A Postmodern Hetoimasia—Feigning Sovereignty during the State of Exception

Author(s):  
Marinos Diamantides

Inspired by images from Greece during its sovereign debt crisis—including of a dog that ended up on the Hellenic President’s throne!—this chapter both illustrates Agamben’s notion of a Christian economic-political theology, for which the sovereign’s glory is never affected by his impotence, and nuances it as specifically occidental. Contrasting it with the earlier, embarrassingly incoherent political theology during the era of Byzantine “game of thrones”—when no reasons were offered for why a religion that claimed to be a fraternity of equals was in bed with a coercive state—the chapter shows how the anomie of oikonomia has been repressed in the Occidental constitutional imagination that obsesses over the so-called paradox of constituent/constituted sovereign power. The chapter further speculates on how this repressed sense of embarrassment can be recuperated together with an ethical sense of responsibility.

2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 3255-3260
Author(s):  
Stelian Stancu ◽  
Alexandra Maria Constantin

Instilment, on a European level, of a state incompatible with the state of stability on a macroeconomic level and in the financial-banking system lead to continuous growth of vulnerability of European economies, situated at the verge of an outburst of sovereign debt crises. In this context, the current papers main objective is to produce a study regarding the vulnerability of European economies faced with potential outburst of sovereign debt crisis, which implies quantitative analysis of the impact of sovereign debt on the sensitivity of the European Unions economies. The paper also entails the following specific objectives: completing an introduction in the current European economic context, conceptualization of the notion of “sovereign debt crisis, presenting the methodology and obtained empirical results, as well as exposition of the conclusions.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Altddrfer ◽  
Carlos A. De las Salas ◽  
Andre Guettler ◽  
Gunter LLffler

Author(s):  
Nauro F. Campos ◽  
Paul De Grauwe ◽  
Yuemei Ji

Structural reform policies move like the business cycle. There are moments when these are implemented with great fervour and others when they are put on the back burner or even dismantled. After the global financial crisis, and in particular the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, many countries were forced by creditor countries or were self-imposed to apply deep reforms to their product markets and especially to their labour markets. Now that Europe is recovering, the pressure to implement structural reforms has abated....


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Nicoletta Layher ◽  
Eyden Samunderu

This paper conducts an empirical study on the inclusion of uniform European Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bond contracts issued from member states of the European Union, introduced as a regulatory result of the European sovereign debt crisis. The study focuses on the reaction of sovereign bond yields from European Union member states with the inclusion of the new regulation in the European Union. A two-stage least squares regression analysis is adopted in order to determine the extent of impact effects of CACs on member states sovereign bond yields. Evidence is found that CACs in the European Union are priced on financial markets and that sovereign bond yields do respond to the inclusion of uniform CACs in the European Union.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhiyong An

Abstract Eurobonds, dubbed as Coronabonds in the context of the current coronavirus crisis, are being hotly debated among the euro area member states amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The debate is in many ways a retread of the euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2011–2012. As China’s “debt centralization/decentralization” experience is comparable with the introduction of Eurobonds in the European Union (EU) in terms of institutional mechanism design, we review our previous series of studies of China’s “debt centralization/decentralization” experience to shed some light on the Eurobonds debate. We obtain three key lessons. First, the introduction of Eurobonds in EU is likely to soften the budget constraint of the governments of the euro area member states. Second, it is also likely to strengthen the moral hazard incentives of the governments of the euro area member states to intentionally overstate their budget problems. Finally, the magnitudes of the moral hazard effects generated by the introduction of Eurobonds in EU are likely larger than their respective counterparts in China.


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