When and why do we value dishonesty? Moral conflicts of Honesty, Cooperation, and Loyalty

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 11975
Author(s):  
Einav Hart ◽  
Sarah Jensen ◽  
Shaked Shuster ◽  
Michael Slepian
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (Supplement_2) ◽  
Author(s):  
João Gentil

Abstract Background In 2019, WHO classified vaccine hesitancy as one of the top 10 threats to global health. Vaccination is an area of excellence in nursing that has gained a new focus and has become a challenge in the provision of care and in the management field. Vaccine hesitation raises questions about mandatory vaccination, individual versus collective freedom that are highlighted in the current context due to the emergence of new vaccines. In this paper, we want to analyze and update knowledge about vaccines hesitancy from an ethical and bioethical perspective. Methods A combination of literature reviews on vaccine refusal/hesitancy, ethics and COVID-19 vaccine confidence, accessed on SciELO and PubMed databases and analysis of documents from General Directorate of Health and Ordem dos Enfermeiros (National Nurses Association). Results Vaccination programs aim is a collective protection. The desirable effects at individual level do not have the same ethical value at collective level, leading to cost-benefit imbalances. Moral conflicts between the individual and the collective, cost-benefit imbalances and the insufficiency of bioethics principles, lead us to the use of other moral values and principles, such as responsibility, solidarity and social justice, as a tool for ethical reflection problems related to COVID-19 vaccines. Conclusions There are no perfect solutions to ethical dilemmas and some optimal solutions could depend the context. In a pandemic situation, one of the most relevant ethical issues is the herd immunity since it leaves public health at risk. Equity and the principle of justice in vaccination campaign are shown daily in the nursing profession.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Jimenez-Leal ◽  
Samuel Murray ◽  
Santiago Amaya ◽  
Sergio Barbosa

We argue that people regularly encounter situations characterized by the presence of moral conflicts among permissible options. These scenarios, which some have called morally charged situations, reflect perceived tensions between moral expectations and moral rights. Studying responses to such situations marks a departure from the common emphasis on sacrificial dilemmas and widespread use of single-dimension measures. In 6 experiments (n=1607), we show that people use a wide conceptual arsenal when assessing actions that can be described as suberogatory (bad but permissible) or supererogatory (good but not required). In Experiment 1 we find that people freely describe actions as suberogatory or supererogatory. Experiment 2 shows that they differentially assess these actions in terms of how permissible, optional, and good they considered them. Experiment 3 tests the use of these evaluative dimensions with sacrificial dilemmas. We found that differences between these categories did not emerge when people respond to dilemmas, even when controlling for trait utilitarian tendencies. By including judgments of blameworthiness and sanction, Experiments 4 and 5 provided additional evidence of the richness sub/super erogatory evaluations. In Experiment 6 people offered their own explanations of their responses. Qualitative analyses revealed that they frequently appeal to character traits, the presence of rights, and the absence of explicit duties. Taken together these results suggest a richer spectrum of both situations and concepts relevant to characterize moral judgment than moral psychologists up to this point have generally recognized. (First three authors contributed equally)


2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monika Sommer ◽  
Christoph Rothmayr ◽  
Katrin Döhnel ◽  
Jörg Meinhardt ◽  
Johannes Schwerdtner ◽  
...  
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Author(s):  
Allyn Fives

Are parents caretakers or liberators? Is the role of parents to act in a paternalistic fashion so as to take care of their children or is it instead to set their children free? In this chapter, I argue that those who defend the caretaker thesis do so on the basis of assumptions characteristic of the liberal view on paternalism. It is assumed that paternalism entails interfering with another’s liberty, that it does not involve moral conflicts, and that it is justified treatment of those who lack the qualities of an agent. In addition, no clear distinction is made between children who lack the qualities of an agent and children who are merely incompetent. What is more, the same assumptions underlie the liberation thesis. Indeed, both the caretaker thesis and the liberation thesis are questionable because they operate with a definition of paternalism that is highly problematic. I also want to make one further argument here. Namely, even an adequate conceptualisation of paternalism is insufficient as a general account of parental power, as there are non-paternalistic forms of parental power as well.


Author(s):  
J.E. Tiles

Two components of the pragmatist outlook shape its ethical philosophy. It rejects certainty as a legitimate intellectual goal; this generates a nondogmatic attitude to moral precepts and principles. It holds, secondly, that thought (even that exercised in scientific inquiry) is essentially goal-directed in a way that makes the refinement of the control we exercise over how we act (for example, in drawing conclusions) integral to achieving any cognitive goal such as that of truth. This makes it possible to treat scientific inquiry as a model of how we might respond to moral problems and the reasonableness and impartiality required of a scientific inquirer as a paradigm of what may be expected in reaching moral judgments. This view of the nature of thought also inclines pragmatists to assess proposed solutions to moral conflicts in terms of consequences. But although human desires are taken as the raw material with which moral thinking must deal, it is not assumed that people’s desires (what they take pleasure in) are fixed and can be used as a standard by which to assess consequences. Pragmatism is thus free to revert to a classical mode of thought (such as Aristotelianism) in which claims about human nature function as norms – a use which is made, for example, of the claim that humans are essentially social creatures.


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