Understanding Anti-Americanism in Central Asia

Author(s):  
Edward Schatz

This essay examines post-Soviet Central Asia and suggests that it is an example that belies typical depictions of the Muslim world. It shows that anti-Americanism is not inherent to the region, to the people that inhabit it, or to the belief systems they claim. It also argues that Central Asians are not simply reacting to U.S. policies. The reality of emergent (and still fairly limited) anti-Americanism is more complex and hinges on the particular meanings that Central Asians in the 1990s came to ascribe to the United States as a symbol. More than a focus on U.S. policies or a focus on the properties of a faith system, a focus on the United States as an ambiguous and changeable symbol provides analytic leverage as we seek to understand anti-Americanism in Central Asia.

Author(s):  
Sven Beckert

This chapter begins by discussing the concept transnational labor history and the challenge it poses to labor historians. It then examines the worldwide crisis of cotton production touched off by the American Civil War, emancipation, and the subsequent frantic search for alternatives, including coolie and sharecropping labor systems. It shows that despite the variety of labor regimes, cotton cultivators everywhere faced essentially similar challenges of labor in the global age: market fluctuations, state coercion, inescapable debt and contract regimes, and political marginalization. These were the people who would grow ever-larger amounts of cotton, from India to Central Asia, from Egypt to the United States, and the new labor regimes in which they found themselves symbolized one of the most significant changes of the nineteenth century.


2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 29-38
Author(s):  
Abid Ullah Jan

The Debate Question 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics? AUJ: The promotion of “moderate” Muslims is part of an extremist tendency sweeping the United States, unlike the situation in the Muslim world. It is the result of a war between two Americas: the America of ideals (e.g., of equality and justice) and the America of extremism, which has succumbed to self-interest groups and individuals. For the America of ideals, the Tariq Ramadan episode is a dark spot, one among many such episodes in recent times. Periodic episodes of tragedy are the hallmark of the America that has shifted its priorities under the pressure and manipulation of the extremists. These forces use all expedient means to sacrifice the wellbeing of the United States for self-interest and promotion of the Zionist state. This extremism entails a morbid dread of Islam. It never regards any Muslim as moderate unless one publicly rejects the Qur’an as “the final manifesto of God,”1 considering this belief a “disturbing cornerstone of Islam,”2 and submitting to the rejection of key parts of the Qur’an.3 Unquestioning support for Israel, along with all other American-approved dictatorships, is the minimum criterion.4 All other factors are irrelevant. The fascistic American track record of accepting “moderates” and rejecting “radicals” is clear.5 The final distinction is not defined by their adherence to Islam, but by the assumed threat they pose to the interests of these extremists. For example, a devout man, fervent in all of his personal rituals but not participating in political affairs, would be a “moderate,” whereas a marginally practicing Muslim with the zeal to voice his opposition to the injustice perpetrated by the extremists’America is classified as a “radical.” In the current political context, a moderate is one who is passive like the devout man, or active like the extremist “moderates” – the Muslim neomods – who openly promote the extremist agenda using Islamic interpretations or “Project Ijthihad”6 as a cover. Hence, the distinction is not academic or religious, but political. Two opposing factors prove this point. First, there are clear commands for Muslims to be moderate by default.7 Moderateness is a prerequisite for all Muslims, not a label of identity for some. Accordingly, Muslims cannot be part-time or partial Muslims (Qur’an 2:208) or reject part of the Qur’an (Qur’an 2:85).8 Hence, such religious labelling is irrelevant. Second, the extremists insist that strong belief in the totality of the Qur’an makes Muslims “Islamists.”9 That is why they believe themselves to be “absolutely at war with the vision of life that is prescribed to all Muslims in the Koran.”10 It means that the standards of “moderateness,” as set by the American extremists, are directed at neutralizing a preconceived threat. Under these circumstances, mere claims of being a “moderate” do not make any difference at all, as long as a Muslim is presented as a threat, however baseless, to the interests of extremist America. Similarly, the so-called extremism in the Muslim world is not the result of Muslims’faith. Rather, it is a function of the perpetually colonized and oppressed people due to the lack of true independence and a central authority to control and productively channel their energies. It is naïve to suggest that a few ill-informed “moderate” individuals or puppet regimes can emulate the abilities of an entire central authority (i.e., the Islamic state) and effect progress and positive meaningful change.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Holslag

The chapter argues that India has a strong interest to balance China and that the two Asian giants will not be able grow together without conflict. However, India will not be able to balance China’s rise. The chapter argues that India remains stuck between nonalignment and nonperformance. On the one hand, it resists the prospect of a new coalition that balances China from the maritime fringes of Eurasia, especially if that coalition is led by the United States. On the other hand, it has failed to strengthen its own capabilities. Its military power lags behind China’s, its efforts to reach out to both East and Central Asia have ended in disappointment, and its economic reforms have gone nowhere. As a result of that economic underachievement, India finds itself also torn between emotional nationalism and paralyzing political fragmentation, which, in turn, will further complicate its role as a regional power.


Author(s):  
Takis S. Pappas

Based on an original definition of modern populism as “democratic illiberalism” and many years of meticulous research, Takis Pappas marshals extraordinary empirical evidence from Argentina, Greece, Peru, Italy, Venezuela, Ecuador, Hungary, the United States, Spain, and Brazil to develop a comprehensive theory about populism. He addresses all key issues in the debate about populism and answers significant questions of great relevance for today’s liberal democracy, including: • What is modern populism and how can it be differentiated from comparable phenomena like nativism and autocracy? • Where in Latin America has populism become most successful? Where in Europe did it emerge first? Why did its rise to power in the United States come so late? • Is Trump a populist and, if so, could he be compared best with Venezuela’s Chávez, France’s Le Pens, or Turkey’s Erdoğan? • Why has populism thrived in post-authoritarian Greece but not in Spain? And why in Argentina and not in Brazil? • Can populism ever succeed without a charismatic leader? If not, what does leadership tell us about how to challenge populism? • Who are “the people” who vote for populist parties, how are these “made” into a group, and what is in their minds? • Is there a “populist blueprint” that all populists use when in power? And what are the long-term consequences of populist rule? • What does the expansion, and possibly solidification, of populism mean for the very nature and future of contemporary democracy? Populism and Liberal Democracy will change the ways the reader understands populism and imagines the prospects of liberal democracy.


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