scholarly journals Political Connection and the Demand for Industry Specialist Auditors

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Zheng Brooks
2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 30
Author(s):  
Dwikky Darmawan ◽  
Weny Putri

The purpose of this study is to determine the effects of political connection toward the earnings management of service sector companies with control variables firm size and audit quality. Firm�s political connection measured by using dummy variable. Earnings management is proxied by discretionary accrual which is measured by using Modified Jones Model. The research data applied in this study are the secondary data which are taken from the annual reports of service sector companies that listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange of 2016-2017 periods. There are 330 observations fit as sample, which are taken by using purposive sampling method. Data are processed by applying the multiple linear regression test. The result show that the political connection had positive but not significant influence to earnings management. Firm size had negative but not significant influence to earnings management. Whereas the audit quality had a negative and significant influence to earnings management.


2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fei Kang

SYNOPSIS This study examines how family firms' unique ownership structure and agency problems affect their selection of industry-specialist auditors. Using data from Standard & Poor's (S&P) 1500 firms, the results show that family firms are more likely to appoint industry-specialist auditors than non-family firms, which suggests that family firms have strong incentives to signal the quality of financial reporting. Additional analysis indicates that due to the potential entrenchment problems, family firms with family member CEOs or with dual-class shares have even a higher tendency to hire industry-specialist auditors to signal their disclosure quality.


2014 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeong-Bon Kim ◽  
Jay Junghun Lee ◽  
Jong Chool Park

SUMMARY This study investigates the monitoring role of high-quality auditors defined as office-level industry specialists in the stock market valuation of cash assets. We find that the market value of cash holdings is significantly higher for the client of an industry specialist auditor. The marginal value of cash is 34 cents higher for the client of a joint-industry specialist at both the national and city levels than for the client of a nonspecialist. We also find that cash holdings are more closely associated with capital investment and the market value of capital investment is significantly higher when the auditor is a joint-industry specialist. Moreover, we find that the value of cash increases significantly when the client changes its auditor to a joint-industry specialist. Our findings hold even after controlling for the client's governance efficacy and financial reporting quality. Our results provide new insight into the mechanism through which high-quality audits affect firm value: External audits facilitate shareholders' monitoring over managerial cash expenditures, thereby leading market participants to attach a higher value to cash holdings.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Malek Hamed Alshirah ◽  
Ahmad Farhan Alshira’h ◽  
Abdalwali Lutfi

Purpose This study aims to empirically examine whether the political connection is related to risk disclosure practices. The study also seeks to contribute to the existent risk disclosure literature by investigating the moderator effect of family ownership on this relationship. Design/methodology/approach The content analysis approach was used to collect data and determine the level of risk disclosure over the non-financial Jordanian firms listed on 1Amman Stock Exchange. The sample of this study contains 376 annual reports over four years from 2014 to 2017. It used the random effect regressions to examine the hypothesis of the study. Findings The results show that politically connected companies disclose less risk information than the unconnected ones in Jordan. The results also refer that family ownership contributes in mitigating the negative effect of the political connection on the level of corporate risk. Practical implications The results have implications for regulatory institutions such as the Jordan Securities Commission to take the negative effect of political connection in their consideration and impose further regulations to monitor this board’s attribute and control politicians’ domination on the board decisions. Originality/value The current study also contributes to the body of literature by investigating the effects of the political connections on the level of risk disclosure in the financial reports. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the current study is the first to examine the effect of the political connection on the risk disclosure practices. Moreover, the study is among the first studies that examine the moderating role of family ownership on such relationship.


Author(s):  
Bing Wang ◽  
Yuedong Li ◽  
Yihan Wang ◽  
Wenshuang Xuan

Author(s):  
Mohamed Ali Azouzi

The objective of this study was to describe the effect of CEO political connection and firm social responsibility on debt access. These constructions have been evaluated in Tunisian firms. The results showed the presence of a positive relationship between political connection, corporate social responsibility, and the debt level. The authors also verified the presence of a negative relationship between political connection and the social responsibility of Tunisian companies. This research has shown how political connection and social responsibility improve the image of the company and facilitate their access to external funding methods. Tunisian companies are advised to know the importance of political connection and social responsibility in the selection of their leaders.


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