whatever rank, in cases that arise before them, and to ignore or to set aside any national law, of whatever rank, which could impede the application of EU law. Thus, according to the ECJ, any norm of EU law takes precedence over any provision of national law, including the national constitutions. This broad assertion of the supremacy of EU law has not however been accepted without qualification by national courts, and the chapter examines the nature of the qualifications that have been imposed by some national courts. The UK version contains a further section analysing the relevance of the supremacy of EU law in relation to the UK post-Brexit.


1999 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 399-412 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Barnard ◽  
Bob Hepple

THE preliminary ruling by the European Court of Justice in the Seymour-Smith and Perez case about the scope and meaning of indirect discrimination has done little to clarify this perplexing concept. The ruling does not tell the thousands of short-service employees whose claims were stayed pending the litigation whether the qualifying period of two years’ continuous service for the right not to be unfairly dismissed is contrary to Community law. Nor does it provide clear standards by which disparate impact is to be tested, nor the relevant time for assessing the legality of an allegedly discriminatory measure, nor the conditions for establishing objective justification. More generally, these proceedings under Article 177 (now Article 234) of the EC Treaty reveal a failure by the Court to perform its function of facilitating the national court in interpreting and applying Community equality law in a way which would be consistent and uniform throughout the Union.


2001 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 705
Author(s):  
Christopher D Bougen

There has been much debate in the United Kingdom over the last decade on whether the discretionary doctrine of forum non conveniens is compatible with the mandatory provisions of the Brussels Convention on jurisdiction issues in the European Union.  A recent decision of the European Court of Justice has answered affirmatively the question of whether a plaintiff domiciled in a non-Contracting State can invoke the rules of the Covention.  The Court has arguably not settled the more fundamental question of whether the Convention applies to conflicts of jurisdiction between courts of a Contracting State and non-Contracting State.  However, there is evidence of a growing acceptance of an expansive view of the scope of the Convention.  Such a development would bring welcome simplicity to cross-border litigation in the UK. 


1992 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 308-348
Author(s):  
Carl Emery

Defendants to criminal or civil proceedings will often seek to escape liability by showing that a public authority has acted ultra vires. For example, a person prosecuted for infringing a byelaw or breaking a licence condition may seek to advance the defence that the byelaw or condition is ultra vires the public authority which made or imposed it. Again, a person sued in debt by a public authority may seek to raise the defence that no money is due because the authority acted ultra vires in imposing the charge which it is now suing to recover. Nowadays, too, the European Court of Justice may hold in effect that an Act of Parliament is contrary to Community law and so should not be applied by UK courts. A person prosecuted, say in a magistrates' court, for a criminal offence created by a statute which is or may be contrary to Community law may seek to persuade the justices to “disapply” the statute—virtually, in the case of a post-Accession statute, to treat it as ultra vires the UK Parliament—and so to acquit him.


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